Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification

CFA Digest ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 49-51
Author(s):  
Robert A. McLean
Keyword(s):  
Agency Problems ◽  
Corporate Diversification ◽  
Equity Ownership

Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification

1997 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID J. DENIS ◽  
DIANE K. DENIS ◽  
ATULYA SARIN
Keyword(s):  
Agency Problems ◽  
Corporate Diversification ◽  
Equity Ownership

Ownership Structure and Corporate Diversification

2006 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi Zhang ◽  
Xi Li
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Corporate Diversification ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Firm Diversification ◽  
Diversification Strategies

This paper examines the motivation and impact of corporate diversification in Chinese listed firms. We find that in local government owned-firms there is a non-linear relationship between the level of firm diversification and state ownership. As state ownership increases from zero, the level of diversification decreases. After state ownership reaches a certain level, the level of diversification increases as state ownership increases. There is no evidence that ownership is related to corporate diversification in non-state-owned firms or central government-owned firms. We also document that diversification is negatively related to firm performance in local government-owned firms. However, there is no evidence that diversification is negatively related to the firm performance in non-state-owned firms or central government-owned firms. Our findings suggest that agency problems are responsible for local government owned-firms taking value-reducing diversification strategies.

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

AIDS Prevention Outreach among Injection Drug Users: Agency Problems and New Approaches

1994 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 473-495 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert S. Broadhead ◽  
Douglas D. Heckathorn
Keyword(s):  
Injection Drug Users ◽  
Drug Users ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Aids Prevention ◽  
Injection Drug ◽  
New Approaches

Agency Problems and the Fate of Capitalism

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall K. Morck ◽  
Bernard Yin Yeung
Keyword(s):  
Agency Problems
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