Authoritarian Attitudes and Control in a Social Service Organization

1976 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 871-872 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judi Strauss ◽  
Donald Timm ◽  
Peter F. Sorensen

The hypothesis that highly authoritarian Ss would tend to desire a more traditional control structure than those who scored lower was tested by giving a sample of 44 members of a social service organization Tannenbaum's Control Graph and the California F Scale. Results were mixed, with highly authoritarian Ss desiring more influence from immediate supervisory positions and Ss lower in authoritarianism desiring more influence from the general planning and policy making group, i.e., the Board of Directors. Under conditions where ambiguity as to the appropriate function of that role exists, the amount of control attributed to that person or group may be a function of personality attributes, i.e., degree of authoritarianism.

Author(s):  
Мария Валерьевна Созинова

В статье автором раскрывается необходимость подготовки руководителя организации социального обслуживания в вузе на уровне магистратуры. Выделяются особенности подготовки руководителя организации социального обслуживания в высшей школе, а также дана характеристика социально-психологических проблем их профессиональной подготовки. In the article, the author reveals the need to train the head of the social service organization at the University at the master's level. The article highlights the features of training the head of a social service organization in higher education, as well as the characteristics of socio-psychological problems of their professional training.


2010 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 361-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zeno C. S. Leung ◽  
C. F. Cheung ◽  
K. F. Chu ◽  
Yuk-chung Chan ◽  
W. B. Lee ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1, Special Issue) ◽  
pp. 222-224
Author(s):  
Paolo Tenuta ◽  
Alexander Kostyuk

Corporate governance is a system designed to improve corporate performance through supervision of management performance to ensure accountability to stakeholders based on a regulatory framework. Board of directors as a field of research becomes a major point for intersection of many other issues of corporate governance, such as financial reporting, firm performance, earnings management, stock market, and reaching even well-established fields of research such as accounting and finance. Most of the papers published in this issue (volume 18, issue 1, special issue) of the Corporate Ownership and Control journal are linked to the board of directors’ issues directly or indirectly.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Wan Adibah Binti Wan Ismail

<p>This study investigates whether family ownership and control, and corporate governance are associated with earnings quality, and whether family influence in firms weakens the association between corporate governance and earnings quality. This study uses a panel sample of 527 publicly traded firms over the period 2003-2008 from the Malaysia Stock Exchange (Bursa Malaysia). Identifying family firms as firms in which family members hold a significant portion of shares and possess control over the board of directors, this study finds that family firms have significantly higher earnings quality. The results remain unchanged, even after using alternative measures of earnings quality and family influence. This study also finds that the earnings quality of firms in Malaysia is positively associated with the size and independence of the audit committee and negatively associated with the size of the board of directors. However, these relationships exist only for nonfamily firms. These results on the corporate governance variables suggest that the effectiveness of corporate governance could be mediated by family influence. Using multivariate regressions that include interaction variables for corporate governance and family firms, the study finds that the relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality is mediated by family ownership and control. The result is consistent with the argument that the monitoring role of corporate governance reduces when there is substantial control by family owners in a firm. Overall, this study concludes that family ownership and control drives higher quality earnings for firms regardless of their corporate governance structure.</p>


2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 6-21
Author(s):  
Zied Bouaziz ◽  
Mohamed Wajdi Triki

The Board of Directors plays a key role as a internal mechanism of corporate governance. Indeed, its effectiveness is dependent on the presence of several factors, the most important are related to characteristics that relate primarily to the independence of its members, board size, the cumulative functions of decision and control, the degree of independence of the audit committee and the gender diversity of the board. To test the validity of our hypothesis, which states the existence of a certain deterministic between the board’s characteristics and financial performance measured by three different ratios, namely ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q, we have developed three linear regression models. Our empirical validation was conducted on a sample of 26 companies listed on the Tunisian stock exchange Tunis (Tunis Stock Exchange) over a period that spans four years (2007-2010). The estimated models show satisfactory results showing the importance of the impact of board characteristics on financial performance of Tunisian companies.


Author(s):  
Stephen M. Bainbridge

This chapter explores issues relating to the board of directors. Focusing on the formal model of corporate governance, it considers why corporate decisions are made through the exercise of hierarchical corporate authority instead of consensus. Specifically, it examines the survival advantage that a bureaucratic hierarchy confers on a large corporation and which of its constituencies should elect the board. It first outlines the key functions of the board of directors drawing on the unitary and dual board models. It then asks why corporations are run by boards of directors rather than by shareholders or the chief executive officer. It discusses why ownership and control are separated in the corporate form, with special emphasis on the US experience, along with the economic rationale for vesting control in a group rather than in an individual. Finally, it analyses how boards fail and looks at the reforms that have been implemented to improve their performance.


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