The UAE

Middle powers rise at times of instability in the international or regional orders. Two sets of middle powers, namely the traditional and the so-called “emerging” middle powers, came to being during and after the Cold War, respectively. On the one hand, traditional middle powers, such as Australia and Canada, emerged during the Cold War. On the other hand, emerging middle powers ascended after the Cold War, and are not the traditional “good citizens” but controversial reformists with independent foreign policy portfolios, and they are becoming increasingly vocal in world affairs.

The Kingdom and the Glory?

In recent years, Saudi Arabia has faced a number of serious challenges to its geopolitical position in the Persian Gulf regional security complex. Having long relied upon the United States as a guarantor of its security, recent friction between Washington and Riyadh, coupled with what appeared to be a burgeoning rapprochement between the US and Iran, has caused policymakers in Riyadh to reconsider Saudi foreign policy behavior.

Middle Power Theory at the Regional Level

The Middle East has often been characterized as a regional system without a regional hegemon. Although several Arab and non-Arab states have aspired to regional hegemony over the decades, none have succeeded. Instead, the structure of the regional system has constituted an important stimulus for the emergence of regional middle powers. The traditional contenders for regional leadership at the core of the Arab system—Egypt, Syria, and Iraq—are further domestically weakened and unable to play a leading, let alone independent, regional role.

‘A Giant Afraid of its Shadow’

This chapter examines Algeria’s foreign policy from the perspective of the concept of “middlepowermanship.” As a middle power, Algeria has adopted many roles to protect its national interests and the preservation of its regime. The main argument in this chapter is that Algeria was destined to be a middle power, but for reasons that will be elucidated, policymakers have refrained from advancing the state as a middle power with the potential of being a regional hegemon in the Maghreb-Sahel region. Thus, the objective is to highlight the lingering difficulty in adequately classifying Algeria’s foreign policy and to understand why such a major country is unwilling to play a regional and international role concomitant with its military and economic capacities.

Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran is described by some pundits as a “middle power,” or as an influential regional player, without whose cooperation not many Gulf and Middle Eastern problems can be satisfactorily addressed. The republic has achieved a level of power and resource capability to be able to impact geopolitical developments within its region and beyond, in support of what it regards as its national interests. The country’s economic and hard and soft power, along with its size, geographical position, culture, and riches drawn from oil and gas, are taken into account in this respect. It is therefore able to affect events, positively or negatively, in its neighborhood, and to deal with major powers from a bargaining position at bilateral and multilateral levels.

Egypt’s Middle Power Aspirations Under el-Sisi

In the international system, states whose capabilities are neither too great nor too small are called middle powers. At a general level of analysis, a middle power could be identified using three approaches: its possession of material capabilities, the way it acts and the way its policymakers perceive its foreign policy identity. The first, often called the “position” approach, sketches at length relevant quantifiable factors, such as geographic location, size, population, gross domestic product (GDP), and defense spending. Yet, a state’s ownership of material capabilities does not in itself indicate that it wants to embrace an assertive and active foreign policy. Therefore, in the late 1980s and early 1990s a shift took place, to the “behavioral” approach, which examines the foreign policy behavior of states to identify and understand middle powers. The third approach, the “identity” approach, considers how policymakers think about the foreign policy identity of their states. This approach presents a straightforward method of identification that has a reasonable power of prediction. It informs us of the kind of foreign policy behavior likely to be followed.

Middle Eastern Middle Powers

This chapter analyzes a selection of mediation and conflict-prevention initiatives promoted by Middle Eastern middle powers since the 1980s. It begins by noting that behavioral approaches to middle power status consider systematic engagement in mediation and conflict prevention as one of the key traits of “middlepowerness,” and reflects on how the literature on middle power mediation and norm-based international behavior can be applied specifically to the Middle East. It then turns to the analysis of three case studies of norm-based mediation or conflict resolution initiatives promoted by three Middle Eastern middle powers—Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt—since the 1980s.

Introduction

The concept of and approaches to “middlepowerhood” have been key to explaining the identity, behavior, and foreign policy roles of many states (such as the United Kingdom, France, Australia, or Brazil) in the international system. However, with the exception of a few studies, this literature has failed to examine cases from the Middle East, despite the theoretical and empirical potential that regional dynamics offer for such an examination. Only a few studies have utilized the concept to understand or explain the behavior of regional actors. This volume addresses this major gap, by offering several contributions that interrogate the conceptual, theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the concept of “middle power” or “middlepowerhood” by examining several cases from the Middle East region. The volume raises several core questions. Namely, what is a middle power, and what does it mean to be a middle power in the Middle East? What drives middle power behavior? Is it the identity, material attributes or position of a state in regional and international orders? Should we focus on the behavior or attributes of states to determine whether they fit the category of middlepowerhood? Empirically, why do some regional actors aspire to be middle powers, while others refrain from doing so? What induces or constrains the behavior of middle powers?

Small-State Aspirations to Middlepowerhood

This chapter argues that small states such as Qatar and the UAE can break the mold of small-state classification, but that the tipping point to middlepowerhood for Qatar came and went during the Morsi presidency in Egypt. Furthermore, as a result of the backlash against an active and interventionist Qatari foreign policy, it could yet become an outlying state on the fringes of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The UAE is found to be approaching a “tipping point” to middlepowerhood due to a combination of factors that are generally enhancing its influence in international affairs.

Middling or Meddling?

The behavior of regional middle powers generates useful challenges to, and avenues for, developing conceptual and theoretical understandings of middle power behavior generally. Owing to its origins, the concept of “middle power” has hitherto demarcated states that are neither great nor weak in their size, economic capability and military power. However, an examination of Middle East regional rivalries questions this definition and reveals that regional influence can be exerted by actors that vary in size and capabilities. Additionally, I find that although some actors possess middle power attributes, they choose to refrain from transforming this potential into real power.