scholarly journals Analysis of the Relationship between Monetary Policy and Stock Market Liquidity

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 25-27
Author(s):  
Feng Liang

After the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, the introduction of the economic theory has promoted the integration of the global socialist market economy. Thereafter, this integration of the domestic and international market has been preliminarily completed, the role of the factor market in resource allocation has been improved, and a sturdy environment has been established for the development of Chinese enterprises. With the effective implementation of a series of policies after the financial system reform, the roles of the financial market in regulating macro-economy and revitalizing the market have become increasingly prominent. In regard to that, it has effectively promoted the financial market as a trade to “enrich people.” This paper analyzes the relationship between monetary policy and stock market liquidity in terms of the influence of the former on the latter and suggests strategies to enhance the liquidity effect of monetary policy.

Author(s):  
Octavio Fernández-Amador ◽  
Martin Lukas Gächter ◽  
Martin Larch ◽  
Georg Peter

2013 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 54-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Octavio Fernández-Amador ◽  
Martin Gächter ◽  
Martin Larch ◽  
Georg Peter

2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jieun Lee ◽  
Doojin Ryu ◽  
Ali M. Kutan

2013 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 637-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yijiang Zhao ◽  
Arthur Allen ◽  
Iftekhar Hasan

AbstractWe test the relationship between takeover protection and voluntary disclosure in a setting of antitakeover laws in a firm’s state of incorporation. After correcting for the endogeneity of firms’ incorporation choices, we find that firms incorporated in states with more antitakeover laws have higher levels of voluntary disclosure and stock market liquidity. Further tests do not support shareholder demands being the driving force for this association. Our findings are consistent with takeover protection and poor disclosure serving as substitute mechanisms for deterring takeovers. Therefore, as antitakeover statutes mitigate takeover threats, they enhance managers’ incentives to disclose more in order to realize capital market benefits.


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