scholarly journals The role of the us supreme court in the legal system

Author(s):  
A. A. Aryn
Author(s):  
A.K. Isabekov ◽  
A.A. Otynshiyeva ◽  
D. Makhambetsaliyev ◽  
J. Castellino

ICL Journal ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonios E. Kouroutakis

AbstractInstitutions such as the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice in due time have developed a status of supremacy through judicial activism. The main target of the article is to identify the judicial activism exercised by these Courts and to reason its need in the legal order. In the first part the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice are placed in the overall polity that they belong to and the development of their status and their characteristics are analyzed. The major concern of the first part is to examine how those declared their supremacy and focus on major cases and their reason­ing.In the second part the extent of the judicial supremacy in each legal order is discussed and its effects in the decision making process are examined. The assumption that judicial activ­ism is acceptable only if it expresses consensus in the legal order is tested and it is argued that up to an extent, Judicial Activism does not distort the political agenda when it ex­presses the consensus of the legal system. Finally, it is argued that when such activism exceeds the boundaries of the consensus, the other actors in the legal system would even­tually react and would limit such activism.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 377-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan C. Black ◽  
Matthew E. K. Hall ◽  
Ryan J. Owens ◽  
Eve M. Ringsmuth

Author(s):  
Roger J.R. Levesque

This chapter analyzes research related to the necessity of remedial approaches as well as potential alternatives to addressing racial disparity and the segregation of schools. These constitute critical analyses due to the manner in which the US Supreme Court addresses group classifications relating to race. These analyses reveal scant empirical evidence that addresses the law’s direct needs. Notably, it is not clear that integration efforts that use racial classifications are necessary to address the ills described by the legal system. In addition, it is not clear that alternatives, such as using economic status to shape school districts, increase integration in ways that reduce the harms associated with discrimination. In the end, the conclusion is not that these approaches could not receive empirical support; rather, it is that researchers simply have not engaged in the type of research needed to address key legal claims.


2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 785-803 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariah Zeisberg

Extensive political science research reveals that the decisions of the US Supreme Court are deeply political. And both advocates and critics of judicial elections concede that partisan elections are a democratic method of judicial selection. Does the value of democratic representation mean that US Supreme Court Justices should be selected through partisan elections? I argue not. Partisan judicial elections are actually far poorer institutional mechanisms for capturing the judgment of the people on legal matters than has been recognized. The role of parties in structuring a campaign distorts the deliberative environment surrounding judicial elections, creating significant barriers to voters expressing a judgment on matters of legal meaning. The kind of distortion is best understood through reference to aprocessualcriterion of deliberative democracy, which provides a fitting normative template to ground theoretical inquiry into the reason-giving possibilities of existing democratic institutions and practices. Hence, answering why the US Supreme Court should not be elected on democratic grounds also reveals new insights about the role of parties in sustaining (or subverting) deliberative democratic ideals.


Ratio Juris ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 443-455
Author(s):  
NEAL K. KATYAL ◽  
GIORGIO BONGIOVANNI ◽  
CHIARA VALENTINI

Politics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Ferdinand ◽  
Robert Garner ◽  
Stephanie Lawson

This chapter examines power and authority, two central concepts in politics, in relation to the state. It first defines power in the context of authority, taking into account the distinction between them by citing the role of the US Supreme Court as an example. It then considers the classic threefold typology of authority proposed by German sociologist Max Weber, namely: traditional authority, charismatic authority, and legal–rational authority. It also addresses some conceptual questions about power; for example, whether power is the same as force, whether it must be exercised deliberately, whether it is a good thing, or whether we can eliminate it. The chapter goes on to explore the methodological problems inherent in the measurement of power, particularly in relation to the theories of the state such as Marxism, pluralism, elitism, and feminism. Finally, it describes Stephen Lukes' three dimensions of power.


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