On the Axiology of a Hidden God

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 79-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirk Lougheed

The axiological question in the philosophy of religion is the question of what impact, if any, God’s existence does (or would) make to the axiological value of our world. It has recently been argued that we should prefer a theistic world where God is hidden to an atheistic world or a theistic world where God isn’t hidden. This is because in a hidden theistic world all of the theistic goods obtain in addition to the experience of atheistic goods. I complete this line of argument by showing that theistic goods do (or could) indeed obtain in a world where God hides. In doing so I indirectly argue against proponents of divine hiddenness arguments such as J.L. Schellenberg. The correct answer to the axiological question turns out to be a solution to the problem of divine hiddenness.

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 51-64
Author(s):  
Julian Perlmutter

For many people, the phenomenon of divine hiddenness is so total that it is far from clear to them that God (roughly speaking, the God of Jewish and Christian tradition) exists at all. Reasonably enough, they therefore do not believe that God exists. Yet it is possible, whilst lacking belief in God’s reality, nonetheless to see it as a possibility that is both realistic and attractive; and in this situation, one will likely want to be open to the considerable benefits that would be available if God were real. In this paper I argue that certain kinds of desire for God can aid this non-believing openness. It is possible to desire God even in a state of non-belief, since desire does not require belief that its object exists. I argue that if we desire God in some particular capacity, and with some sense of what would constitute satisfaction, then through the desire we have knowledge – incomplete yet vivid in its personal significance – about the attributes God would need in order to satisfy us; thus, if God is real and does have those attributes, one knows something about God through desiring him. Because desire does not require belief, neither does the knowledge in question. Expanding on recent work by Vadas and Wynn, I sketch the epistemology of desire needed to support this argument. I then apply this epistemology to desire for God. An important question is how one might cultivate the requisite kinds desire for God; and one way, I argue, is through engaging with certain kinds of sacred music. I illustrate desire’s religiously epistemic power in this context, before replying to two objections.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2020.1.1) ◽  
pp. 48-57
Author(s):  
Pavel Butakov

In the end of the 20th century analytic philosophy of religion has formed a new course for the debate about the existence of God, which is concerned with the problem of the divine hiddenness. The paper addresses the historical context of the origin of the new course. It shows how its originator John Schellenberg was able to formulate his Hiddenness Argument using the contemporary achievements in epistemology. In addition, the paper brings out Schellenberg’s novel approach to defense of plausibility of the Argument’s premises. Finally, it suggests promising directions for debating the Hiddenness Argument.


Author(s):  
Michael C. Rea

This introductory chapter provides an informal characterization of the phenomena of divine hiddenness, briefly contextualizes the contemporary philosophical discussion of that phenomenon, and lays out in some detail what will happen in subsequent chapters of the book.


2021 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-181
Author(s):  
O. Y. Fabrikant-Burke

AbstractDivine hiddenness in the Hebrew Bible is widely construed as the conceptual equivalent to divine absence. This article challenges this influential account in light of Psalm 88—where the hidden God is hostilely present, not absent—and reevaluates divine hiddenness. Divine hiddenness is not conterminous with divine absence. Rather, with its roots in the ancient Near Eastern idea of the royal and cultic audience, the meaning of “hide the face” (סתר + פנים) may be construed as a refusal of an audience with the divine king YHWH. Building on this insight, I argue that divine hiddenness possesses a petitionary logic and develop a distinction between the experiential and petitionary inaccessibility of salvific divine presence. Divine absence and hostile divine presence denote the former, while divine hiddenness the latter. I probe the relationships between divine hiddenness, divine absence, and hostile divine presence, concluding that the absent or hostilely present God is not ipso facto hidden.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-183
Author(s):  
Derek King

C. S. Lewis's Till We Have Faces is, among other things, a meditation on and response to divine hiddenness. The theme of hiddenness stretches throughout the work, and Orual's accusation against the gods centers precisely on the silence of the gods. Accordingly, Lewis gives a number of responses to the problem of divine silence or hiddenness in the novel. In this paper, I explore Lewis's engagement with divine hiddenness by comparing his framing of the problem, and his responses given, to divine hiddenness in modern philosophy of religion: the argument of J. L. Schellenberg and his responders. I argue that at least two of Lewis's responses in Till We Have Faces are similar to those found in this literature, despite predating Schellenberg's argument by almost fifty years, and that a third response, though different, is an important though often neglected response today.


2015 ◽  
Vol 97 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-52
Author(s):  
Travis Dumsday

Along with the problem of evil, the problem of divine hiddenness has become one of the most prominent arguments for atheism in the contemporary philosophy of religion. Roughly it is this: if there is a loving God, surely he would make his existence apparent to us, and in a way that we could not rationally doubt. Why? (i) Because it is of the nature of love that the lover will seek open relationship with the object of love, and (ii) because on most traditional theisms it is claimed that our ultimate well-being requires having a positive relationship with God, which relationship presupposes belief in God's reality. Yet as a matter of fact many people fail to believe in God, and that through no fault of their own. Such nonbelief is incompatible with the truth of theism. Therefore God does not exist. Here I explore how the writings of C. S. Lewis (probably the twentieth century's most popular Anglican author) can be brought to bear on the problem.


2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaco Gericke

This study is concerned with the problem of divine hiddenness as it has taken shape in analytic philosophy of religion over the past two decades. More specifically, the interest lies with providing a comparative-philosophical perspective on the most fundamental assumptions of the problem in certain formulations and its responses against the backdrop of diverse yet related data in the Hebrew Bible. In doing so the aim is not to justify or critique any particular biblical or philosophical perspective on divine hiddenness but simply to identify and clarify some crucial differences in various relevant conceptual backgrounds.Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: By way of pointing out a number of similarities and differences between concepts of divine hiddenness in the theologies of the Hebrew Bible and in a specific formulation thereof in analytic philosophy of religion, this article not only reveals some neglected specifics of the historical variability of an important theological idea but also suggests taking caution when appealing to alleged biblical precursors to contemporary philosophical-theological problems.


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