Tax Deferral and Tax-Loss Harvesting

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (5) ◽  
pp. 24-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey E. Horvitz
Keyword(s):  
Tax Loss

The Impact of Tax Loss Carry－forwards Unrecognized as Assets on Firm Value

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 49-69
Author(s):  
Moon－Tae Kim ◽  
Seong－Hyeon Kim
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Tax Loss ◽  
The Impact

The Influence of Tax and Nontax Factors on Banks' Choice of Organizational Form

2003 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 297-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie Hodder ◽  
Mary Lea McAnally ◽  
Connie D. Weaver
Keyword(s):  
Equity Capital ◽  
Income Taxes ◽  
Regulatory Capital ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Deferred Taxes ◽  
Deferred Tax Assets ◽  
State Income ◽  
Deferred Tax ◽  
Tax Loss ◽  
First Time

This paper identifies tax and nontax factors that influence commercial banks' conversion from taxable C-corporation to nontaxable S-corporation from 1997 to 1999, after a 1996 tax-law change allowed banks to convert to S-corporations for the first time. We find that banks are more likely to convert when conversion saves dividend taxes, avoids alternative minimum taxes, and minimizes state income taxes. Banks are less likely to convert when conversion restricts access to equity capital, nullifies corporate tax loss carryforwards, and creates potential penalty taxes on unrealized gains existing at the conversion date. Banks with significant deferred tax assets are less likely to convert, presumably because the write-off of deferred taxes at conversion decreases regulatory capital and exposes the bank to costly regulatory intervention. We also investigate the strategic choices banks make before converting to S-corporations. Converting banks alter their capital structures, deliberately sell appreciated assets, and strategically set dividends to augment net conversion benefits.

Tax Loss Carrybacks: Investment Stimulus versus Misallocation

2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (4) ◽  
pp. 101-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inga Bethmann ◽  
Martin Jacob ◽  
Maximilian A. Müller
Keyword(s):  
Productivity Loss ◽  
Future Prospects ◽  
Competitive Selection ◽  
Aggregate Output ◽  
Tax Regimes ◽  
Investment Response ◽  
Tax Loss ◽  
Loss Firms ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Selection Of

ABSTRACT Tax regimes treat losses and profits asymmetrically when profits are immediately taxed, but losses are not immediately refunded. We find that treating losses less asymmetrically by granting refunds less restrictively increases loss firms' investment: A third of the refund is invested and the rest is held as cash or returned to shareholders. However, the investment response is driven primarily by firms prone to engage in risky overinvestment. Consistent with the risk of misallocation, we find a delayed exit of low-productivity loss firms receiving less restrictive refunds, indicating potential distortion of the competitive selection of firms. This distortion also negatively affects aggregate output and productivity. Our results suggest that stimulating loss firms' investment with refunds unconditional on their future prospects comes at the risk of misallocation. JEL Classifications: G31; H21; H25.

The Effect of Tax Reform on the Dairy Farmer

1973 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 80-88
Author(s):  
E.L. LaDue ◽  
W.R. Bryant
Keyword(s):  
Low Income ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Tax Reform ◽  
Capital Gains ◽  
Dairy Farmer ◽  
Competitive Disadvantage ◽  
Tax Loss ◽  
Tax Accounting

Recent Congressional testimony has focused on the desirability of eliminating certain income tax “preferences” that are important in agriculture. Specifically, separate proposals have urged that capital gains treatment pertaining to livestock, vineyards and orchards be eliminated and that the cash method of tax accounting no longer be permitted. The justification for these proposals is based on the continued activity of wealthy individuals in tax loss or tax sheltered farming, despite provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 to limit such ventures. Furthermore, it is argued that these tax preferences result in a greater subsidy to the high tax bracket individual than low tax bracket individual and thus place low income bonafide farmers at a competitive disadvantage which could force them out of business.

Stochastic dominance, tax-loss selling and seasonalities in Sweden

1996 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magnus Dahlquist ◽  
Peter Sellin
Keyword(s):  
Stochastic Dominance ◽  
Tax Loss

Tax-Loss Harvesting: An Individual Investor’s Perspective

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Kevin Khang ◽  
Thomas Paradise ◽  
Joel Dickson
Keyword(s):  
Tax Loss

Tax Optimization of Municipal Bond Portfolios: Investment Selection and Tax Rate Arbitrage

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rates ◽  
Capital Gains ◽  
Municipal Bond ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Arbitrage Opportunities ◽  
Bond Portfolio ◽  
Tax Management ◽  
Selling Strategies ◽  
Tax Loss

This article considers how to improve the after-tax performance of a municipal bond portfolio by using tax-beneficial selling strategies. These strategies include tax loss harvesting (selling a bond at a price below the investor’s tax basis), applicable when interest rates increase, and tax rate arbitrage (paying tax earlier at a relatively low long-term capital gains rate, rather than at maturity at a much higher rate), applicable when rates decline. A tax-beneficial selling opportunity is a free investor-specific option, acquired automatically at the time of purchase. The combination of tax loss harvesting and rate arbitrage opportunities provides a straddle. The embedded tax option in a portfolio can be valued using option-adjusted spread–based bond analytics. Astute investors should maximize the value of the tax option in their portfolios, subject to the usual portfolio profile constraints. The author shows that bonds purchased near par are poorly suited for tax management and that dynamic tax management can improve the expected annual after-tax return by 20 to 30 bps.

scholarly journals What can VAT Statistics Tell Politicians? (with a Focus on EAEU Data)

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimir Tyutyuryukov
Keyword(s):  
Tax Competition ◽  
Feedback Mechanism ◽  
Tax Policies ◽  
Signal Function ◽  
Eurasian Economic Union ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
Economic Union ◽  
Tax Benefits ◽  
Tax Loss

Abstract While policymakers use taxes for the regulation of the economy, tax authorities constantly monitor the amount of revenues from different taxes, and sometimes the tax benefits in use. However, the author believes that policymakers neglect the feedback mechanism, offered by the tax statistics – the signal function of the taxes. The author shows, on the example of tax policies and VAT statistics, how these outline the trends in the development of the Eurasian Economic Union – signs of tax competition, dependence on import and tax loss due to policy gap. The paper further suggests the possible course of action for the policymakers.

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