scholarly journals The Limits of Interpretation in the Law of Contract

2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 191
Author(s):  
Andrew Robertson
Keyword(s):  
Risk Allocation ◽  
Gap Filling ◽  
The Law ◽  
Interpretative Approach ◽  
Do So

In the law of contract questions of risk allocation properly turn, where possible, on interpretation of the agreement. This article will explore the limits of that approach. It will do so by considering two doctrines that lie at the boundaries of contract interpretation: the implication of terms in fact and the remoteness principle. Both doctrines have been commonly understood as gap-filling rules, but in two influential judgments Lord Hoffmann sought to recast them as interpretative principles. It will be argued in this article that the implication of terms in fact can properly be regarded as an interpretative exercise, but the same cannot be said of the application of the remoteness doctrine. The implication of terms in fact can helpfully be understood as interpretative, provided care is taken to explain the paths of reasoning leading to the conclusion that a contractual instrument must be understood to include a particular unexpressed term. Because no common paths of interpretative reasoning can be identified for the determination of remoteness questions, it is unsettling and counterproductive to attempt to take an interpretative approach to these questions.

Pembagian Harta Waris dalam Tradisi Masyarakat Muslim di Gorontalo

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-202
Author(s):  
Hamid Pongoliu
Keyword(s):  
Islamic Law ◽  
Sharia Law ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Law

Gorontalo has a customary principle derived from sharia law, and the sharia law is sourced from the Qur'an, hadith, ijmak and qiyas (adati-hula'a to syara'a, syara'a hula'a to Kitabi), which should reflect the existence of the implementation of the distribution of inheritance in Islam in the Gorontalo community. This customary principle can be a source of law if it is a rational act, not immorality, done always repeatedly, does not bring harm and does not conflict with the law of sharak. But in reality there is the implementation of inheritance that violates Islamic law, namely the distribution by way of deliberation, the determination of the amount of heirs equally, the delay in the distribution of inheritance, wills with houses given to girls, wills not to distribute inheritance, distribution of assets it depends on the will of the heir and the delay in the distribution of inheritance on the grounds that one of the parents is still alive. The distribution by deliberation and determination of the amount of the portion for each heir are equally acceptable as long as they follow the guidelines of the Compilation of Islamic Law article 183 and the concept of takharruj which was previously preceded by the Shari'a division. After the heirs know the size of the portion, then they may agree to share it in their own way or leave the inheritance according to Shari'a and agree to give to each other with other heirs.

The Dudley Lee Case: A new approach to factual causation and its implications for transformative jurisprudence

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 273-289
Author(s):  
Anmari Meerkotter
Keyword(s):  
Case Note ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Recent Contribution ◽  
New Approach ◽  
State Accountability ◽  
The Law ◽  
Transformative Impact ◽  
Constitutional Jurisprudence ◽  
Law Of Delict

The Constitutional Court (CC) judgment of Lee v Minister of Correction Services 2013 2SA 144 (CC) is a recent contribution to transformative constitutional jurisprudence in the field of the law of delict. This matter turned on the issue of factual causation in the context of wrongful and negligent systemic omissions by the state. In this case note, I explore the law relating to this element of delictual liability with specific regard to the traditional test for factual causation – the conditio sine qua non (‘but-for’) test. In particular, I note the problems occasioned by formalistic adherence to this test in the context of systemic state omissions as evidenced by the SCA judgment in the same matter. I also consider the manner in which English courts have addressed this problem. Thereafter, I analyse the CC’s broader approach to the determination of factual causation as one based on common sense and justice. I argue that this approach endorses a break from a formalistic application of the test and constitutes a step towards an approach which resonates with the foundational constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality. Furthermore, it presents an appropriate solution to the problems associated with factual causation where systemic omissions are concerned. I then consider the transformative impact of the Lee judgment. In particular, I argue that the broader enquiry favoured by the CC facilitates the realisation of constitutionally guaranteed state accountability, and amounts to an extension of the existing norm of accountability jurisprudence. Hence, I contend that the judgment presents a further effort by the Constitutional Court to effect wholesale the constitutionalisation of the law of delict, as well as a vindicatory tool to be used by litigants who have been adversely affected by systemic state omissions.

Practical Application

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kubo Mačák
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Practical Application ◽  
Temporal Perspective ◽  
Applicable Law ◽  
The Law ◽  
Geographical Scope

This chapter analyses the practical application of the law of belligerent occupation in internationalized armed conflicts in its temporal, geographical, and personal dimensions. Firstly, from a temporal perspective, the law is shown to apply once one of the conflict parties consolidates its control over the enemy territory and substitutes its own authority for that of the displaced enemy. Secondly, the chapter assesses the geographical scope of the applicable law and draws specific guidelines for the determination of the territory subject to the law of occupation in various types of internationalized armed conflicts. Thirdly, the chapter endorses the allegiance-based approach to the designation of protected persons under the law of occupation and applies it to the reality of internationalized armed conflict. Overall, the chapter presents a workable toolkit for the application of the law of occupation to internationalized armed conflicts.

Line Drawing in the Dark

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-136
Author(s):  
Adam J. Kolber
Keyword(s):  
Line Drawing ◽  
The Law ◽  
Do So

Abstract The law inevitably draws lines. These lines distinguish, for example, whether certain conduct reflects ordinary recklessness constituting manslaughter or more extreme recklessness constituting murder. There is no way to meaningfully draw such lines, however, absent shared ways of representing amounts of recklessness or at least knowledge of the consequences of drawing lines in particular places. Yet legal actors frequently draw lines in the dark, establishing cutoffs along a spectrum with little or none of the information required to do so in a way that suits the law’s goals. For example, jurors must decide whether some conduct constitutes extreme recklessness without knowing prior precedent nor the sentencing consequences of drawing cutoffs in particular places. Judges and lawyers cite line drawing precedents from other jurisdictions without considering whether the lines drawn in prior cases had the same consequences as those in the case at bar. And scholars argue about how to classify conduct without making clear what consequences they believe ought to attach once the classification is made, leaving it hard to tell when scholars have substantive or simply superficial disagreements. In this Article, I discuss some line drawing problems and briefly suggest ways we can add meaning to cutoffs. More generally, I argue, we can “smooth” certain features of the law to both reduce our vulnerability to line drawing in the dark and improve the fit between the law and what our best theories of law recommend. Even when we cannot easily smooth the law, thinking about the law in a smoother fashion can help reduce the jurisprudential pathologies I describe.

Reverberating the Glas: Towards a Deconstructive Account of Particularity in Hegel's Logic of the Concept

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Jakub Mácha
Keyword(s):  
Free Play ◽  
Subjective Perspective ◽  
The Law

Abstract Understanding Hegel's account of particularity has proven to be anything but straightforward. Two main accounts of particularity have been advanced: the particular as an example or instance and the particular as a subjective perspective on a universal concept. The problem with these accounts is that they reduce particularity either to singularity or to universality. As Derrida's analyses make apparent, the ‘structure of exemplarity’ in Hegel is quite intricate. Hegel uses ‘example’ in three senses: it means (1) ‘instance’, ‘illustration’, or (2) ‘model’, ‘exemplary individual’, ‘paradigm’, or (3) a by-play (a meaning derived from Hegel's neologism beiherspielen, in which Beispiel is understood quasi-etymologically as a ‘by-play’ of accidental moments). A Beispiel in the first sense can be replaced by another instance in a free play (by-play). This play of accidental moments, however, is not entirely free; it generates a series (of replacements) that ultimately leads to an example in the second sense, to an exemplary individual. I argue that particularity can be taken as exemplarity of this kind, oscillating between a singular example and a universal paradigm. Within this by-play, the universal concept, its law, is supposed to be mediated and determined. However, out of the differences between the examples the by-play induces another law, the law of non-mediation, which may, in Derrida's view, actually negate the dialectical movement towards universality. I argue, utilizing Malabou's concept of plasticity, that this disruption may be recovered. This implies that each individual example within a series is a particular determination of the universal. Hence, we can take literally Hegel's claim that the movement of the concept is play.

Guarding the Public Interest: England's Coroners and Organ Transplants, 1960–1975

2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 926-946 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen MacDonald
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Spare Part ◽  
Organ Transplants ◽  
Legal Requirement ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Law ◽  
Do So

AbstractFrom the mid-twentieth century, England's coroners were crucial to the supply of organs to transplant, as much of this material was gleaned from the bodies of people who had been involved in accidents. In such situations the law required that a coroner's consent first be obtained lest removing the organs destroy evidence about the cause of the person's death. Surgeons challenged the legal requirement that they seek consent before taking organs, arguing that doing so hampered their quick access to bodies. Some coroners willingly cooperated with surgeons while others refused to do so, coming into conflict with particular transplanters whom they considered untrustworthy. This article examines how the phenomenon of “spare part” surgery challenged long-held conceptions of the coroner's role.

scholarly journals Culpability, Kingston and the Law Commission

2010 ◽  
Vol 74 (5) ◽  
pp. 434-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cath Crosby
Keyword(s):  
Justice System ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Character Theory ◽  
Criminal Offence ◽  
Pragmatic Approach ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Law Commission ◽  
Do So

This article considers the basis upon which a person should be held to be criminally liable, and to do so, it is necessary to examine the leading theories of character and choice that underpin the State holding a person to be culpable of a criminal offence, i.e. the link between culpability and fault. The case of R v Kingston1 is used to examine the application of these leading theories and it is observed that choice theorists would not excuse such a defendant from criminal liability even though his capacity to make a choice to refrain from law breaking was made extremely difficult by external factors beyond his control. Only character theory could possibly offer exculpation in such circumstances on the basis that the defendant acted ‘out of character’ and his deed did not deserve the full censure and punishment of the criminal law. The Court of Appeal in R v Kingston would have been prepared to excuse, but the House of Lords, and most recently the Law Commission have adopted a pragmatic approach to the involuntarily intoxicated offender. This case serves as a reminder that while justice is the aim of the criminal justice system, it is not an absolute standard.

The Law of International Criminal Procedure and Domestic War Crimes Trials

2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-635 ◽  
Author(s):  
Göran Sluiter
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Procedure ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
Specific Context ◽  
National Courts ◽  
International Criminal Tribunals ◽  
War Crimes Trials ◽  
The Law ◽  
Do So

AbstractThis article deals with the question of possible effect of the law of international criminal procedure for domestic war crimes trials. With the increasing number of national prosecutions for war crimes this question will gain in relevance.The article starts with an exploration of the origin and development of the law of international criminal procedure, to reach the conclusion that because of the lack of a strong foundation it is difficult to discern firmly established rules in this field. Next, two areas are examined where the law of international criminal procedure is capable of producing effect for national trials: human rights and rules that have developed in the specific context of war crimes prosecutions.Whether rules of international criminal procedure are formally effective in the domestic legal order remains to be seen. There is no clear obligation under international law to do so. Furthermore, the law of international criminal procedure may be difficult to harmonise with domestic inquisitorial systems.In spite of these difficulties, the article concludes that national courts will increasingly face similar procedural problems in complex war crimes trials as international criminal tribunals and will be happy to learn from their experiences.

scholarly journals Civil Disobedience in Times of Pandemic: Clarifying Rights and Duties

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoann Della Croce ◽  
Ophelia Nicole-Berva
Keyword(s):  
Working Conditions ◽  
Healthcare Professionals ◽  
Medical Profession ◽  
Civil Disobedience ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Normative Evaluation ◽  
The Law ◽  
Descriptive Sense ◽  
Public Demonstration ◽  
Do So

AbstractThis paper seeks to investigate and assess a particular form of relationship between the State and its citizens in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, namely that of obedience to the law and its related right of protest through civil disobedience. We do so by conducting an analysis and normative evaluation of two cases of disobedience to the law: (1) healthcare professionals refusing to attend work as a protest against unsafe working conditions, and (2) citizens who use public demonstration and deliberately ignore measures of social distancing as a way of protesting against lockdown. While different in many aspects, both are substantially similar with respect to one element: their respective protesters both rely on unlawful actions in order to bring change to a policy they consider unjust. We question the extent to which healthcare professionals may participate in civil disobedience with respect to the duty of care intrinsic to the medical profession, and the extent to which opponents of lockdown and confinement measures may reasonably engage in protests without endangering the lives and basic rights of non-dissenting citizens. Drawing on a contractualist normative framework, our analysis leads us to conclude that while both cases qualify as civil disobedience in the descriptive sense, only the case of healthcare professionals qualifies as morally justified civil disobedience.

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