scholarly journals The new economic governance of the Eurozone

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dermine Paul
2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 44-62
Author(s):  
Laura Gómez Urquijo

The objective of this article is to contribute to the discussion on the validity of new instruments to enhance cohesion in the European Union (EU). First, we question to which extent cohesion policy is submitted to the new economic governance. Second, we discuss this subordination affects the fulfillment of cohesion aims. This question is especially relevant due to the increase of inequalities in the current economic crisis and the great diversity among State Members (including social protection systems and expenses). Thus, our starting point is the new economic governance framework and its impact on the fulfillment of cohesion objectives. Statistical data are considered with this aim. Next, we will assess the role of European Structural and Investment Funds to eventually compensate public expense cuts, as well as its subordination to the macroeconomic government. This aspect will be contrasted through the study of Country Specific Recommendations given by the European Semester. Spanish El objetivo de este artículo es contribuir a la discusión sobre la validez de los nuevos instrumentos para fomentar la cohesión en la Unión Europea. Nos preguntamos en qué modo queda sometida la política de cohesión a la nueva gobernanza económica y cómo afecta a la efectividad para cubrir susfines. Esta cuestión es particularmente relevante ante el incremento de las desigualdades suscitado en la crisis económica actual. Por ello, nuestro punto de partida es el nuevo marco de gobernanza económica y su impacto en el cumplimiento de los objetivos de cohesión, considerando para ello datos estadísticos. A continuación, valoraremos, el papel de los Fondos Estructurales y de Inversión Europeos como posibles compensadores de la reducción del gasto público así como su subordinación al gobierno macroeconómico. Esta cuestión será contrastada también a través del examen de las Recomendaciones Específicas por país dadas por el Semestre Europeo. French Le but de cet article est de contribuer à la discussion sur la validité de nouveaux instruments pour promouvoir la cohésion dans l'UE. Nous avons considéré, d'une part, en quoi la politique de cohésion est soumise à la nouvelle gouvernance économique et, d'autre part, la façon dont elle utilise l'efficacité pour répondre à ses fins.Cette question est particulièrement pertinente étant donnée l'augmentation de l'inégalité soulevée par la crise économique actuelle, dans un contexte de grande diversité d'États membres, notamment en ce qui concerne les systèmes de protection sociale et les dépenses publiques. Par conséquent, notre point de départ s'inscrit dans le nouveau cadre de gouvernance économique et son impact sur la mise en œuvre des objectifs de cohésion, à partir de la prise en compte de données statistiques. Pour ce faire, nous évaluons le rôle des Fonds Structurels Européens, leur capacité de compenser la réduction des dépenses publiques et leur subordination au gouvernement macroéconomique. Ce e question sera également abordée par l'examen des recommandations spécifiques par pays fournies par le Semestre Européen.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-131
Author(s):  
Julia Lux

This article will investigate the ‘political crisis’ in France (Amable, 2017) to highlight two aspects often set aside in public and academic discussions: 1) the technocratic, neoliberal character of the European Union (EU) that limits democratic debate about political economic issues and 2) the socio-economic context the parties operate in. Using this perspective, I add to the debate on the inherent theoretical/conceptual tension between representative democracy and populism (Taggart, 2002) by showing how the ‘new economic governance’ increases the democratic problems of the EU by limiting the discursive space. Representative liberal democracy has particularly marginalised anti-capitalism at EU and national level. My analysis shows that the EU's discursive strategies are aligned to those of governing parties and the employers’ association. Left-wing actors and the Front National (FN) oppose the EU's discourse not necessarily for reasons of sovereignty but for political reasons concerning the politico-economic trajectory of France.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Constantine E. Passaris

Abstract The mission and mandate of economic governance in Greece and its accompanying institutional architecture requires a re-alignment in order to conform to the realities of the new global economy of the 21st century. Two recent events, one foundational and the other cataclysmic, have precipitated the need for a new vision and a new conceptual framework for revitalizing and modernizing Greece’s economic governance architecture. These two defining milestones are the emergence of a new global economy and the devastating consequences of the 2008 global financial crisis on the Greek economy. This paper proposes a new conceptual framework for reforming the public administration in Greece that is congruent with the structural changes precipitated by the new global economy of the 21st century. The Great Recession and the contemporary jobless recovery provide the contextual narrative for redefining macroeconomic policy with regard to achieving good economic governance. A new set of ten interactive and complementary principles for good governance in the 21st century are proposed. These governance principles should be accompanied with a modern institutional governance architecture. Furthermore, the structural qualities and resilient infrastructure of a revitalized governance model must be able to withstand the future economic shocks and interface effectively with the new global economy of the 21st century. In essence, this paper sets a new economic governance agenda and designs the supporting governance infrastructure that has the administrative capability and the capacity to meet the challenges and take advantage of the opportunities confronting Greece in the 21st century. All of this, for the purpose of designing a governance infrastructure that interacts more effectively with global institutions; national, regional and local governments; economic, social and political networks; community and grassroots organizations and civil society.


2019 ◽  
pp. 49
Author(s):  
Γιώργος Ανδρέου

Drawing on historical institutionalism, the paper seeks to compare the imprint of existing EU cohesion policy with the imprint formed on the basis of the policy reform proposals for the 2021-2027 programming period. It is deduced that the proposed changes are incremental in nature, seek to perpetuate the subjection of the goal of cohesion to the “new economic governance” and burden cohesion policy with additional general objectives. In addition, the distributivedimension of the proposals is problematic, as drastic reductions of funds are envisaged for 10 out of the 12 Central and Eastern European member states. The final conclusion is that: a) the proposed distribution of funds is politicallyunfeasible and b) the proposed reforms, while designed to limit complexity at the level of policy means, do not suffi ciently address “goal congestion” and do not event attempt to resolve the compatibility problem between the goal of cohesion – i.e. the reduction of territorial disparities – and the EU’s strategic ambitions. 


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