scholarly journals Picking Sequences and Monotonicity in Weighted Fair Division

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mithun Chakraborty ◽  
Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin ◽  
Warut Suksompong
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Fair Division ◽  
Complete Picture ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Population Monotonicity ◽  
Resource Population ◽  
Monotonicity Properties ◽  
Divisor Methods ◽  
Division Problems ◽  
Apportionment Methods

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items to agents with different entitlements, which captures, for example, the distribution of ministries among political parties in a coalition government. Our focus is on picking sequences derived from common apportionment methods, including five traditional divisor methods and the quota method. We paint a complete picture of these methods in relation to known envy-freeness and proportionality relaxations for indivisible items as well as monotonicity properties with respect to the resource, population, and weights. In addition, we provide characterizations of picking sequences satisfying each of the fairness notions, and show that the well-studied maximum Nash welfare solution fails resource- and population-monotonicity even in the unweighted setting. Our results serve as an argument in favor of using picking sequences in weighted fair division problems.

scholarly journals Comparing Approximate Relaxations of Envy-Freeness

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georgios Amanatidis ◽  
Georgios Birmpas ◽  
Vangelis Markakis
Keyword(s):  
Fair Division ◽  
Complete Picture ◽  
Indivisible Goods ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Approximation Quality ◽  
Division Problems

In fair division problems with indivisible goods it is well known that one cannot have any guarantees for the classic fairness notions of envy-freeness and proportionality. As a result, several relaxations have been introduced, most of which in quite recent works. We focus on four such notions, namely envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), envy-freeness up to any good (EFX), maximin share fairness (MMS), and pairwise maximin share fairness (PMMS). Since obtaining these relaxations also turns out to be problematic in several scenarios, approximate versions of them have also been considered. In this work, we investigate further the connections  between the four notions mentioned above and their approximate versions. We establish several tight or almost tight results concerning the approximation quality that any of these notions guarantees for the others, providing an almost complete picture of this landscape. Some of our findings reveal interesting and surprising consequences regarding the power of these notions, e.g., PMMS and EFX provide the same worst-case guarantee for MMS, despite PMMS being a strictly stronger notion than EFX. We believe such implications provide further insight on the quality of approximately fair solutions. 

scholarly journals THE DUTTA-RAY SOLUTION ON THE CLASS OF CONVEX GAMES: A GENERALIZATION AND MONOTONICITY PROPERTIES

2005 ◽  
Vol 07 (04) ◽  
pp. 431-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
JENS LETH HOUGAARD ◽  
BEZALEL PELEG ◽  
LARS PETER ØSTERDAL
Keyword(s):  
Tu Game ◽  
Convex Games ◽  
Population Monotonicity ◽  
The Core ◽  
Maximal Solutions ◽  
Monotonicity Properties

This paper considers generalized Lorenz-maximal solutions in the core of a convex TU-game and demonstrates that such solutions satisfy coalitional monotonicity and population monotonicity.

Persistent protests threaten Tunisian government

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Government ◽  
Oil And Gas Sector

Significance Another field, Chouech Essaida, has been shut since February 28 because of labour unrest. Demonstrations extend beyond the oil and gas sector. Months of protests across Tunisia are beginning to exact a toll on the coalition government as demonstrators return to the streets of the capital to challenge the latest effort to pass a controversial ‘economic reconciliation’ bill that would in effect give amnesty to businessmen who engaged in corrupt practices under the former regime. Impacts The unity of the coalition government will come under further pressure as ministers struggle to respond to demonstrations. Political parties risk becoming more isolated from the electorate without major internal reforms. The government will be tempted to return to more authoritarian techniques of rule as protests deepen.

scholarly journals KOALISI DAN PENGELOLAAN KOALISI, PADA PEMERINTAHAN JOKO WIDODO-JUSUF KALLA

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Efriza Efriza
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Political Market ◽  
Institutional Competition ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Presidential Systems ◽  
Modern Era

<pre><em><span lang="EN">This paper discusses the relationship between the President and the House of Representatives and the coalition government based on the three years of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), who was trapped in inter-institutional competition as a consequence of a mixture of presidential and multi-party systems</span></em><em><span lang="IN">.</span></em><em></em><em><span lang="IN">Initialy</span></em><em><span lang="EN">, President Jokowi has the desire to realize a coalition based on ideology and the same program (consensus coalition) between political parties, but the reality, it is difficult to make it happen in government,</span></em><em><span lang="IN"> finally President Jokowi re-elected a coalition of “all parties”</span></em><em><span lang="EN">. </span></em><em><span lang="IN">Using </span></em><em><span lang="EN">some of the basics of Scott Mainwaring and David Altman about presidential and multiparty combination systems and coalitions in presidential systems, complemented by several Coalitions. Then, complete the results of Otto Kirchheimer on Catch All Party, to outline the transformation of the party in this modern era. Accompanied by discussions on political parties in Indonesia, based on Yasraf Amir Piliang's description of political nomadism. Based on the facts and outcomes, a combination of presidential and multiparty systems and the government's management of government by President Jokowi, which manages a "fat" coalition with accommodative leadership and transactional performances. Matters relating to the harmonious relationship between the President and the House of Representatives with the consequence that the President is committed to realizing an unconditional coalition and not for the power-seats. Coalition management can be done because the choice of the party that develops as a supporter of the government is also based not only on the need for political imagery in order to encourage electoral in the political market, but also in the spirit of the party.</span></em><em></em></pre><pre><em><span lang="EN">                                                                                                                          </span></em><span lang="EN">                               </span></pre><pre><strong><em><span lang="NO-BOK">Key</span></em></strong><strong><em></em></strong><strong><em><span lang="NO-BOK">words</span></em></strong><em><span lang="NO-BOK">: </span></em><em><span lang="EN">Presidential System, Coalition Government, the President-Parliament Relations, Leadership Jokowi </span></em><em></em></pre>

scholarly journals Fair Division with a Secretive Agent

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 1732-1739
Author(s):  
Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran ◽  
Siddharth Barman ◽  
Nidhi Rathi
Keyword(s):  
Partial Information ◽  
Fair Division ◽  
Polynomial Time Algorithm ◽  
Time Algorithm ◽  
Indivisible Goods ◽  
Cake Cutting ◽  
Division Problems ◽  
Divisible Goods ◽  
Arbitrary Selection ◽  
Selection Of

We study classic fair-division problems in a partial information setting. This paper respectively addresses fair division of rent, cake, and indivisible goods among agents with cardinal preferences. We will show that, for all of these settings and under appropriate valuations, a fair (or an approximately fair) division among n agents can be efficiently computed using only the valuations of n − 1 agents. The nth (secretive) agent can make an arbitrary selection after the division has been proposed and, irrespective of her choice, the computed division will admit an overall fair allocation.For the rent-division setting we prove that well-behaved utilities of n − 1 agents suffice to find a rent division among n rooms such that, for every possible room selection of the secretive agent, there exists an allocation (of the remaining n − 1 rooms among the n − 1 agents) which ensures overall envy freeness (fairness). We complement this existential result by developing a polynomial-time algorithm for the case of quasilinear utilities. In this partial information setting, we also develop efficient algorithms to compute allocations that are envy-free up to one good (EF1) and ε-approximate envy free. These two notions of fairness are applicable in the context of indivisible goods and divisible goods (cake cutting), respectively.One of the main technical contributions of this paper is the development of novel connections between different fairdivision paradigms, e.g., we use our existential results for envy-free rent-division to develop an efficient EF1 algorithm.

Nuclear Power and Politics in the Netherlands

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kees Aarts ◽  
Maarten Arentsen
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
The Netherlands ◽  
Chernobyl Accident ◽  
Electricity Generation ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Nuclear Energy ◽  
Government Policies ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Electoral Performance ◽  
Fukushima Disaster

Nuclear power accounts for a low share only of electricity generation in the Netherlands. Plans for further expansion came to a halt due to a high-intensity nuclear energy debate and the Chernobyl accident. After a short resurgence in the early 2000s, political parties and voters shifted towards the anti-nuclear position after the Fukushima disaster. The chapter underlines the importance of path dependency in energy policy and concludes that government policies in consensus democracies with many political parties and coalition government are relatively unresponsive to public opinion and changes in the electoral performance of parties, because there is continuity in parts of the government’s composition in most cases.

Fair Division in Allocating Cabinet Ministries

2019 ◽  
pp. 886-898
Author(s):  
Steven J. Brams
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Fair Division ◽  
Indivisible Goods ◽  
Parliamentary Government

This chapter describes a mechanism for allocating cabinet ministries, considered to be indivisible goods, to political parties in a parliamentary government according to the proportion of seats that each party holds in a parliament. It precludes the usual bargaining and horse trading over how many, and which, ministries each party will get by using one of two apportionment schemes that prescribe the order of choice in which parties, based on their size, choose ministries. It was used, in modified form, to allocate ministries to each of the major Catholic and Protestant political parties in Northern Ireland in 1999.

New Moroccan premier may fail to set the agenda

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Economic Reforms ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Justice And Development Party ◽  
2016 Election

Significance Morocco’s new coalition government is struggling to address the unrest. The new coalition is unwieldy: it has 39 ministerial posts and includes six political parties. The make-up of the coalition dilutes the influence of the Justice and Development Party (PJD), which won the most seats in the October 2016 election, and reaffirms the National Rally of Independents (RNI) as the palace favourite, even though the party lost 15 parliamentary seats. Impacts Large protests will distract the new government from promoting its economic reforms. Demonstrations could become a political liability for the new prime minister. The palace will face less resistance from the PJD than previously in setting policy on a range of issues.

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