scholarly journals Corporate governance, ownership structure and agency costs: evidence from Sri Lanka

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 121
Author(s):  
Pratheepkanth Puwanenthiren ◽  
Balaputhiran Sathasivam ◽  
Velnampy Thirunavukarasu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Sri Lanka ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Financial Management ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Expense Ratio ◽  
Structure And Agency ◽  
Asset Turnover

<p>The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between corporate governance, ownership structure and agency cost in Sri Lanka. The present study uses the regression model to analyse data for a sample of 150 firms listed in the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) for the financial years 2014 to 2018.  The empirical results show statistically significant and positive associations between board size, CEO duality, managerial ownership and agency cost proxies (i.e., asset turnover and expense ratio). The results also show a positive and significant relationship between the independent directors and asset turnover (though statistically insignificant with expense ratio), suggesting that, entrenched independent directors employ lower conflict of interest  in order to reduce the agency cost. Nonetheless, ownership concentration, was statistically insignificantly associated with agency costs, this paper provides support for such a view in Sri Lankan context. This study contributes to the literature on the on the association between corporate governance, ownership structure and agency costs. The findings may be useful for financial managers, investors, financial management consultants, and other stakeholders.</p>

scholarly journals Ownership, structure and agency costs in UK firms

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 303-311
Author(s):  
Mahendra Raj ◽  
Mazida Abdul-Malik
Keyword(s):  
Agency Theory ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Structure And Agency ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Prior Literature ◽  
Firm Type ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates the impact of firm type and ownership structure on agency costs in UK firms. Prior literature suggests that agency costs are significantly higher when an outsider manages the firm. In this paper, we examine the agency costs associated with different types of firms such as subsidiary, holding, foreign-owned and limited companies. We extend our analysis by examining the agency costs for firms with various levels of diffuse ownership. Consistent with the agency theory, we find that firms with single ownership incur lower agency cost. In addition, we find that the type of firm does contribute to the increase or decrease of agency cost

scholarly journals Ownership structure and demand for independent directors: evidence from an emerging market

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 335-342
Author(s):  
Quoc Trung Tran
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Insider Ownership

PurposeIn this study, we examine how ownership structure affects the use of independent directors in Vietnam – an emerging stock market.Design/methodology/approachWe develop logit and tobit regression models to investigate the effects of ownership structure on the propensity to use independent directors and the number of independent directors on the board, respectively. Insider ownership and the use of independent directors are proposed to have a non-linear relationship.FindingsWith a sample of 1,318 observations collected from 192 listed firms over the period from 2008 to 2017, we find that insider ownership and independent director appointment have a U-shaped relationship. It is positive when insiders hold a small proportion of shares, and turns out to be negative when insiders hold a large percentage of shares. In addition, both state ownership and foreign ownership are negatively related to firm decisions of appointing independent directors.Practical implicationsOur findings imply that minority shareholders should have appropriate actions to reduce agency costs and protect their own interests. In addition, policymakers should improve the effectiveness of corporate governance legislation to increase the presence of independent directors in order to protect minority shareholders. Moreover, government agencies also need to increase the number of independent directors in state-controlled firms as a means to improve their corporate governance. Foreign investors may be a substitute for independent directors; therefore, firms without independent directors are able to improve their corporate governance by attracting foreign investors.Originality/valueWhile the extant literature shows that independent directors can help firms decrease agency costs of equity in financial decisions and performance, there are relatively few studies investigating corporate decisions to use independent directors. This paper contributes to the literature of corporate governance mechanisms through independent directors in emerging markets.

The relationship between ownership structure, capital structure and corporate governance practices

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 511-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krishna Reddy ◽  
Stuart Locke
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Ordinary Least Squares ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Least Squares Regression ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Governance Practices

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature of corporate governance practised by co-operatives and mutual societies in New Zealand and whether there is any relationship between co-operatives’ ownership structure, capital structure and agency costs. The study also explores whether the capital structure and the ownership structure changed during the period 2005-2011. Design/methodology/approach – Panel data for the period 2005-2011 are analysed using ordinary least squares regression and the Tobit model regression. The authors have used operating expense to sales, asset utilisation and ROA as the dependent variables. Findings – The findings indicate that an increase in independent directors, board member experience and size (measured by total annual sales) reduces agency costs in co-operatives and mutuals in New Zealand. Also, borrowing from members rather than banks reduces agency cost and increases profitability in co-operatives and mutuals. Research limitations/implications – Caution should be exercised when generalising the findings of the study as it is restricted to New Zealand environment and the sample size used is relatively small. Practical implications – This study offers insights for policy makers internationally who are interested in adopting similar corporate governance practices in their own countries. Within New Zealand, the corporate governance debate associated with co-operatives and mutual societies will be better informed as a direct consequence of this research. Originality/value – This is the first study that extends the research undertaken by Ang et al. (2000) and Singh and Davidson (2003) to the cooperative and mutual business model in New Zealand.

scholarly journals STRUKTUR KEPEMILIKAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AGENCY COST, DAN KINERJA PERUSAHAAN

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tyara Dwi Putri
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Return On Equity ◽  
Expense Ratio

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis pengaruh struktur kepemilikan, corporate governance, agency cost, terhadap kinerja perusahaan. Sampel yang digunakan adalah sebanyak 20 perusahaan keluarga yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia periode 2016-2018. Struktur kepemilikan diukur dengan kepemilikan saham oleh pihak keluarga. Corporate governance diukur dengan jumlah dewan direksi dan persentase komisaris independen. Proksi untuk agency cost adalah asset utilization dan expense ratio. Kinerja perusahaan diukur dengan Return on Equity (ROE). Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa kepemilikan keluarga dan direksi tidak berpengaruh terhadap kinerja perusahaan. Sedangkan, komisaris independen, asset utilization dan expense ratio berpengaruh terhadap kinerja perusahaan.

scholarly journals Three Essays on Corporate Governance in China

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Zonghao Chen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Women Directors ◽  
Director Compensation ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Director Characteristics ◽  
Chinese Public

<p>This thesis consists of three empirical papers on corporate governance in Chinese listed firms. The first essay examines the influence of director characteristics and ownership structure on director compensation. Over the period 2005 through 2015, we find that director compensation in Chinese listed firms is influenced by both director characteristics and ownership structure. We measure director compensation by both the propensity to be paid and the level of compensation. For independent directors, we find that director busyness, tenure, and ownership concentration positively influence and state-ownership negatively influences director compensation. For non-independent directors, we find that tenure positively influences and that both state-ownership and related directors negatively influence director compensation. Lastly, our evidence suggests that women directors in China are not underpaid.  The second essay examines the influence of rookie independent directors on board functions and firm performance in Chinese public companies from 2008 to 2014. We find that rookie independent directors attend more board meetings than seasoned independent directors. Independent directors with higher board meeting attendance are more likely to remain in the firm in the following year (lower turnover rate). This influence of board attendance on re-appointment is stronger for rookie independent directors. Further, we find that boards with more rookie independent directors tunnel less to controlling shareholders, suggesting that rookie independent directors are efficient monitors. Lastly, we find that firms with more rookie independent directors are associated with higher accounting returns.  In the third essay, we investigate the influence of board networks on directors’ career outcomes in Chinese public firms from 2005 to 2014. We find that board connections increase compensation for independent directors. We find that board connections are positively associated with director turnover for non-related directors, but negatively associated with director turnover for related directors. Further, we find that board connections lead to additional future directorships. Overall, we find that board connections both directly lead to higher compensation and indirectly through labor mobility and additional board seats.</p>

scholarly journals Agency costs and corporate governance mechanisms in Indian state-owned companies and privately owned companies - A panel data analysis

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 8-17
Author(s):  
Stuart Locke ◽  
Geeta Duppati
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Government ◽  
Suitable Reference ◽  
The Impact

This paper explores the impact of corporate governance reforms and changing ownership patterns of core public sector enterprises. A number of reforms were introduced by the Government of India in 1991, and intensified in 2004 with the aim of improving efficiency and financial performance across state owned enterprises. The core state enterprises provide a unique opportunity to consider two aspects of the reforms. First, did the reforms have an impact, and second, is there a distinguishable difference between wholly government owned and partially-public shareholding enterprises? The public listed companies provide a suitable reference point for comparison. A comprehensive dataset of 123 SOEs and matching listed public companies for 10 years was collected for the study. A regression approach is adopted with agency cost as the dependant variable and several corporation-specific governance variables. Size and industry are the independent variables. The findings of the study indicate that the agency costs for mixed ownership models tend to be lower than those of the concentrated state-owned firms because they operate in an open market with the market facing the regulatory framework of a competitive environment.

scholarly journals The board of directors and firm performance: empirical evidence from listed companies

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 508-551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Merendino ◽  
Rob Melville
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Content Type

PurposeThis study aims to reconcile some of the conflicting results in prior studies of the board structure–firm performance relationship and to evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of agency theory in the specific context of Italian corporate governance practice.Design/methodology/approachThis research applies a dynamic generalised method of moments on a sample of Italian listed companies over the period 2003-2015. Proxies for corporate governance mechanisms are the board size, the level of board independence, ownership structure, shareholder agreements and CEO–chairman leadership.FindingsWhile directors elected by minority shareholders are not able to impact performance, independent directors do have a non-linear effect on performance. Board size has a positive effect on firm performance for lower levels of board size. Ownership structure per se and shareholder agreements do not affect firm performance.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by reconciling some of the conflicting results inherent in the board structure–performance relationship. Firm performance is not necessarily improved by having a high number of independent directors on the board. Ownership structure and composition do not affect firm performance; therefore, greater monitoring provided by concentrated ownership does not necessarily lead to stronger firm performance.Practical implicationsThis paper suggests that Italian corporate governance law should improve the rules and effectiveness of minority directors by analysing whether they are able to impede the main shareholders to expropriate private benefits on the expenses of the minority. The legislator should not impose any restrictive regulations with regard to CEO duality, as the influence of CEO duality on performance may vary with respect to the unique characteristics of each company.Originality/valueThe results enrich the understanding of the applicability of agency theory in listed companies, especially in Italy. Additionally, this paper provides a comprehensive synthesis of research evidence of agency theory studies.

Shariah monitoring, agency cost and fund performance in Malaysian mutual funds

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 945-972
Author(s):  
Mohd Fikri Sofi ◽  
M.H. Yahya
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Mutual Funds ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Fund Performance ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Advisory Panel ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Shariah Governance

Purpose This paper aims to examine the effect of Shariah Advisory Panel (SAP) on both the level of agency cost and fund performance against conventional corporate governance, within corporate and Shariah governance settings, between Shariah and conventional mutual fund (CMF), in an emerging economy of Malaysia during the period 2008-2015. Design/methodology/approach Panel data regression is appropriately used within corporate governance research because of empirical issues of unobserved heterogeneity effects to avoid spurious evidence. The secondary data of 172 CMFs and 80 Shariah mutual funds are gathered hand-collected from annual reports and master prospectuses for the purpose of analysis between the period 2008 and 2015, generating 2,016 fund-year observations. Findings SAP is found to have a positive effect on agency costs. Consequently, it leads to empirical evidence that substantiates a negative and marginally significant association with fund performance when designated by accounting measure. Thus, the Shariah monitoring proxy is not a good mechanism for controlling agency costs inconsistent with performance maximizing (agency cost minimizing) outcomes. Research limitations/implications The unique data set of mutual funds used in this research may restrict the generalization of the findings unless mentioned and explained specifically the data characteristics. The single proxy for Shariah monitoring could be better off by having a list of different measures. Practical implications The paper highlights and suggests a consistent improvement in regulation that could be performed by policymakers pertaining to the non-trivial additional cost of implying Shariah governance. Originality/value This paper provides empirical evidence of the SAP effects from the view of a more complex monitoring structure in consequence of having an additional layer of governance, devoting on the trade-off between benefit and cost to shareholders.

scholarly journals Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms: A case study in New Zealand unlisted small companies

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nirosha Hewa Wellalage ◽  
Stuart Locke
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Small Businesses ◽  
Diagnostic Tests ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Small Companies ◽  
Dynamic Panel ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
And Performance

This study investigates the linkage between agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance in small business. Eleven years of data for 100 unlisted small businesses, are collected and 1099 observations are analysed using as dynamic panel GMM estimation. Various diagnostic tests are utilised to check for stationary and convergence of variables. The results indicate that ownership concentration has the most significant governance effect and also has the largest impact on corporate governance. Moreover, this study finds U-shape relationship between internal ownership and performance, which under that agency proxy. Agency costs vary with leverage the life of the business and with its size.

scholarly journals Earnings management, corporate governance, and ownership structure of Philippine initial public offerings

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 175-191
Author(s):  
Angelo O. Burdeos
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Public Offerings

Prior studies examined the effect of corporate governance variables on discretionary current accrual, the most widely used measurement of earnings management. The principal-agent conflict implies that the size of the board, the percent of independent directors, CEO duality, and auditor prestige limit discretionary current accruals (DCA). This paper extends past studies by examining the effect of ownership structure on discretionary current accruals. The study determines the level of income-increasing earnings management of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Philippines and the factors that explain it. Particularly, the paper examines the effect of ownership concentration and largest shareholder ownership on discretionary current accruals. The study uses a final sample of 105 IPO firms in Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) from 2008 to 2018. Employing the modified Jones’s (1991) model to measure discretionary current accrual and multiple regression analysis, the study finds -4.19% discretionary current accrual on the average. It also reveals that the 2002 Philippine Code of Corporate Governance (PCCG) is ineffective in curbing earnings management. In addition, there is an insignificant relationship between the size of the board, CEO duality, ownership concentration, largest shareholder ownership and auditor prestige, and earnings management. Furthermore, the paper finds a significant relationship between the percent of independent directors, industry sector, return on assets (ROA) and cash flow from operations and earnings management.

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