How the Eurozone disempowers trade unions: the political economy of competitive internal devaluation

The marginalization of trade unions was a notable feature of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone periphery. However, governments have recently imposed liberalizing reforms against union protests in the Eurozone core too. We argue that organized labour loses influence across the core-periphery divide because the ‘new economic governance’ puts national governments under enhanced pressure to compete against each other on wage and labour market flexibility—a process known as competitive internal devaluation. The article illustrates this argument through comparative quantitative indicators of liberalization and qualitative process-tracing in three core countries. Whereas Germany’s outstanding competitiveness position allowed its unions to extract significant concessions, their counterparts in France and Finland faced unprecedented defeats from governments aiming to restore economic growth by closing down the competitiveness gap to Germany. Our findings highlight the class power implications of the Eurozone’s reliance on the labour market as the main economic adjustment variable.

Η πολιτική συνοχής της Ε.Ε. μετά το 2020: Περισσότεροι στόχοι, λιγότεροι πόροι

Drawing on historical institutionalism, the paper seeks to compare the imprint of existing EU cohesion policy with the imprint formed on the basis of the policy reform proposals for the 2021-2027 programming period. It is deduced that the proposed changes are incremental in nature, seek to perpetuate the subjection of the goal of cohesion to the “new economic governance” and burden cohesion policy with additional general objectives. In addition, the distributivedimension of the proposals is problematic, as drastic reductions of funds are envisaged for 10 out of the 12 Central and Eastern European member states. The final conclusion is that: a) the proposed distribution of funds is politicallyunfeasible and b) the proposed reforms, while designed to limit complexity at the level of policy means, do not suffi ciently address “goal congestion” and do not event attempt to resolve the compatibility problem between the goal of cohesion – i.e. the reduction of territorial disparities – and the EU’s strategic ambitions.

Understanding the Crisis Symptoms of Representative Democracy: The New European Economic Governance and France's ‘Political Crisis’

This article will investigate the ‘political crisis’ in France (Amable, 2017) to highlight two aspects often set aside in public and academic discussions: 1) the technocratic, neoliberal character of the European Union (EU) that limits democratic debate about political economic issues and 2) the socio-economic context the parties operate in. Using this perspective, I add to the debate on the inherent theoretical/conceptual tension between representative democracy and populism (Taggart, 2002) by showing how the ‘new economic governance’ increases the democratic problems of the EU by limiting the discursive space. Representative liberal democracy has particularly marginalised anti-capitalism at EU and national level. My analysis shows that the EU's discursive strategies are aligned to those of governing parties and the employers’ association. Left-wing actors and the Front National (FN) oppose the EU's discourse not necessarily for reasons of sovereignty but for political reasons concerning the politico-economic trajectory of France.

How have EU ‘fire-fighters’ sought to douse the flames of the eurozone’s fast- and slow-burning crises? The 2013 structural funds reform

This article examines the debates surrounding the Regulation 1303/2013 on structural funds, arguing that the rules adopted in the midst of the eurozone crisis to strengthen the governance of the euro area had spill-over effects on cohesion policy. It shows how, in the fast-burning phase of the crisis (2010–2013), some actors pushed forward the idea of suspending structural funds in case of non-compliance with the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, making funding conditional on Member States’ compliance with the rules of the new economic governance, and how, after the entry into force of this Regulation, in the slow-burning phase of the crisis (from 2013 onwards), a greater number of actors has been calling for a more flexible interpretation of the rules. To explain the disruption between t1 and t2, the article examines the change in the power relations between and within institutions and the change in ideas.