A Stackelberg game-theoretic approach to optimal real-time pricing for the smart grid

2013 ◽  
Vol 17 (12) ◽  
pp. 2365-2380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fan-Lin Meng ◽  
Xiao-Jun Zeng
Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (22) ◽  
pp. 6138
Author(s):  
Ri Piao ◽  
Deok-Joo Lee ◽  
Taegu Kim

Unbalanced power demand across time slots causes overload in a specific time zone. Various studies have proved that this can be mitigated through smart grid and price policy, but research on time preference is insufficient. This study proposed a real-time pricing model on a smart grid through a two-stage Stackelberg game model based on a utility function that reflects the user’s time preference. In the first step, the suppliers determine the profit-maximizing price, and then, the users decide the electricity usage schedule according to the given price. Nash equilibrium and comparative analysis of the proposed game explain the relationship between time preference, price, and usage. Additionally, a Monte Carlo simulation demonstrated the effect of the change in time preference distribution. The experimental results confirmed that the proposed real-time pricing method lowers peak-to-average ratio (PAR) and increases overall social welfare. This study is meaningful in that it presents a pricing method that considers both users’ and suppliers’ strategies with time preference. It is expected that the proposed method would contribute to a reduction in the need for additional power generation facilities through efficient operation of the smart grid.


2017 ◽  
Vol 260 ◽  
pp. 149-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yeming Dai ◽  
Yan Gao ◽  
Hongwei Gao ◽  
Hongbo Zhu

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 2232-2244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shibo Chen ◽  
Zhenwei Guo ◽  
Zaiyue Yang ◽  
Yunjian Xu ◽  
Roger S. Cheng

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (17) ◽  
pp. 7174
Author(s):  
Xiaoxiao Chang ◽  
Guangye Xu ◽  
Qian Wang ◽  
Yongguang Zhong

This paper mainly aims at investigating the governments’ take-back policy of penalty or subsidy that motivates eco-design or remanufacturing. For this purpose, we consider a two-stage Stackelberg game between a government and a manufacturer. The government first decides to impose a take-back penalty or offer a take-back subsidy, and then the manufacturer selects to remanufacture or invest in eco-design as a response to the take-back policy. Upon analyzing and comparing game equilibrium, we find that the government prefers to offer a subsidy policy for eco-design and to impose a penalty policy for remanufacturing. The manufacturer will decide on investing in eco-design when the monetary value of the environmental impact of landfill and eco-design coefficient is medium. However, if the eco-design coefficient is high, the manufacturer practices remanufacturing instead of eco-design whether penalized and subsidized. The present study provides a set of guidelines in practical managerial recommendations for governments and manufacturers.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 1439-1450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yunpeng Wang ◽  
Walid Saad ◽  
Zhu Han ◽  
H. Vincent Poor ◽  
Tamer Basar

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document