Feng Shui and the Demarcation Project

The vast majority of well-informed philosophers of science and scientists who are clearly (uncontroversially) scientists are able to extensionally differentiate between almost all scientific and non-scientific practices, disciplines, theories, attitudes, modes of procedure, etc., and do so or would do so in much the same way. This legitimately leads to the conclusion that the main problem of scientific demarcation has already, in a sense, been solved, although an explicative integrated account of that solution has not yet been given. Doing so is the goal of the project proposed in Fernandez-Beanato (Journal for General Philosophy of Science 51(3):375–391, 2020b). To advance toward the solution of the scientific demarcation problem, this article executes part of that project: a first step for scientific demarcation is the composition of a broad “list” (set) of accepted characteristics, conditions, or properties of science, or indicators of scientificity (most of them, by themselves, unnecessary and insufficient) which might be collectively used to establish a demarcation between those theories, cognitive fields, practices, etc. which are scientific and those which are not. This article deals with feng shui as a clear case of a non-science. It defines feng shui and then lists properties of science that feng shui possesses and properties of science that it lacks. This article then shows that the proposed demarcatory list demarcates feng shui as non-scientific, in agreement with the current philosophical and scientific consensus.

Philosophy of sustainability experimentation _ experimental legacy, normativity and transfer of evidence

The recent proliferation of types and accounts of experimentation in sustainability science still lacks philosophical reflection. The present paper introduces this burgeoning topic to the philosophy of science by identifying key notions and dynamics in sustainability experimentation, by discussing taxonomies of sustainability experimentation and by focusing on barriers to the transfer of evidence. It integrates three topics: the philosophy of experimentation; the sustainability science literature on experimentation; and discussions on values in science coming from the general philosophy of science, the social sciences, and sustainability science. The aim is to improve understanding of how sustainability experimentation has evolved, from a broader picture of the history and philosophy of science, with a specific focus on understanding evidence production and how evidence traveling in and from sustainability experiments can be improved, particularly in the context of complex and pervasive normative commitments of the research. By engaging in these topics, this research is one of the first philosophical accounts of sustainability experimentation, contributing both to the knowledge on specific philosophies of science and to the further development of an evidence-based sustainability science through a better understanding of the barriers to more relevant and usable knowledge.

Modeling Crack Growth in ASME Section XI Flaw Evaluations

Rules for assessment of flaws found as a result of periodic in-service examinations of nuclear components, first appeared in Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code in 1974. Since that time, literally hundreds of evaluations have been completed, which have allowed flaws that met the required margins to be accepted for continued service without repair. The flaw evaluation process of Section XI involves prediction of the future growth of such flaws, and then comparison with a calculated allowable flaw size for the location of interest. The crack growth models to be used for such evaluations are generally contained in the ASME Code itself, in Section XI Nonmandatory Appendices A or C, or the new Nonmandatory Appendix Y for Crack Growth Rate Curves (2021 Code Edition), depending on the application and material type. Occasionally, Code Cases are also used to provide recommended crack growth models. The philosophy that has been followed by the Code since its inception has been to model crack growth as accurately as possible, so as to make an accurate prediction of future flaw growth, and then compare the predicted final flaw size with the allowable flaw size for the area of interest, after a margin has been applied. Therefore, the margin is applied only once, so it is easily identified, and is not “double-counted”. The goal of this paper is to summarize the background and basis behind the ASME Section XI general philosophy of the use of a best estimate, or mean, treatment of the crack growth models in Section XI of the ASME Code. This paper will discuss the various approaches that are available to characterize crack growth, and then discuss the approaches which have been used in ASME Code Section XI flaw evaluation rules over the years.

Inferring the demographic history of tetraploid species from genomic data

Genomic patterns of diversity and divergence are impacted by certain life history traits, reproductive systems and demographic history. The latter is characterised by fluctuations in population sizes over time, as well as by temporal patterns of introgression. For a given organism, identifying a demographic history that deviates from the standard neutral model allows a better understanding of its evolution, but also helps to reduce the risk of false positives when screening for molecular targets of natural selection. Tetraploid organisms and beyond have demographic histories that are complicated by the mode of polyploidisation, the mode of inheritance and different scenarios of gene flow between subgenomes and diploid parental species. Here we provide guidelines for experimenters wishing to address these issues through a flexible statistical framework: approximate Bayesian computation (ABC). The emphasis is on the general philosophy of the approach to encourage future users to exploit the enormous flexibility of ABC beyond the limitations imposed by generalist data analysis pipelines.

The Integrative Approach to Inferring Homology: Morphology and Development Combined

Reconstructing ancestral species is a challenging endeavour: fossils are often scarce or enigmatic, and inferring ancestral characters based on novel molecular approaches (e.g. comparative genomics or developmental genetics) has long been controversial. A key philosophical challenge pertinent at present is the lack of a theoretical framework capable of evaluating inferences of homology made through integration of multiple kinds of evidence (e.g. molecular, developmental, or morphological). Here, I present just such a framework. I start with a brief history and critical assessment of attempts at inferring morphological homology through developmental genetics. I then bring attention to a recent model of homology, namely Character Identity Mechanisms (DiFrisco, Love, & Wagner, 2020), intended partly to elucidate the relationships between morphological characters, developmental genetics, and homology. I utilise and build on this model to construct the evaluative framework mentioned above, which judges the epistemic value of evidence of each kind in each particular case based on three proposed criteria: effectiveness, admissibility, and informativity, as well as providing a generalised guideline on how it can be scientifically operationalised. I then point out the evolution of the eumetazoan body plan as a case in point where the application of this framework can yield satisfactory results, both empirically and conceptually. I will conclude with a discussion on some potential implications for more general philosophy of biology and philosophy of science, especially surrounding evidential integration, models and explanation, and reductionism.

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 1

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind is an annual publication of some of the most cutting-edge work in the philosophy of mind. The philosophy of mind has, for at least half a decade, been torn between a traditional, armchair-led approach and a naturalistic, empirically driven approach. The most prestigious general philosophy journals tend to favor the traditional approach, while journals dedicated to the philosophy of mind tend to favor the naturalistic approach. Meanwhile, the history of philosophy of mind gets no play in philosophy-of-mind-dedicated journals, and is of course published mostly in history-of-philosophy journals. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind will publish work from all three sectors: armchair philosophy of mind, empirically driven philosophy of mind, and history of philosophy of mind. As far as invited contributions are concerned, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind will observe a strict gender balance, with exactly half of the invitees being women and half men. It does not control, of course, the ultimate delivery of manuscripts by the invitees, nor the quantity and quality of submissions from each gender. This inaugural volume contains thirteen articles focused on three themes: the value of consciousness, naturalism and physicalism, and the nature of content.