scholarly journals THE ROLE OF THE PERSONAL FACTOR IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE US SUPREME COURT (BASED ON DOCUMENTS OF 1940–1960s)

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. A. Ageeva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Personal Factor ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court

The Role of Emotional Language in Briefs before the US Supreme Court

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 377-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan C. Black ◽  
Matthew E. K. Hall ◽  
Ryan J. Owens ◽  
Eve M. Ringsmuth
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Emotional Language ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court

Should We Elect the US Supreme Court?

2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 785-803 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariah Zeisberg
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Science Research ◽  
Judicial Selection ◽  
Judicial Elections ◽  
The People ◽  
Theoretical Inquiry ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Meaning

Extensive political science research reveals that the decisions of the US Supreme Court are deeply political. And both advocates and critics of judicial elections concede that partisan elections are a democratic method of judicial selection. Does the value of democratic representation mean that US Supreme Court Justices should be selected through partisan elections? I argue not. Partisan judicial elections are actually far poorer institutional mechanisms for capturing the judgment of the people on legal matters than has been recognized. The role of parties in structuring a campaign distorts the deliberative environment surrounding judicial elections, creating significant barriers to voters expressing a judgment on matters of legal meaning. The kind of distortion is best understood through reference to aprocessualcriterion of deliberative democracy, which provides a fitting normative template to ground theoretical inquiry into the reason-giving possibilities of existing democratic institutions and practices. Hence, answering why the US Supreme Court should not be elected on democratic grounds also reveals new insights about the role of parties in sustaining (or subverting) deliberative democratic ideals.

Terrorism, Emergency Powers, and the Role of the US Supreme Court: An Interview with Neal K. Katyal

Ratio Juris ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 443-455
Author(s):  
NEAL K. KATYAL ◽  
GIORGIO BONGIOVANNI ◽  
CHIARA VALENTINI
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Emergency Powers ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court

3. Political Power, Authority, and the State

Politics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Ferdinand ◽  
Robert Garner ◽  
Stephanie Lawson
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Max Weber ◽  
The State ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
Good Thing ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Methodological Problems ◽  
German Sociologist

This chapter examines power and authority, two central concepts in politics, in relation to the state. It first defines power in the context of authority, taking into account the distinction between them by citing the role of the US Supreme Court as an example. It then considers the classic threefold typology of authority proposed by German sociologist Max Weber, namely: traditional authority, charismatic authority, and legal–rational authority. It also addresses some conceptual questions about power; for example, whether power is the same as force, whether it must be exercised deliberately, whether it is a good thing, or whether we can eliminate it. The chapter goes on to explore the methodological problems inherent in the measurement of power, particularly in relation to the theories of the state such as Marxism, pluralism, elitism, and feminism. Finally, it describes Stephen Lukes' three dimensions of power.

Democratic Law and the Erosion of Common Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 65-89
Author(s):  
Seana Valentine Shiffrin
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Narrow Focus ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Democratic Character ◽  
The Common ◽  
Customary Practices

This chapter explores the democratic character of the common law by examining the implied contractual duty of good faith and its dismissive treatment by the US Supreme Court in Northwest v. Ginsberg, a 2014 preemption decision. The decision was mistaken because it failed to recognize law’s morally indispensable role of publicly articulating and interpreting our shared moral commitments, treating law instead as a mere means of resolving disputes. The chapter also celebrates the democratic character of common law, which, although articulated by judges, responds to reasons and problems emerging from the citizenry and attends to moral expectations embodied in customary practices. The chapter underscores the importance of common law (and the doctrine of good faith) in publicly articulating reasons and drawing on the underlying values that law serves, democratic functions that are lost when litigation is replaced by private arbitration and overlooked by a narrow focus on elections.

scholarly journals THE ROLE OF THE US SUPREME COURT IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM

2019 ◽  
Vol 89 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
A.K. Isabekov ◽  
A.A. Otynshiyeva ◽  
D. Makhambetsaliyev ◽  
J. Castellino
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal System ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court

Insult of Public Officials

2021 ◽  
pp. 388-409
Author(s):  
Christoph Bezemek
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Structural Differences

This chapter assesses public insult, looking at the closely related question of ‘fighting words’ and the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire. While Chaplinsky’s ‘fighting words’ exception has withered in the United States, it had found a home in Europe where insult laws are widely accepted both by the European Court of Human Rights and in domestic jurisdictions. However, the approach of the European Court is structurally different, turning not on a narrowly defined categorical exception but upon case-by-case proportionality analysis of a kind that the US Supreme Court would eschew. Considering the question of insult to public officials, the chapter focuses again on structural differences in doctrine. Expanding the focus to include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), it shows that each proceeds on a rather different conception of ‘public figure’.

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