Collective Action Failures and Lenders of Last Resort: Lessons from the U.S. Foreclosure Crisis

2012 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 333-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Zalewski
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Foreclosure Crisis ◽  
The U.S

Analyzing Rates of Seriously Delinquent Mortgages in Asian Census Tracts in the United States

2017 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 616-638 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katrin B. Anacker
Keyword(s):  
Race And Ethnicity ◽  
Weighted Least Squares ◽  
The United States ◽  
Community Survey ◽  
Descriptive Statistics ◽  
Social Differences ◽  
Metropolitan Statistical Areas ◽  
Census Tracts ◽  
Foreclosure Crisis ◽  
The U.S

Although race and ethnicity have been analyzed and discussed in the context of the national foreclosure crisis, there has been little work on neighborhoods in which different Asian subgroups reside, which is surprising given the relatively large demographic, economic, and social differences. Based on NSP 3 data, provided by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and 2005/2009 American Community Survey (ACS) data, provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, this article utilizes descriptive statistics and weighted least squares (WLS) regressions to analyze rates of seriously delinquent mortgages for Census tracts in all Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), differentiating among different Asian subgroups. Findings show that neighborhoods with Hmong, Laotian, and Cambodian households had relatively high rates of seriously delinquent mortgages, whereas neighborhoods with Chinese, Japanese, and Pakistani households had relatively low rates of seriously delinquent mortgages.

Good Faith in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Mapping a Shift from Enforcement to Voluntary Compliance

2007 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dania Thomas ◽  
Javier García-Fronti
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Legal Rule ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
Fair Dealing ◽  
Voluntary Compliance ◽  
Debt Market ◽  
Specific Standard ◽  
Collective Action Clauses ◽  
The U.S

AbstractOur examination of changes in the period leading up to the Argentine debt exchange and after, reveals that with Collective Action Clauses (CACs), the sovereign debt market is increasingly reliant on good faith as a standard of fair dealing to ensure fair and orderly debt restructurings in the future. Unlike the entrenched, enforceable, doctrinal good faith in domestic jurisdictions such as the U.S., the norm relied on in the sovereign debt market is a contextual open norm similar to the notion of Treu und Glauben, section 242 BGB of the German civil code. It is not a legal rule with specific requirements that need to be fulfilled. This paper reveals that reliance on a contextual, open norm is evidence of a shift in the framework that regulates sovereign debt restructurings: a shift from enforcement to voluntary compliance. Further, we argue that in the absence of a multilateral, regulatory, framework that embeds good faith as a specific standard of fair dealing, this reliance will exacerbate not solve the problem of sovereign debt restructurings.

Cities Destroyed (Again) For Cash: Forum on the U.S. Foreclosure Crisis

2008 ◽  
Vol 29 (8) ◽  
pp. 745-784 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff Crump ◽  
Kathe Newman ◽  
Eric S. Belsky ◽  
Phil Ashton ◽  
David H. Kaplan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Foreclosure Crisis ◽  
The U.S

The Ethics of Collective Security

1993 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
David C. Hendrickson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Economic Sanctions ◽  
The United States ◽  
Gulf War ◽  
Good Thing ◽  
Collective Security ◽  
Unilateral Action ◽  
Action Collective ◽  
The U.S

This article is based upon Rousseau's vision of interdependence being a habitual source of conflict among nations. Today's version of collective security, in contrast to Woodrow Wilson's advocation of exclusive use of political and economic sanctions, often demands military action. Collective security offers inherent contradictions: Does multilateral action, for example, usually led by the United States, indicate international accord on countering the ‘aggressor’? The authors' answer is “no” because smaller nations may be joining the crusade for completely different reasons, for example, so as not to offend the larger partner. Does multilateral action always succeed in creating a Pax Universalis? No, on the contrary it may lead to war. Generally offering arguments from the U.S. perspective and examples from the Gulf War, Hendrickson sees neither collective action as necessarily a good thing nor unilateral action as necessarily a bad thing. However, he does urge reconsideration of the advantages of collective security as an all-powerful preventor of conflict.

scholarly journals Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Reciprocity

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric A. Posner
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
International Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
Laws Of War ◽  
Human Rights Regime ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Patterns Of Behavior ◽  
Self Enforcement ◽  
The U.S

Abstract Human rights law does not appear to enjoy as high a level of compliance as the laws of war, yet is institutionalized to a greater degree. This Article argues that the reason for this difference is related to the strategic structure of international law. The laws of war are governed by a regime of reciprocity, which can produce selfenforcing patterns of behavior, whereas the human rights regime attempts to produce public goods and is thus subject to collective action problems. The more elaborate human rights institutions are designed to overcome these problems but fall prey to second-order collective action problems. The simple laws of war institutions have been successful because they can exploit the logic of reciprocity. The Article also suggests that limits on military reprisals are in tension with self-enforcement of the laws of war. The U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda is discussed.

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