The Acting Person and “Inactivity”: Sociological Attractiveness of Realism in Constructivist Times

The article presents the analysis of some chosen arguments from Karol Wojtyła’s The Acting Person in consideration of the opposition between the realist and constructivist theoretical standpoints. It ponders the attractiveness of the realist position both for the social and personal dimension of human existence by considering such issues as freedom, autonomy, alienation, truth, receptivity, and community. Finally, it points to the ecological problem of the rightly understood “inactivity,” which is contrasted with the late modern hyperactivity of social constructivism.

Research based on scientific realism should not make preliminary assumptions about mathematical structure representing human behavior: Cronbach and Gleser’s measure as an example

Phenomena in the world we study can often be described by various mathematical structures. If a psychologist who studies human behavior takes a realist position, they should not choose a mathematical structure that represents this behavior without examination as to whether the phenomenon could be represented by this structure, but they should eventually choose the mathematical structure after thorough reasoning based on full knowledge of the problem. Using Cronbach and Gleser’s measure for assessing the similarities between psychological profiles, I show that psychologists often simply copy the mathematical structure used in other research without thoroughly reasoning about the problem. As Arocha (2021) shows, researchers should prefer approaches that include no unjustified assumptions about the mathematical structure that represents the behavior.

Scientific realism and the historical emergence of consciousness

In “Scientific Realism and the Issue of Variability in Behavior,” J. F. Arocha (2021) proposes a (hylo)-realist method of studying behaviour and consciousness. Arocha adopts the thesis that reality consists of concrete (determinate) things, is orderly and lawful, and that it has an emergent character. I propose that furthering the critical power of the realist position requires the adoption of the thesis that human societies also have emergent properties and are determined by historically specific laws.

Basic Virtue and Differentiated Virtue

This chapter argues that virtue ethics in traditional form has been overly simple, since it has not adequately integrated within its theoretical structures such important ethical features as role ethics, the narrative quality of our lives, cultural and historical location. It is important for Target Centred Virtue Ethics to offer a theoretical account of how such features can be accommodated within virtue ethics and how the targets of virtues can be more closely specified once that is done. The resulting view is not relativist but an objectivist realist position. This is achieved by a distinction between basic and differentiated virtue so that in role ethics, for example, a basic virtue such as generosity is role differentiated to form a virtue of generosity qua CEO which limits permitted acts of generosity.

In defence of a liberal realism and a realist political ethics: On Edward Hall’s Value, Conflict, and Order

This review argues that Edward Hall’s outstanding new book on the political thought of three outstanding 20th-century thinkers – Isaiah Berlin, Stuart Hampshire and Bernard Williams – has three major substantial contributions to contemporary realism: it offers convincing realist interpretations of their oeuvres, extracts inspiring new ideas from their works for future theorizing and provides powerful arguments in defence of a liberal realist position. However, given Hall’s expertise in Williams’ thought, it might be surprising that the chapters about Hampshire seem the most interesting and most convincing parts of the book because they address some of the most fundamental issues of realism in an especially concise and well-written form.

The Relevance of Metaphysics to Behavior Analysis

Behavior analysis takes a natural science approach to human and animal behavior. Some basic tenets are widely agreed in the field but it can be argued that some other assumptions are implicit in our approach and, if unexamined, may impair progress. Since the time of David Hume, there has been a strong Western philosophical tradition of naturalism and realism. Although behavior analysis has from the outset embraced pragmatism, features of naturalism are embedded in the metaphysics of science and thus have been imported into behavior analysis. Many versions of naturalism imply dualism, but this can be avoided without abandoning a naturalist–realist position either by adopting the historicist approach of Rorty, which suggests that apparently a priori truths are often merely conventions of a philosophical tradition, or by accepting Wittgenstein’s view that there are hinge statements that are fundamental to our thinking but are not propositional beliefs and do not entail dualism. As an alternative, we can adopt the metaphysical assumptions of monism, possibly starting from William James’s approach of neutral monism. Revising our metaphysical assumptions while retaining the pragmatism that is central to behavior analysis may enable us to engage more effectively with cognitive psychology, to develop stronger links with ecological psychology and other approaches that reject representationalism, and to move beyond the debate about the status of private events.

Reality, Determination, Imagination

In contemporary debates, the realist position (here speculative realism/materialism is of particular interest) not only implies a belief in what is real, but also allows us to ascertain a certain possibility of accessing reality, thus bringing about the question of correlation as it pertains to determination and subordination. This article borrows from Cornelius Castoriadis’ arguments regarding Georg Cantor’s set theory to criticize the primacy of mathematics in Quentin Meillassoux’s thinking. At the same time, it argues that there are three regimes of correlation. The first two senses of correlation imply determining subordination, whereas the third one invokes a new understanding of correlation: being is always related to the subject, but is never determined or subordinated by it. In this light, Castoriadis’s notion of radical imagination aims to maintain an emancipatory meaning – the call for an anamorphic procedure of change in perspective, to the gestures of constant re-determination, without any pretense to totality.

The Cognitive Value of Religious Truth Statements

This chapter tackles the problem of religious truth in a broader theological context, and not simply with reference to one of the prevailing challenges, typically the challenge of the reliability of tradition or the confrontation with science. It makes us aware of the surprising anti-realist position of Rav Kook, wherein he is willing to consider various truth statements as not capturing truth fully and completely. The chapter explores Rav Kook's position against the history of non-realism in Jewish tradition, but more significantly against the broader orientations of postmodern philosophy. In seeking to distinguish Rav Kook from postmodern thinkers, the chapter allows us to appreciate the fine balancing act between the theoretical flexibility that allows him to adopt an instrumentalist view of truth statements and the relativism that characterizes postmodern philosophy. Rav Kook, then, offers an intriguing balance between non-realist understandings on the one hand and an ontological grounding of his spiritual life on the other, largely by virtue of his mystical experience and panentheistic world-view. This balance opens up promising avenues in a contemporary educational context, wherein one seeks to integrate willingness to adopt a view that does not rely on heavy ontological claims for grounding truth with religious fervour and devotion.

The evidence-based policy movement and political idealism

The opposing views in the scholarly debate on evidence-based policy (EBP) have recently been labeled ‘rationalist’ and ‘constructivist’, where the former are positive to EBP and the latter are not. This framing of the debate is suboptimal, as it conflates critical positions that should be kept separate. This article suggests that the debate should be understood as one between idealists, realists, and counter-idealists about EBP. The realist position, that is, that EBP is difficult or impossible to achieve in practice, has already been treated at length in the debate. The conflict between idealism and counter-idealism, to the contrary, has been neglected. This article aims to stimulate the scholarly debate on EBP by initiating a principled discussion between idealism and counter-idealism about EBP, which should motivate proponents of EBP to formulate their ideal with substantial moral arguments. This places the debate on EBP in the context of normative political theory, where it rightfully belongs.<br /><br />Key messages<br /><ul><li>The scholarly debate on evidence-based policy (EBP) has been framed as one between ‘rationalists’ and ‘constructivists’</li><br /><li>It is better understood as one between idealists, realists, and counter-idealists</li><br /><li>The principled conflict between idealism and counter-idealism is treated at length</li><br /><li>The discussion should motivate proponents of EBP to formulate their ideal with substantial moral arguments</li></ul>

Virtual Reality: Digital or Fictional?

Are the objects and events that take place in Virtual Reality genuinely real? Those who answer this question in the affirmative are realists, and those who answer in the negative are irrealists. In this paper we argue against the realist position, as given by Chalmers (2017), and present our own preferred irrealist account of the virtual. We start by disambiguating two potential versions of the realist position—weak and strong— and then go on to argue that neither is plausible. We then introduce a Waltonian variety of ictionalism about the virtual, arguing that this sort of irrealist approach avoids the problems of the realist positions, fits with a unifying theory of representational works, and offers a better account of the phenomenology of engaging in virtual experiences.