scholarly journals The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in Uganda: The Case of Private Companies

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lwanga ◽  
Doreen Basemera

This paper examines the effectiveness of rules, procedures and Acts as instruments of corporate governance in Uganda, with interest in the performance of private companies. An extensive review of literature and ethnographic observation of the dynamic of corporate governance in private companies indicate that much as the private companies have adopted a hybrid regulatory framework of corporate governance, loopholes do still exist that have hindered the effectiveness  of these instrument in the performance of private companies. Therefore there is need for strengthening corporate governance systems; however some of the weakness are attributed to the unsolved debate on key issues of corporate governance globally that trickles down to Uganda’s young corporate governance system in the private sector.

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nuno Moutinho ◽  
Carlos Francisco Alves ◽  
Francisco Martins

Purpose This study aims to analyse the effect of borrower’s countries on syndicated loan spreads, featuring countries according to institutional factors, namely, financial systems and corporate governance systems. Design/methodology/approach This study is an empirical investigation based on a unique sample of more than 85,000 syndicated loans from 122 countries. The paper uses standard and two-stage least squares regression analysis to test whether the types of financial and corporate governance systems affect loan spreads. Findings The paper finds that borrowers from countries with financial systems oriented towards the banking-based paradigm pay lower interest rate spreads than those from countries with financial systems oriented towards the market-based paradigm. In addition, there is evidence that borrowers from countries with more developed financial systems pay lower spreads. The results also show that borrowers from countries with an Anglo-Saxon governance system pay higher spreads than borrowers from countries with a Continental governance system. Research limitations/implications This study does not consider potential promiscuous relationships that can arise at the ownership structure and governance level between banks and borrowers and may affect loan spreads. Practical implications This study suggests that financial and corporate governance systems are essential factors in the financial intermediation process. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that corporates with higher potential agency costs and higher potential information asymmetry are requested to pay higher spreads. Therefore, the opportunities to such corporates invest optimally tend to be scarcer. Originality/value The paper highlights the impact of institutional factors on the cost of financing, characterising the countries according to the type of financial system and the type of corporate governance system. The study finds that borrowers from countries with bank-based financial systems pay lower interest rate spreads than those from countries with market-based financial systems. The paper also highlights how the level of financial development affects the cost of financing. The paper focusses on non-financial firms, unlike financial firms, which have been the focus of several empirical studies on topics relating to the cost of funding and corporate governance.


ORDO ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elmar Gerum ◽  
Sascha H. Mölls

ZusammenfassungDas Ziel des Beitrages ist es zu prüfen, ob und inwieweit sich das deutsche Corporate Governance-System, insbesondere die Unternehmensfinanzierung, im Zuge des Systemwettbewerbs an internationale Standards angeglichen hat. Dazu wird das deutsche System zunächst im Kontext alternativer Corporate Governance-Systeme verortet. Danach werden empirische Befunde zur Struktur der Unternehmensfinanzierung sowie flankierender Institutionen in deutschen Großunternehmen präsentiert und erklärt. Es zeigt sich, dass heute eine effiziente Mischfinanzierung typisch ist, die die traditionellen Vorteile einer Bankenfinanzierung mit den Möglichkeiten des Kapitalmarkts kombiniert. Im Lichte der Befunde empfiehlt sich eine Neuorientierung von Forschung und Politik zu Corporate Governance.


2007 ◽  
Vol 28 (10) ◽  
pp. 1461-1481 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Tylecote

Firms are central actors in innovation, and their actions are much affected by their corporate governance and the finance available. Thus a country's finance and corporate governance system is a key element of its national system of innovation. The technological regimes of sectors (and sub-sectors) vary in ways that affect the demands innovation makes on the financial and corporate governance system. Finance and corporate governance systems (FCGSs) vary among countries in their ability to meet these demands. By setting three dimensions of regime variation alongside the three corresponding dimensions of FCGS variation, patterns of relative and absolute technological advantage among economies can be largely explained — particularly when the focus is on nationality of firm rather than location of activity.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 40-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandra Damijan ◽  
Jože P. Damijan

Because of deploying specific methods of privatization that favoured domestic over foreign owners and that enabled both internal owners and state-controlled funds to gain control over companies, corporate governance in Slovenia used to be a cumbersome issue over the last two decades. This led to an on-going battle for control over companies. On one side, in addition to management buy-outs, internal owners used peculiar methods, such as “shares parking” at related companies to gain control over companies of interest without having to engage in a takeover procedure. On the other side, the government used its state-controlled funds to gain control over strategic companies in specific sectors, such as finance, energy, transport and telecommunications. Combined with direct holdings of assets by the state, this gave the existing political coalition in power a mechanism to exert control over a large number of companies and to interfere with the management of privatized firms through an adverse selection of candidates for supervisory boards and board of directors. The victims of these unsound corporate governance practices were usually small shareholders and suboptimal performance of companies. For a private sector, the “game-changer” was a financial crisis that deprived many management-owned companies of control over the companies, while government involved in some changes in the regulatory framework to fight peculiar corporate governance practices. However, while Slovenia has gradually established a modern framework for a transparent corporate governance system, regulating listed and non-listed private companies as well as SOEs, the practices deployed by the parties are still far from transparent, adequate and professional.


2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 399-407
Author(s):  
Anna Blajer-Gołębiewska ◽  
Leszek Czerwonka

The optimal corporate governance system aims to give shareholders confidence that a company is managed efficiently, to create the highest possible profit and to preserve a firm’s reputation. The aim of the research is to find out if the lower level of information asymmetry in corporate governance systems in the Polish listed companies implies higher rates of return for shareholders in the future. We put forward a hypothesis that the impact of lower information asymmetry on company’s performance is overestimated and in reality no long-run effect on the higher abnormal returns occurs. Taking into consideration the initial level of propensity to share information index we analysed future buy-and-hold abnormal returns achieved by 61 companies during the next 3 years.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 421-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Banu Durukan ◽  
Serdar Ozkan ◽  
Fatih Dalkilic

This study investigates CEO turnover and corporate performance relationship as a measure of the effectiveness of a corporate governance system. The impact of different financial accounting regimes on the turnover/performance relationship is also analyzed. If systems replace poorly performing managers, they are considered as not ineffective. The results provide evidence that corporate governance systems with poor governance characteristics may not be ineffective, due to the existence of alternative governance mechanisms. The disciplinary CEO turnover is found to be more strongly associated with corporate performance compared to voluntary CEO turnover, whereas in the IFRS subsample the relationship is stronger with contemporaneous performance measures.


Author(s):  
Corinna Ewelt-Knauer ◽  
Anja Schwering ◽  
Sandra Winkelmann

Ein funktionsfähiges Corporate-Governance-System ist insbesondere für Sparkassen von zentraler Bedeutung, weil bei der Erfüllung des öffentlichen Auftrags eine Vielzahl divergierender Stakeholderinteressen zu berücksichtigen ist. Um das Handeln der Sparkassenvorstände im Sinne der Stakeholder zu lenken, werden von den regionalen Sparkassenverbänden in NRW Empfehlungen erlassen, die die Höhe und Struktur der Vergütung bestimmen. Vorliegend wird ein Überblick über das Corporate-Governance-System der Sparkassen gegeben und analysiert, ob und inwieweit die in der Vergütung gesetzten Anreize mit den Zielen des Corporate- Governance-Systems übereinstimmen und wie diese verbessert werden können.


2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 10-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Udo C Braendle ◽  
Juergen Noll

Since October 2004 the idea of a European Company, the Societas Europaea, has become reality and companies are allowed to incorporate in this legal form. Concerning corporate governance the Statute allows the companies to choose between a two-tier organisational structure typical for Civil Law countries and a one-tier organisational structure which is predominant in Anglo-Saxon Common Law countries. By analysing the regulations of Austria and the United Kingdom for the two board systems to elaborate the respective advantages and pitfalls, we find a strong evolution of the systems towards each other. As the board system is an integral component of a corporate governance system, the Societas Europaea highlights a major step towards convergence of these systems


2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 280-300
Author(s):  
Corinna Ewelt-Knauer ◽  
Anja Schwering ◽  
Sandra Winkelmann

Da Sparkassen einen öffentlichen Auftrag erfüllen müssen, der ihr Bestehen gesetzlich legitimiert, zeichnet sich ihr Corporate-Governance-System durch Besonderheiten aus. Diese Besonderheiten wirken sich nicht nur auf die Vorstandstätigkeit, sondern auch auf die Tätigkeit der Kontrollorgane aus, welche eine nachhaltige Erfüllung des öffentlichen Auftrags prüfen und gewährleisten sollen. Nach einer Vorstellung des Corporate-Governance-Systems beschäftigt sich der Beitrag daher mit der Frage, ob und wie allgemeine Herausforderungen, die durch das System bedingt sind, sowie besondere Herausforderungen, die sich aus der langanhaltenden Niedrigzinspolitik ergeben, die Effektivität der Kontrollen beeinflussen.


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