scholarly journals Corporate governance in Slovenia: Working at last?

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 40-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandra Damijan ◽  
Jože P. Damijan

Because of deploying specific methods of privatization that favoured domestic over foreign owners and that enabled both internal owners and state-controlled funds to gain control over companies, corporate governance in Slovenia used to be a cumbersome issue over the last two decades. This led to an on-going battle for control over companies. On one side, in addition to management buy-outs, internal owners used peculiar methods, such as “shares parking” at related companies to gain control over companies of interest without having to engage in a takeover procedure. On the other side, the government used its state-controlled funds to gain control over strategic companies in specific sectors, such as finance, energy, transport and telecommunications. Combined with direct holdings of assets by the state, this gave the existing political coalition in power a mechanism to exert control over a large number of companies and to interfere with the management of privatized firms through an adverse selection of candidates for supervisory boards and board of directors. The victims of these unsound corporate governance practices were usually small shareholders and suboptimal performance of companies. For a private sector, the “game-changer” was a financial crisis that deprived many management-owned companies of control over the companies, while government involved in some changes in the regulatory framework to fight peculiar corporate governance practices. However, while Slovenia has gradually established a modern framework for a transparent corporate governance system, regulating listed and non-listed private companies as well as SOEs, the practices deployed by the parties are still far from transparent, adequate and professional.

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
pp. 207-212
Author(s):  
Saxhide Mustafa ◽  
Hajdin Berisha ◽  
Shyqyri Llaci

Abstract An effective corporate governance system is established to ensure proper balance of long-term interests of different stakeholders (primarily: owners, employees and management) and improve company's performance and its competitive position in the market. This paper provides a theoretical discussion and empirical evidence on the interdependence between corporate governance and company performance among medium and large enterprises in Kosovo. A questionnaire survey was employed for data collection purposes. The study included a sample of 87 managers from 87 medium and large enterprises. Results indicate that effects of corporate governance on the performance tend to be greater in larger companies. Regarding the determinants, the theoretical expectations are confirmed. Results confirm that the size of the company, the level of investment, export activities and company life expectancy are statistically significant determinants of the adoption of corporate governance practices. As a result, larger companies with large scales of investment and longer market experience tend to adopt more corporate governance practices. The study suggests that corporate governance will inevitably affect companies’ performance and further research is needed in this context.


2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-348
Author(s):  
Miroslav Mateev

This paper examines the corporate governance problem in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and the major implications of highly concentrated ownership in these countries on their economic development. Our main message is that ownership and control in transition economies will remain highly concentrated in short-term aspect, and regulatory intervention should focus on protecting minority shareholder interests while maintaining the incentives for entrepreneurship and large shareholder monitoring. We also argue that the corporate governance system in transition economies will have to rely on active involvement and monitoring by large shareholders, even after the emergence of a class of professional managers. Moreover, our empirical results support Berglöf and Pajuste (2003) findings that controlling shareholders (strategic investors) are critical to the successful restructuring of privatized firms; minority protection is also important to attract outside capital, but it may reduce the disciplinary role of the market for corporate control


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lwanga ◽  
Doreen Basemera

This paper examines the effectiveness of rules, procedures and Acts as instruments of corporate governance in Uganda, with interest in the performance of private companies. An extensive review of literature and ethnographic observation of the dynamic of corporate governance in private companies indicate that much as the private companies have adopted a hybrid regulatory framework of corporate governance, loopholes do still exist that have hindered the effectiveness  of these instrument in the performance of private companies. Therefore there is need for strengthening corporate governance systems; however some of the weakness are attributed to the unsolved debate on key issues of corporate governance globally that trickles down to Uganda’s young corporate governance system in the private sector.


2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 283-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Adegbite ◽  
Philip Shrives ◽  
Timothy Nichol

Incessant corporate failures have led to increasing governmental participation in the governance of the modern corporation. In this conceptual paper, we examine and propose that the role of government in the UK corporate governance system is four fold, namely: to enhance competitive advantage; to compensate for the failure of self-regulation; to prevent corporate scandals and restore investors’ confidence; and owing to significant public pressures and associated political undertones, to suggest to the public the government is still an effective overseer in the existing prominence of self-regulation. We contribute to the literature on corporate governance, politics, policy making and regulatory institutions, whilst raising important issues that are of practice and policy relevance.


2020 ◽  
pp. 088832542095348
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Szarzec ◽  
Bartosz Totleben ◽  
Dawid Piątek

This article discusses political state capture in the context of party patronage. Evidence of this is delivered from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the rotations of members of their management and supervisory boards. In this case, it is deemed that an interest group, which consists of politicians and representatives in the government administration, decides about the appointment and dismissal of board members through the corporate governance of SOEs and ownership policy of the state. We analyzed the scale and intensity of rotations in Poland of about twelve thousand joint-stock companies in the years 2001–2017 according to their ownership structure. We show that changes of managers and supervisory board members in state-owned enterprises are higher than in private companies and are related to political elections. We estimated that on average three months after a new government is formed, a peak of changes in the composition of boards is observed, though they are earlier in the case of a supervisory board. We conclude that this can be regarded as an example of state capture by politicians.


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-433
Author(s):  
Adeoye Amuda Afolabi

This paper uses empirical evidence to identify views about the important components of good corporate governance practice for listed firms in Sub-Saharan African Anglophone countries. This study used survey questionnaire based on international corporate governance norms, data were collected from listed firms in Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. The findings include: In Ghanaian and South African firms there are evidence that regulatory framework and enforcement of corporate governance promote sound corporate governance system. This study revealed that commitment of board of directors to disclosure and communication may provide effective corporate practices. Political environment and ownership structure of firms’ hinder sound corporate governance practices. Accounting system operating in each country plays a vital role in promoting sound corporate governance system. However, societal, cultural and corruption seem to deter corporate governance system in Ghanaian and South African firms. We recommend that there should be prudent monitoring of corporate governance rules and enforcement.


2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 38-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masao Nakamura

Facing the prolonged recession since the burst of a financial bubble in 1990 Japan has been experimenting with various new policy initiatives both in the public and private sectors, corporate governance reform being one of such policy initiatives. Japanese corporate governance practices in particular have been severely blamed as one of the primary reasons for Japan’s poor economic performance in the last decade. In this paper we discuss the relationship between corporate governance and various aspects of management practices in Japan. (Corporate governance in Japan emphasizes not only the shareholders and managers, as in the West, but also the workers as important corporate stakeholders.) We point out also that Japan’s relatively loosely practiced anti-monopoly (anti-trust) laws continue shaping Japanese corporate governance behavior. We then evaluate Japan’s corporate governance reform movement which emphasizes the transformation of the current corporate governance system, which pays little attention to individual shareholders, into one similar to the Anglo-American system which focuses more on shareholders’ value. We tentatively conclude that Japan has not yet found a new corporate governance system that can serve as an equilibrium business system in that it is compatible with Japan’s management, legal and other practices and the incentives of the constituents of Japanese firms. This paper also presents various incentive and institutional issues which would have to be considered by those who consider potential applicability of the Japanese-like corporate governance practices to transitional economies.


Author(s):  
Muhammad Arslan ◽  
Jamal Roudaki

Corporate governance (CG) fosters dynamic economic growth through managing stakeholder interest and reducing the cost of capital which ultimately lead towards the development of financial markets and better firm performance. Recently, regulators and policy makers around the world either have revised extensively or introduced new laws, codes and listing regulations to enhance effectiveness and transparency of corporate governance practices. Established economic theories were already aware of the significance of corporate governance for development and economic growth. This study assesses the link between corporate governance, socio-economic factors and economic growth through a consistent literature review. A majority of studies show a positive effect of corporate governance on economic growth of a country through stock market development. Moreover, theoretical and empirical research reveals that socio-economic factors are also a pivotal determinant of corporate governance mechanisms. This study summarizes the key findings and concludes that dynamic and flexible corporate governance system claims more demand as compared to rigorous corporate governance principles especially in emerging countries. This study also finds the need of methodological advancement in corporate governance research. Nevertheless, the social economic factors, political and legal system of the country should be blended in introduction and adaption of corporate governance system. The regulators and policy makers can use theoretical grounds of study for reforms of the corporate governance system.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 219
Author(s):  
Christopher P.P. Shafuda ◽  
Rainer Lenz ◽  
Matthew Mirecki

This paper assessed the practices and standards of Corporate Governance for SOEs in Namibia. The results revealed that the state of the SOEs Corporate Governance system in Namibia is weak. SOEs are nearly uncontrolled and unmonitored regarding their Corporate Governance. Although the Government spends roughly half the size of its annual development budget on funding SOEs, it is not controlling the performance of its investments. The Namibian system of Corporate Governance is a decentralised model and relies almost solely on the Line Ministries to ensure compliance. However, the majority of Line Ministries are not executing their assigned ownership power. Most Line Ministries do not establish extra units or divisions for SOE monitoring, and instead, delegate the task of monitoring performance to staff across different divisions.


2022 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Friedrich Hamadziripi ◽  
Patrick C Osode

Abstract The importance and contribution of derivative litigation to the effectiveness and credibility of a jurisdiction's corporate governance system is indisputable. There is a positive correlation between good corporate governance practices, which include shareholders’ rights, and investors’ return on their investments. On the one hand, an overly pro-shareholder derivative scheme is vulnerable to abuse and results in unnecessary interference with company management. This may, in turn, discourage directors from entrepreneurial risk-taking and undermine enterprise efficiency. On the other hand, a complex and ineffective system of derivative litigation protects errant directors and decreases investor confidence. This article is a critical assessment of Zimbabwe's recently adopted statutory derivative remedy. The analysis focuses on five locus standi-related aspects of the new statutory derivative regime. The article highlights some major weaknesses within Zimbabwe's statutory remedy and proposes pertinent legislative amendments.


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