What is Normativity?
Abstract The thesis that the concept of a reason is the fundamental normative concept is in the air. In this paper, I examine what it amounts to, how to formulate it, and how ambitious it should be. I distinguish a semantic version, according to which any normative predicate is definitionally reducible to a reason predicate, and a conceptual version, according to which the sole normative ingredient in any normative concept is the concept of a reason. Although I reject the semantic version, I examine its potential in some detail. And I claim that the conceptual version is plausible.
2017 ◽
2021 ◽
Vol 10
(1)
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pp. 119-144
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2007 ◽
Vol 7
(6/7)
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pp. 895
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2021 ◽
Vol 4
(10(74))
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pp. 31-36
Keyword(s):