scholarly journals Stoicism and the impossibility of social morality

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-77
Author(s):  
Andrei Seregin
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Moral Evaluation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Social Morality ◽  
Human Happiness ◽  
Normative Standard ◽  
The One

Stoic ethical theory is famously “rigorist” in the sense that it regards all kinds of generally recognized non-moral goods and evils as “indifferents” that do not influence human happiness or misery. One of the problems with rigorism is that prima facie it seems to make impossible even a rudimentary social morality, for if non-moral evils, experienced by the victims of various inhumane actions, actually do them no harm and do not contribute to their being unhappy, then why should we regard the infliction of these evils as morally wrong? In this paper I examine the question of whether such a critique of Stoic rigorism (put forward, for example, by Claudia Card in her book “The Atrocity Paradigm”) is justified. I argue that, on the one hand, one cannot find convincing counterarguments against it within Stoic tradition itself (e.g, the distinction between “preferred” and “rejected” indifferents, in my view, is of no avail for the Stoics in this case), but, on the other, the validity of this criticism depends on what we take to be the ultimate normative standard of moral evaluation. It is only valid under the assumption that some kind of “humanistic consequentialism” (as I call it here) is true. I also try to demonstrate that, if this kind of consequentialism is true, then similar criticism may be applied to many other ethical theories regardless of whether they endorse rigorism or not. (Personally, I believe “humanistic consequentialism” to be true, although I do not argue for this thesis here).

Notsituationen als Herausforderung für die Moralphilosophie

2014 ◽  
Vol 62 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Héctor Wittwer
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Emergency Situations ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The One ◽  
Self Defence

AbstractThe fact that the topic of emergency situations has been neglected almost completely by ethical theory raises the question why normative ethics has had so little to say about extreme situations so far. One can assume that this disinterest is not due to the rarity of emergency situations but rather to their peculiar properties. All ethical theories rest on the premise that moral agents make the most of their decisions under normal circumstances. The aim of the paper is to answer the question whether or not normative ethics is able to adequately evaluate emergency situations. In order to do this, different types of extreme situations must be distinguished. It is argued that, on the one hand, self-defence and agreements by which all the participants refrain from certain of their rights in order to enable some of them to survive are morally unproblematic. On the other hand, there are emergency situations that do not allow for a solution which would be morally acceptable to all of the involved persons. Hence, morality itself can be unacceptable under extreme circumstances.

Some Cucurbitaceae in Latin Literature

1943 ◽  
Vol 37 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 101-111
Author(s):  
F. A. Todd
Keyword(s):  
Human Head ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
The Other ◽  
Latin Literature ◽  
The One

Blockhead or or Baldhead?(i) Petron. Sat. 39. 12: ‘in Aquario (nascuntur) copones et cucurbitae’.(ii) Apul.Met. I. 15: ‘nos cucurbitae caput non habemus ut pro te moriamur’.Cucurbita in its literal use is the name of many varieties of the numerous family of Cucurbitaceae, as one may learn, e.g. from Plin. Nat. Hist. xix. It is also the name of the cupping instrument called by Juvenal, xiv. 58, uentosa cucurbita, for which see Mayor's note ad loc. For other metaphorical uses of the name, Forcellini and the Thes. Ling. Lat. cite only the two passages quoted above; of these two, Lewis and Short cite only the former. Lexicographers and editors,1 comparing the one passage with the other, concur in the view that the cucurbita is the symbol of stupidity, and that a stupid man may be called a cucurbita, as in Petronius, or be said cucurbitae caput habere, as in Apuleius. At first sight their interpretation of the Apuleian phrase is plausible, for it makes tolerable sense in the context and appears to be supported by such modern expressions as ‘pumpkin-head’ and Kürbiskopf and κεχλι κολοκνθνιον, all of which liken the head of a stupid man to a pumpkin or other gourd which, though bearing some resemblance to a human head, encloses not a brain but an insensate mass of pulp and seeds. But ‘to have a pumpkin-head’ and ‘to be a pumpkin’ are prima facie very different, for the latter equates the man himself with the cucurbita, whereas it is only qua substitute for a head that the cucurbita can typify stupidity; and when it is further observed that in the Petronian passage cucurbitae so interpreted accords ill with the context, it becomes clear that some other explanation must be sought.

scholarly journals Reliability profile of an information source: The most basic version

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-121
Author(s):  
Adam Nedeljkovic
Keyword(s):  
Information Sources ◽  
Information Source ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
The Other ◽  
Interesting Connection ◽  
Explanatory Coherence ◽  
Information Set ◽  
The One ◽  
Basic Version ◽  
Formal Theories

The aim of this paper is an attempt at analyses and reconciliation of some prima facie confronted theories of reliability in the context of formal theories of coherence. Formal coherentists attempted to show that there is an epistemologically interesting connection between coherence of an information set and reliability of information sources. Amongst these authors there are divisions and differences concerning the nature of coherence, as well as the nature of reliability. On the one side, we have before us probabilistic coherentists who support a statistical understanding of reliability. On the other side we have supporters of explanatory coherence who see reliability as a dispostition. There are two goals that we shall attempt to achieve in this paper: to present and explain some ideas of reliability, without going into fine detailes and depths of theories in which they were formulated and to show that those ideas about reliability are not that irreconcilable as they might appear, but that they together can form something that we shall call ?reliability profile of an information source?, ?the most basic version?, or shorter: RPISbasic.

scholarly journals The simplicity of divine ideas: theistic conceptual realism and the doctrine of divine simplicity

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
MICHELLE PANCHUK
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
The Other ◽  
Divine Simplicity ◽  
Conceptual Realism ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One

AbstractThere has been little discussion of the compatibility of Theistic Conceptual Realism (TCR) with the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS). On the one hand, if a plurality of universals is necessary to explain the character of particular things, there is reason to think this commits the proponent of TCR to the existence of a plurality of divine concepts. So the proponent of the DDS has a prima facie reason to reject TCR (and vice versa). On the other hand, many mediaeval philosophers accept both the existence of divine ideas and the DDS. In this article I draw on mediaeval and contemporary accounts of properties and divine simplicity to argue that the two theories are not logically incompatible.

Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part III: Cross-Categorical Reduction

Dialogue ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 496-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
C.A. Hooker
Keyword(s):  
Nervous System ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
The Other ◽  
Mental Function ◽  
Physical Processes ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
State Association ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The One ◽  
Different Parts

Any theory of reduction that goes only so far as carried in Parts I and II ([165], [166]) does only half the job. Prima facie at least, there are cases of would-be reduction which seem torn between two conflicting intuitions. On the one side there is a strong intuition that reduction is involved, and a strongly retentive reduction at that. On the other side it seems that the concepts at one level cross-classify those at the other level, so that there is no way to identify properties at one level with those at the other. There is evidence to suggest that there will be no unique mental state/neural state association that can be set up, because, e.g., many different parts of the nervous system are all capable of taking over ‘control’ of the one mental function. And it is alleged that infinitely many, worse: indefinitely many, different bio-chemo-physical states could correspond to the economic property ‘has a monetary system of economic exchange’; and similarly for the property ‘has just won a game of tennis’. Yet one doesn't want an economic system or a game of tennis to be some ghostly addition to the actual bio-chemo-physical processes and events involved (cf. Rudner [188]). Similarly one hopes that neurophysiology allied with the rest of natural science will render human experience and behaviour explicable.

Melissus And His Opponents: The Argument of DK 30 B 8

Phronesis ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 263-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Makin
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Good Argument ◽  
Orthodox Interpretation ◽  
Realist Position ◽  
The World ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
The One

AbstractIn this paper I offer a new interpretation of Melissus' argument at DK 30 B8.In this passage Melissus uses an Eleatic argument against change to challenge an opponent who appeals to the authority of perception in order to support the view that there are a plurality of items in the world. I identify an orthodox type of approach to this passage, but argue that it cannot give a charitable interpretation of Melissus' strategy. In order to assess Melissus' overall argument we have to identify the opponent at whom it is aimed. The orthodox interpretation of the argument faces a dilemma: Melissus' argument is either a poor argument against a plausible opponent or a good argument against an implausible opponent.My interpretation turns on identifying a new target for Melissus' argument. I explain the position I call Bluff Realism (contrasting it with two other views: the Pig Headed and the Fully Engaged). These are positions concerning the dialectical relation between perception on the one hand, and arguments to counter-perceptual conclusions on the other. I argue that Bluff Realism represents a serious threat from an Eleatic point of view, and is prima facie an attractive position in its own right.I then give a charitable interpretation of Melissus' argument in DK 30 B8, showing how he produces a strong and incisive argument against the Bluff Realist position I have identified. Melissus emerges as an innovative and astute philosopher.

Duty

Philosophy ◽  
1948 ◽  
Vol 23 (85) ◽  
pp. 99-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Macbeath
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
The Other ◽  
General Philosophy ◽  
Ethical Pluralism ◽  
Ethical Discussion ◽  
The One

The tendency towards analysis and criticism, realism and pluralism, which has been evident in general philosophy during the present century has had important effects on recent ethical discussion. Its influence is to be seen in the two theories which on account of their prominence and the number of their disciples may be said to be most characteristic of the period—Ideal Utilitarianism and the New Intuitionism—theories which no less an authority than Sir David Ross described as the rival theories. However different these theories are in many respects they have a tendency towards ethical pluralism, if not atomism—a tendency not only to emphasize distinctions but even to harden the distinguishable elements into independent, if not even unrelated, entities. The one leaves us with a series of independent goods and the other with a series of prima facie duties, with the result that neither gives us any unitary principle to help us in one of the principal tasks of the moral life, the attempt to discover what in particular circumstances we ought to do.

Some Cucurbitaceae in Latin Literature

1943 ◽  
Vol 36 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 101-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. A. Todd
Keyword(s):  
Human Head ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
The Other ◽  
Latin Literature ◽  
The One

Blockhead or or Baldhead?(i) Petron. Sat. 39. 12: ‘in Aquario (nascuntur) copones et cucurbitae’.(ii) Apul.Met. I. 15: ‘nos cucurbitae caput non habemus ut pro te moriamur’.Cucurbita in its literal use is the name of many varieties of the numerous family of Cucurbitaceae, as one may learn, e.g. from Plin. Nat. Hist. xix. It is also the name of the cupping instrument called by Juvenal, xiv. 58, uentosa cucurbita, for which see Mayor's note ad loc. For other metaphorical uses of the name, Forcellini and the Thes. Ling. Lat. cite only the two passages quoted above; of these two, Lewis and Short cite only the former. Lexicographers and editors,1 comparing the one passage with the other, concur in the view that the cucurbita is the symbol of stupidity, and that a stupid man may be called a cucurbita, as in Petronius, or be said cucurbitae caput habere, as in Apuleius. At first sight their interpretation of the Apuleian phrase is plausible, for it makes tolerable sense in the context and appears to be supported by such modern expressions as ‘pumpkin-head’ and Kürbiskopf and κεχλι κολοκνθνιον, all of which liken the head of a stupid man to a pumpkin or other gourd which, though bearing some resemblance to a human head, encloses not a brain but an insensate mass of pulp and seeds. But ‘to have a pumpkin-head’ and ‘to be a pumpkin’ are prima facie very different, for the latter equates the man himself with the cucurbita, whereas it is only qua substitute for a head that the cucurbita can typify stupidity; and when it is further observed that in the Petronian passage cucurbitae so interpreted accords ill with the context, it becomes clear that some other explanation must be sought.

scholarly journals Vulnerable Dignity, Dignified Vulnerability: Intertwining of Ethical Principles in End-of-Life Care

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 482
Author(s):  
José María Muñoz Terrón
Keyword(s):  
End Of Life ◽  
End Of Life Care ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
The Other ◽  
Life Care ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Embodied Subjectivity ◽  
The One ◽  
Equitable Treatment ◽  
Phenomenological Conception

The aim of this article is to analyze how dignity and vulnerability, as declared principles of bioethics, both can be seen in a new light when they are thought of together, in their intertwining, in order to outline a proposal for an analytical framework for end-of-life care. It is thus shown, on the one hand, that the demand for respect for the equal dignity of every person, linked by the different anthropological and ethical theories to their autonomy as a rational agent, also refers to their fragile, vulnerable, and interdependent character, as an embodied subjectivity, sustained by a complex web of care. On the other hand, the vulnerability of these selves as others, constituted by the radical appeal of everything that affects them socially, emotionally, sensitively, and by their need for recognition and attention, would be pathological if it did not include the impulse towards autonomy, which, although precarious and connotative, requires dignified and equitable treatment. This intertwining of both principles points to a phenomenological conception of the person as a corporeal social existence, from which a number of studies on the attention to dignity and vulnerability at the end of life are analyzed.

Utilitarianism and the Noble Art

Philosophy ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 63 (243) ◽  
pp. 63-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Radford
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Main Claim ◽  
Positive Difference ◽  
Moral Rightness ◽  
Wrong Thing ◽  
Human Happiness ◽  
Wrong Reason ◽  
Right Reason ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

Utilitarianism tells us that actions are morally right and good if and to the extent that they add to human happiness or diminish human unhappiness. And—or, perhaps, therefore—it also tells us that the best action a person can perform is that which of all the possible actions open to him is the one which makes the greatest positive difference to human happiness. Moreover, as everyone will also remember, utilitarianism further tries to tell us, perhaps intending it as a corollary of that first, main claim, that the motive for an action has nothing to do with its moral rightness or goodness. (This, of course, is just a philosopher's excessive and incorrect way of making the platitudinous point that one may do the wrong thing for the right reason and the right thing for the wrong reason.) But even if, as utilitarians, we accepted the dubious corollary, it would not follow, as many have thought, that utilitarians have no moral interest in motives. For unless, absurdly, a utilitarian believed either that there was never more than a fortuitous connection between on the one hand what we intended to do and on the other what we did and the consequences of what we did, or that, if there were such connections, we could not know of them, he must believe, as a moralist, that the best motive a person can have for performing an action is likely to be the desire to produce the happiest result. Indeed, utilitarians ought to be morally committed, it would seem, to trying to find out as much as they can about the consequences of our actions, e.g. what connections exist, if any, between how we raise children and what sort of adults they grow up to be.

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