Constitutionality and the Charter: The Judiciary vs. Framer’s Intent

Federalism-E ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-35
Author(s):  
Daniel Attard

For decades there has been controversy surrounding many of the Supreme Court's judgments regarding equality rights, specifically those concerning sexual orientation. The debate stems from whether the Supreme Court has upheld basic civil and human rights through its interpretation of the Charter and the inclusion of sexual orientation leading to a more comprehensive and universal understanding of democracy, or whether this instance exemplifies a growing judicial tendency to define the Charter, rather than interpret it, moving Canadian society away from "framer's intent."[...]

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 118-137
Author(s):  
Tatiana Vasilieva ◽  

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.


2009 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Savage

In the wake of a series of prolabor Supreme Court decisions in Canada, the mantra of “workers' rights as human rights” has gained unprecedented attention in the Canadian labor movement. This article briefly reviews the Canadian labor movement's recent history with the Supreme Court before arguing that elite-driven judicial strategies, advocated by several academics and Canadian unions, threaten, over time, to depoliticize traditional class-based approaches to advancing workers' rights. The argument is premised on the notion that liberal human rights discourse does little to address the inequalities in wealth and power that polarize Canadian society along class lines.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 67-72
Author(s):  
Tatyana A. Vasilyeva ◽  

The Canadian system of human rights protection is an original one. The Supreme Court of Canada is one of the most influential constitutional review bodies in the field of human rights. At the time of its adoption, the Canadian Charter of rights and freedoms had the broadest catalog of equality rights in Western countries, formed on the basis of the Bill of rights and provincial human rights codes case-law, as well as the activities of political movements and groups of equality advocates who played a decisive role in its drafting. In Canada, a distinction is made between the enumerated in Charter and analogous grounds of discrimination established by court. The plaintiffs may claim differences on the basis of the enumerated or analogous grounds, or indicate the necessity to establish new analogous grounds. Article 15 (the right to equality) is recognized as one of the most conceptually complex provisions of the Charter. It is aimed at ensuring equality in the process of law drafting and implementation, as well as protecting human dignity. The Supreme Court of Canada is considering the provisions of the first part 1 of article 15, which enshrines the right to equality, and part 2 of this article, which provides for affirmative actions to assist disadvantaged groups as interrelated, reflecting the understanding of equality according to which affirmative actions are considered not as an exception, but as one of its best manifestations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-113
Author(s):  
Nana Tawiah Okyir

This article argues for the strengthening and entrenchment of socio-economic rights provisions in Ghana's jurisprudence. The purpose of this entrenchment is to engender judicial activism in promoting more creative pathways for enforcing socio-economic rights in Ghana. The article traces the development of socio-economic rights in Ghana's jurisprudence, especially the influence of the requirements of the international rights movement, particularly of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The article delves into the constitutional history of Ghana and its impact on the evolution of rights in the country. Of particular historical emphasis is the emergence of socio-economic rights under the Directive Principles of State Policy in the 1979 Constitution. However, the significance of the socio-economic rights only became profound with the return to democratic rule under the 1992 Constitution, again under a distinct chapter on Directive Principles of State Policy. However, unlike its counterpart, the chapter on the Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, which is directly enforceable, the Directive Principles of State Policy were not. It took the Supreme Court of Ghana a series of landmark decisions until finally, in 2008, it arrived at a presumption of justiciability in respect of all of the provisions in the 1992 Constitution. It is evident that prior to this, the Supreme Court was not willing to apply the same standards of adjudication and enforcement as it ordinarily applies in respect of rights under the chapter on Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms. Having surmounted the non-justiciability hurdle, what is left is for the courts to begin to vigorously pursue an agenda that puts socio-economic rights at the centre of Ghana's rights adjudication framework. The article draws on comparative experiences from India and South Africa to showcase the extent of judicial creativity in rights adjudication. In India, the courts have been able to work around provisions restricting the enforcement of Directive Principles by often connecting them to Fundamental Freedoms. In South Africa, there is no hierarchy between civil and political rights on the one hand and socio-economic rights on the other; for that reason, the courts give equal ventilation to both sets of rights. The article further analyses these examples in the light of ongoing constitutional reforms in Ghana. It argues that these reforms fall short of the activism required to propel socio-economic rights adjudication to the forefront in Ghana's jurisprudence. In this regard, the article proposes social movements as a viable tool for socio-economic rights advocacy by recounting its success in previous controversial issues in Ghana. The article also connects this to other important building blocks like building socio-economic rights into a national development blueprint. Overall, the article calls for an imaginative socio-economic rights enforcement approach that is predicated on legislation, judicial activism, social movements and a national development blueprint aimed at delivering a qualitative life for the Ghanaian.


Author(s):  
Christoph Bezemek

This chapter assesses public insult, looking at the closely related question of ‘fighting words’ and the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire. While Chaplinsky’s ‘fighting words’ exception has withered in the United States, it had found a home in Europe where insult laws are widely accepted both by the European Court of Human Rights and in domestic jurisdictions. However, the approach of the European Court is structurally different, turning not on a narrowly defined categorical exception but upon case-by-case proportionality analysis of a kind that the US Supreme Court would eschew. Considering the question of insult to public officials, the chapter focuses again on structural differences in doctrine. Expanding the focus to include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), it shows that each proceeds on a rather different conception of ‘public figure’.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-39
Author(s):  
Vera Rusinova ◽  
Olga Ganina

The article analyses the Judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada on the Nevsun v. Araya case, which deals with the severe violations of human rights, including slavery and forced labor with respect of the workers of Eritrean mines owned by a Canadian company “Nevsun”. By a 5 to 4 majority, the court concluded that litigants can seek compensation for the violations of international customs committed by a company. This decision is underpinned by the tenets that international customs form a part of Canadian common law, companies can bear responsibility for violations of International Human Rights Law, and under ubi jus ibi remedium principle plaintiffs have a right to receive compensation under national law. Being a commentary to this judgment the article focuses its analysis on an issue that is of a key character for Public International Law, namely on the tenet that international customs impose obligations to respect human rights on companies and they can be called for responsibility for these violations. This conclusion is revolutionary in the part in which it shifts the perception of the companies’ legal status under International Law. The court’s approach is critically assessed against its well-groundness and correspondence to the current stage of International law. In particular, the authors discuss, whether the legal stance on the Supreme Court of Canada, under which companies can bear responsibility for violations of International Human Rights Law is a justified necessity or a head start.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-84
Author(s):  
Joshua Sealy-Harrington

A clear legal test for equality is impossible, as it should be. Indeed were the test clear, it could not be for equality. It would have to be for something other than equality — in effect, for inequality. The abstract character of equality is not a new idea. In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada’s first decision under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 recognized equality as “an elusive concept” that “lacks precise definition.”2 Why, then, do judges continue to demand such definition over thirty years later? The answer, at times, is politics. 1 s 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].2 Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 at 164, 56 DLR (4th) 1 [Andrews].


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