scholarly journals A PROBLEM OF OPENING OF THE SECOND FRONT IS IN EUROPE: LOOK AFTER SEVEN DECADES

Author(s):  
A. A. Paderin

For the expired time of seventy years historiography of this comprehensive problem was enriched with a large number of researches in our country and in western countries. The author associate himself with those historians, who support the origin of idea about the efficient strategy of attack against enemy simultaneously from different directions by the defeat of Germany, against which in the years of world war first two-front war was going: Russian army - from the east and Anglo-Franco-American soldiers from the west. The concept «second front» in its modern meaning, as it was suggested in the article, came into use widely since 1941 due to the beginning of German aggression against the USSR. In author's opinion, it is fully grounded historically, that front, formed by the Anglo-American troops in Normandy, for example, was called not norman or western, but «second». As it is generally known, to the summer of 1944 western allies have already conducted battle actions in North Africa, Italy, on the Pacific Ocean and in South-east Asia. Moreover, in war process their activity in battles with enemy increased both in the air, and at the seaside. However, as author shows, the USSR decision-makers persevering defended the other way, leading to more rapid victory over an aggressor - to the opening by allies of the second front in Europe. Both for the western politicians and for the allied command armies it was abundantly clear, but for Anglo-American decision-makers such choice was unacceptable. The article deals with the view of the reasons of such position of allies. Thus, an author relies not only on the results of his personal study of a problem but also onto a large extent of researches both domestic and foreign historians. Therefore he answers on the row of concrete questions, such as Why did the second front in Europe became reality only on the fifth year of Second world war? What led soviet government to strive so persistently for its fastest opening? What underplots of western allies did determine their attitude toward the problem of opening of the second front?

Author(s):  
Edward D. Melillo

Since the early 1800s, Chileans have imagined their nation’s history and destiny through an ever-changing array of transoceanic connections with the rest of the planet. At a deeper level, Chile’s relationship with the Pacific Ocean is built upon myriad collective memories and aspirational identities. The long arc of Chile’s linkages with the Pacific World—or the peoples and ecosystems in and around the Pacific Ocean—has yet to be fully explored by historians. This article fills this lacuna by analyzing five diverse historical episodes that span more than two centuries: first, Valparaíso’s growth into a Pacific commercial hub during the early 1800s; second, Chile’s role in the Californian and Australian gold rushes of the mid-1800s; third, the Chilean victory in the late-19th-century War of the Pacific; fourth, Chile’s burgeoning commercial relationship with China, which began in the years following the Second World War; and, finally, the emergence of a Chilean-Pacific variant of neoliberal ideology in the final decades of the 20th century. These five developments reveal a litany of ambiguities and antagonisms in Chile’s complicated, ongoing association with its western ocean.


Author(s):  
Dean Aszkielowicz

For Australia’s government, military, and people, the conflict with Japan that lasted from December 1941 to August 1945 was by far the most significant part of the Second World War. During those years Australian and Commonwealth forces, alongside those of the United States, battled the Japanese military on land, at sea, and in the air in a series of ferocious and bloody encounters. Japan achieved great military success early in its war against the US and its allies; at its peak the Japanese empire encompassed large areas of East and South East Asia and the Pacific. As a result of their sweeping early victories, Japanese forces captured roughly 320,000 prisoners, of whom 140,000 were Allied soldiers. The rest were civilians in areas that Japanese forces occupied....


2020 ◽  
pp. 69-102
Author(s):  
Steven Fielding ◽  
Bill Schwarz ◽  
Richard Toye

This chapter focuses on the way in which political actors of different stripes have used the idea of Churchill as a means of self-validation. It explores how, in the decades after his death, Churchill became a key point of reference in Anglo-American relations, a theme which intensified after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The chapter also examines how Churchill has been used by those on both sides of the long-running debate about British membership of the European Union. Although Remainers invoked the memory of the 1946 ‘United States of Europe’ speech, they struggled to sell Churchill as a complex figure who was prepared to make concessions on British sovereignty in the interests of future peace. The ingrained, bulldog image remained hegemonic—even though Churchill’s popular reputation had shifted in subtle but significant ways since the end of the Second World War.


The Second World War marked the apex of industrial war and was nothing short of the most costly and destructive conflict ever experienced. It was total in its conduct and global in its scale—a true World War. The scale of the conflict may be explained by virtue of the fact that it was the product of numerous regional conflicts and theaters of operation that increasingly became woven into a contiguous war. In Western Europe the conflict began as a rerun of the Great War. In Eastern Europe it evolved into an ideological war of extermination between the polar opposites of fascism and communism. Parts of Africa and the Middle East became battlegrounds where European colonial ambitions clashed while other parts provided men and material. Maintaining access to resources more generally was indispensable for all belligerents in order to sustain their war efforts, thus attempting to stem the flow of their opponents’ resources was a central facet of most wartime strategies. Farther east, Japanese imperial ambitions clashed with the dynamics of a civil war in China in the attempt to create a new “Asian” international system free of American and European encroachments. In this respect, the war in the Asia-Pacific region that broke out in December 1941 should be separated from the one conducted in China up until that point. Japanese operations in China and on the Mongolian border before 1941 certainly had an impact on, but were different from, the vast new front that opened up in the Pacific following the Japanese attacks on Anglo-American positions from Pearl Harbor to Singapore. It was the events of December 1941 that brought these disparate strands formally together and linked them to events in Europe, Africa, and elsewhere. The result was a single war with very few areas formally out of bounds to armed conflict....


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