scholarly journals Online Revenue Maximization for Server Pricing

Author(s):  
Shant Boodaghians ◽  
Federico Fusco ◽  
Stefano Leonardi ◽  
Yishay Mansour ◽  
Ruta Mehta

Efficient and truthful mechanisms to price time on remote servers/machines have been the subject of much work in recent years due to the importance of the cloud market. This paper considers online revenue maximization for a unit capacity server, when jobs are non preemptive, in the Bayesian setting: at each time step, one job arrives, with parameters drawn from an underlying distribution. We design an efficiently computable truthful posted price mechanism, which maximizes revenue in expectation and in retrospect, up to additive error. The prices are posted prior to learning the agent's type, and the computed pricing scheme is deterministic. We also show the pricing mechanism is robust to learning the job distribution from samples, where polynomially many samples suffice to obtain near optimal prices.

Author(s):  
Zehong Hu ◽  
Jie Zhang

Posted-price mechanisms are widely-adopted to decide the price of tasks in popular microtask crowdsourcing. In this paper, we propose a novel posted-price mechanism which not only outperforms existing mechanisms on performance but also avoids their need of a finite price range. The advantages are achieved by converting the pricing problem into a multi-armed bandit problem and designing an optimal algorithm to exploit the unique features of microtask crowdsourcing. We theoretically show the optimality of our algorithm and prove that the performance upper bound can be achieved without the need of a prior price range. We also conduct extensive experiments using real price data to verify the advantages and practicability of our mechanism.


Author(s):  
Weichao Mao ◽  
Zhenzhe Zheng ◽  
Fan Wu ◽  
Guihai Chen

Online pricing mechanisms have been widely applied to resource allocation in multi-agent systems. However, most of the existing online pricing mechanisms assume buyers have fixed valuations over the time horizon, which cannot capture the dynamic nature of valuation in emerging applications. In this paper, we study the problem of revenue maximization in online auctions with unknown time discounting valuations, and model it as non-stationary multi-armed bandit optimization. We design an online pricing mechanism, namely Biased-UCB, based on unique features of the discounting valuations. We use competitive analysis to theoretically evaluate the performance guarantee of our pricing mechanism, and derive the competitive ratio. Numerical results show that our design achieves good performance in terms of revenue maximization on a real-world bidding dataset.


Author(s):  
Ian Greer ◽  
Karen Breidahl ◽  
Matthias Knuth ◽  
Flemming Larsen

Marketization in this book is conceptualized in terms of the features of transactions that produce competition between providers. The organization of competition between providers is an important feature of policymaking because it affects the way that public policy is articulated in front-line public services. This chapter distinguishes among three transaction modes under which marketization proceeds along very different lines: grants (which are prior to marketization), purchasing (which is the subject of public procurement law), and vouchers (which rely on customer choice of clients). The chapter then analyzes these in terms of four features of the transaction that determine the intensity of competition between providers: the price mechanism, openness, prescription, and frequency.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Albert ◽  
Vincent Conitzer ◽  
Giuseppe Lopomo ◽  
Peter Stone

Traditionally, much of the focus of the mechanism/auction design community has been on revenue optimal mechanisms for settings where bidders’ private valuations over outcomes can be reasonably thought of as independent of each other. This has been the case even though there is good reason to believe that valuations are often correlated and there are theoretical results suggesting that mechanisms designed with this correlation in mind can generate much higher revenue. In “Mechanism Design for Correlated Valuations: Efficient Methods for Revenue Maximization,” we look at the setting where there is correlation, but the exact distribution is unknown and must be estimated from samples. We show that in this setting, the previous extremely strong theoretical results around the usefulness of correlation are now very sensitive to the degree of correlation in the underlying distribution and the number of samples that the mechanism designer has access to. However, we also show that if correlation is sufficient, we can construct mechanisms, using a computationally efficient procedure, that significantly outperform traditional mechanism design paradigms.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-88
Author(s):  
Subhasish M. Chowdhury ◽  
Debabrata Datta ◽  
Souvik Dhar

If all potential buyers participate in a first-price auction, then (theoretically) the auction price weakly exceeds the price placed by the seller under a posted price mechanism. However, it is documented that in online sales sellers prefer posted price mechanism to auction. We aim to explain this empirical contradiction in terms of partial participation of the buyers in auction, prompted by impatience and dissuasion. Auction on Internet often requires waiting, and hence, many impatient participants may not join the auction process. Furthermore, a previous experience of failure in auction may also prompt buyers’ non-participation. We show, theoretically, that in the case of partial participation, the price in auction may be lower; posted price turns out to be payoff dominant for both the buyers and the sellers. We then run a laboratory experiment and verify the presence of impatience (through waiting cost) and dissuasion factor (through previous failure) among the subjects.


1976 ◽  
Vol 16 (02) ◽  
pp. 53-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
H.B. Hales ◽  
A.S. Odeh

Introduction Most reservoir simulators employ finite-difference methods to solve the appropriate set of equations. Variables that influence the accuracy of the results are the time-step size and the cell dimensions. While the effects of these variables on the results of conventional simulators can be significant, they can be even more important with chemical-flooding models. This is because of the presence of an additional phase, such as a surfactant slug that is moving with time and that can occupy part of, or all of, a cell. Within this slug, fluid saturations and relative permeability relations are different than those ahead or behind it. This causes a mathematical problem that is the subject of this work. problem that is the subject of this work. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM Simulation of the low-tension flooding process involves calculating the three unknown variables, pressure, saturation, and surfactant concentration, pressure, saturation, and surfactant concentration, as a function of time and space. The pressure and saturation distributions can be calculated using the usual finite-difference methods of solution of the equations for immiscible flow. The surfactant concentration distribution can be determined by tracking the surfactant slug boundaries analogous to the scheme proposed by Vela et al. for polymerflood simulation. However, the surfactant slug polymerflood simulation. However, the surfactant slug maintains a fairly sharp boundary as it moves through the reservoir. Therefore, in some finite-difference cells, two distinct parts may exist, one with and one without surfactant. Each part is different from the other in fluid saturations and relative permeability relations. However, the finite-difference method of solution requires that the two parts be represented by one average saturation and by one relative permeability value. Thus, the problem is how to average the two parts and to determine how sensitive the results of simulation are to the averaging scheme, to the cell size, and to the time step. METHOD OF ATTACK Ideally, one wants an averaging scheme that (1) gives answers that are not sensitive to the time step or to the cell size, and (2) gives correct answers. The second criterion is the most difficult to check since no exact solution to the surfactant flood is reported in the literature. The work was started by developing an analytic solution (Buckley-Leverett type) to a one-dimensional surfactant flood. The solution is analogous to solutions for other tertiary recovery projects. It combines the relationship for the normalized motion of a point of constant saturation, with expressions for the dimensionless velocity of each phase, and vw = (1-fo)/(1-So). (fo is fractional flow of oil; So is oil saturation.) Saturations throughout the one-dimensional reservoir are thereby obtained. Several solution regimes result. (1) For oil-water viscosity ratios greater than unity, oil moves exclusively in front of the surfactant, forming a bank, and all the oil is produced. (2) For slightly unfavorable viscosity ratios, an oil bank is still formed, but the oil gradually invades the surfactant and may result in reduced production. (3) Highly unfavorable viscosity ratios cause all the oil to move through the surfactant, and no bank is formed. The one-dimensional surfactant flood was then simulated using an incompressible, two-dimensional, polymer-surfactant model that solves for the polymer-surfactant model that solves for the concentration using a point-tracking scheme based on the method of characteristics. This method eliminates numerical dispersion and results in sharp surfactant-slug interfaces. Several sets of runs were made, with each set using a different averaging scheme. The various schemes used are described in the next section. SPEJ P. 53


Author(s):  
Shang Wu ◽  
Jacob R. Fooks ◽  
Tongzhe Li ◽  
Kent D. Messer ◽  
Deborah A. Delaney

Abstract Economic experiments have been widely used to elicit individuals' evaluation for various commodities. Common elicitation methods include auction and posted price mechanisms. A field experiment is designed to compare willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates between these two mechanisms. Despite both of these formats being theoretically incentive compatible and demand revealing, results from 115 adult consumers indicate that WTP estimates obtained from an auction are 32–39 percent smaller than those from a posted price mechanism. A comparison in statistical significance shows that auctions require a smaller sample size than posted price mechanisms in order to detect the same preference change. Nevertheless, the signs of marginal effects for different product characteristics are consistent in both mechanisms.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Rafi ◽  
Titing Nurhayati ◽  
Dian M Sari

Routine physical exercise will provide a remarkable impact on the body,especially on cardiovascular system performance. This study aims to describe the heart rate profile of professional and amateur football athletes. This is a descriptive study with cross-sectional approach. Samples are taken through a total sampling approach in 34 athletes (17 professional football athletes from Persib U-19 team and 17 amateur football athletes from the Unpad Football Unit in Bandung). The average resting heart rate in professional football athletes is 70.29 times per minute while for amateur soccer athletes it is 88.47 times per minute. The mean post-step test heart rate in professional football athletes is 125.41 and in amateur athletes is 132.94. The average recovery time in professional football athletes is 2.06 minutes and in amateur athletes is 2.41 minutes. The study concludes that heart rate in the subject group of amateur soccer athletes is higher than the subject group of professional soccer athletes. Further research is needed to assess physical performance in both groups of athletes and evaluate the training programs that have been used.Keywords : amateur athletes, football, heart rate, professional athletes, recovery time, step test 


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