The impact of geographic location on the foreign policy behavior of states. (c2002)

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cynthia Nasard
Author(s):  
Janice Stein

The use of psychological concepts to explain the behavior of individuals and groups that shape foreign policy is centuries old. Thucydides in his great History of the Peloponnesian War explored the impact of the fear of decline on leaders’ decisions to go to war. Barbara Tuchman in The Guns of August demonstrated how misperception and miscalculation by leaders in the summer of 1914 led to an accidental war that no leader wanted or expected. During and after World War II, political scientists began to draw systematically on psychological concepts to explain foreign policy behavior. Scholarship advanced when the International Society of Political Psychology was founded in 1978 along with a specialized journal, Political Psychology. Early scholarship focused on leaders’ personalities and their impact on the foreign policy choices they made, with special attention devoted to decisions to go to war or make peace. A second wave of scholarship drew on the work of cognitive psychologists who had identified heuristics and biases to explore the impact of the way leaders thought on the foreign policy decisions that they made and examined pairs of interacting leaders to explain spirals of escalation. Scholars mined cognitive psychology to explore decisions to cooperate or compete, the success and failure of deterrence and compellence, and bargaining and signaling behavior by leaders. A third wave of scholarship drew on psychological research on emotion and examined how the emotional states of leaders influenced foreign policy choices. Scholars moved beyond leaders to study elite and group attributes to explain foreign policy behavior. In doing so, they confronted the central problem of aggregation; cognition and emotion are embedded in the individual. When they move to explain group behavior, scholars deepened psychological concepts by adding a broader social dimension to the analysis. Research in the last decade situates feeling and thinking in a larger social and cultural context in a more contextualized explanation of foreign policy behavior. Research is increasingly multidisciplinary, drawing on neuroscience, evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, and behavioral economics to explain foreign policy behavior.


2020 ◽  
pp. 91-112
Author(s):  
Nael M. Shama

In the international system, states whose capabilities are neither too great nor too small are called middle powers. At a general level of analysis, a middle power could be identified using three approaches: its possession of material capabilities, the way it acts and the way its policymakers perceive its foreign policy identity. The first, often called the “position” approach, sketches at length relevant quantifiable factors, such as geographic location, size, population, gross domestic product (GDP), and defense spending. Yet, a state’s ownership of material capabilities does not in itself indicate that it wants to embrace an assertive and active foreign policy. Therefore, in the late 1980s and early 1990s a shift took place, to the “behavioral” approach, which examines the foreign policy behavior of states to identify and understand middle powers. The third approach, the “identity” approach, considers how policymakers think about the foreign policy identity of their states. This approach presents a straightforward method of identification that has a reasonable power of prediction. It informs us of the kind of foreign policy behavior likely to be followed.


Author(s):  
Eric Hamilton

Scholarship on the relationship between domestic institutions and foreign policy is driven by the assumption that a state’s domestic political arrangement can explain important aspects of its foreign policy behavior. Democratic domestic institutions, in particular, are thought to be significant for explaining an important set of outcomes. Research shows, for example, that democracies tend to cooperate with each other; uphold their commitments; make more effective threats; engage in fewer wars with each other (but do fight non-democracies quite frequently); perform better in the wars in which they are involved; and tend to fight wars of shorter duration. Studying the impact of democratic domestic institutions on foreign policy has developed along two broad lines. The first and most established approach is rooted in the basic distinction between democracies and non-democracies. In this view, democratic institutions constrain leaders in a way that produces distinct democratic foreign policy patterns. This approach has yielded a tremendous amount of research and insight into democratic foreign policy, but also suffers from several important shortcomings. One is that democracy tends to be correlated with a host of other variables, making it difficult to specify what exactly it is about democracy that explains certain foreign policy outcomes. A second and related critique of this approach is that it tends to treat democracy uniformly when in fact there is often great variation in democratic domestic institutions across cases. A second and more recent approach focuses on the differences among democracies and seeks to explain how this variation, in turn, creates variation in foreign policy behavior. Democracies differ in terms of their underlying institutional arrangements in a variety of ways, including whether they have presidential or parliamentary systems, autonomous or constrained executives, and open or closed institutions to modulate the flow of information between leaders and citizens, among others. Even within a country, there can be a different set of institutional constraints on democratic leaders depending on the given foreign policy instrument they seek to employ. Studying these variations and their impact on policy processes and outcomes provides great promise for further unpacking the relationship between domestic democratic institutions and foreign policy.


1979 ◽  
Vol 73 (2) ◽  
pp. 494-504 ◽  
Author(s):  
James M. McCormick ◽  
Young W. Kihl

In this study, we evaluate whether the increase in the number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) has resulted in their increased use for foreign policy behavior by the nations of the world. This question is examined in three related ways: (1) the aggregate use of IGOs for foreign policy behavior; (2) the relationship between IGO membership and IGO use; and (3) the kinds of states that use IGOs. Our data base consists of the 35 nations in the CREON (Comparative Research on the Events of Nations) data set for the years 1959–1968.The main findings are that IGOs were employed over 60 percent of the time with little fluctuation on a year-by-year basis, that global and “high politics” IGOs were used more often than regional and “low politics” IGOs, that institutional membership and IGO use were generally inversely related, and that the attributes of the states had limited utility in accounting for the use of intergovernmental organizations. Some of the theoretical implications of these findings are then explored.


2019 ◽  
Vol IV (II) ◽  
pp. 238-244
Author(s):  
Asif Farooq ◽  
Umbreen Javaid

China’s tremendous rise will certainly be one of the major turbulent of the current century. Chinese leadership has already astonished the world with its economic development and active diplomacy. It is apparent that there will be a greater increase in Chinese power, influence, and involvement in regional and global affairs in future decades. We cannot envisage the exact nature of Chinese objectives and intentions in near future, however, we can proclaim that Chinese aims will be more spacious than they now are. Some observers view this increasing Chinese enthusiasm in regional affairs as a step towards regional hegemony, while others regard it as promotion of mutual understandings and economic interdependence. Some regional states are viewing Chinese policies with cautions and concerns have been raised in international community. To discuss and elaborate all these aspects of Chinese foreign policy behavior; the major paradigms like realism, liberalism, and constructivism will be explored respectively.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Majid Divsalar ◽  
Ebrahim Javadi Veshki

In international system scene, interests and strategies for ensuring these interests are among key strategies of powerful countries. Therefore, super powers, organize security in different geographical areas through competition in order to challenge competitors and threaten them. Shanghai cooperation organization (SCO), as the most important security measure, has been developed by influence of competitive atmosphere in international system by help of Russian, China and some other important regional allies in response to transatlantic actions. As a result, this security measure could control peripheral threats in the region. In this regard, Islamic Republic of Iran, has considered emergence of this regional security measure as a serious threat for its national and regional interests and has acted to suppress them in the framework of its defense diplomacy. Considering this, authors try to answer this question that how Shanghai cooperation organization as security measure can influence the foreign policy behavior of Islamic Republic of Iran? By studying and analyzing how and why Shanghai cooperation organization (SOC) around Islamic Republic of Iran and determining foreign policy of super powers in establishing this organization, its effect on the foreign policy behavior of Islamic Republic of Iran is considered.


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