From Social to Private Ownership: Multiple Blockholders in Slovenian Unlisted Firms

2011 ◽  
Vol 47 (5) ◽  
pp. 27-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Gregorič ◽  
Arjana Brezigar Masten ◽  
Katarina Zajc
2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-100
Author(s):  
Raffaele Caterina

“A system of private ownership must provide for something more sophisticated than absolute ownership of the property by one person. A property owner needs to be able to do more than own it during his lifetime and pass it on to someone else on his death.”1 Those who own things with a long life quite naturally feel the urge to deal in segments of time. Most of the owner's ambitions in respect of time can be met by the law of contract. But contract does not offer a complete solution, since contracts create only personal rights. Certain of the owner's legitimate wishes can be achieved only if the law allows them to be given effect in rem—that is, as proprietary rights. Legal systems have responded differently to the need for proprietary rights limited in time. Roman law created usufruct and other iura in re aliena; English law created different legal estates. Every system has faced similar problems. One issue has been the extent to which the holder of a limited interest should be restricted in his or her use and enjoyment in order to protect the holders of other interests in the same thing. A common core of principles regulates the relationship between those who hold temporary interests and the reversioners. For instance, every system forbids holder of the possessory interest to damage the thing arbitrarily. But other rules are more controversial. This study focuses upon the rules which do not forbid, but compel, certain courses of action.


Author(s):  
Ekaterina Pravilova

“Property rights” and “Russia” do not usually belong in the same sentence. Rather, our general image of the nation is of insecurity of private ownership and defenselessness in the face of the state. Many scholars have attributed Russia's long-term development problems to a failure to advance property rights for the modern age and blamed Russian intellectuals for their indifference to the issues of ownership. This book refutes this widely shared conventional wisdom and analyzes the emergence of Russian property regimes from the time of Catherine the Great through World War I and the revolutions of 1917. Most importantly, the book shows the emergence of the new practices of owning “public things” in imperial Russia and the attempts of Russian intellectuals to reconcile the security of property with the ideals of the common good. The book analyzes how the belief that certain objects—rivers, forests, minerals, historical monuments, icons, and Russian literary classics—should accede to some kind of public status developed in Russia in the mid-nineteenth century. Professional experts and liberal politicians advocated for a property reform that aimed at exempting public things from private ownership, while the tsars and the imperial government employed the rhetoric of protecting the sanctity of private property and resisted attempts at its limitation. Exploring the Russian ways of thinking about property, the book looks at problems of state reform and the formation of civil society, which, as the book argues, should be rethought as a process of constructing “the public” through the reform of property rights.


2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Emilio Farinós Viñas ◽  
Begoña Herrero Piqueras ◽  
Miguel Angel Latorre Guillem

Author(s):  
Douglas J. Cumming ◽  
Aurelie Sannajust ◽  
Monika Tarsalewska ◽  
Jie Zhu

2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 441-447
Author(s):  
J. Davis ◽  
G. Cashin

This paper examines the similarities and differences between public and private ownership of water utilities, including variations such as corporatisation. In any utility where the asset owner and the asset operator are the same, there are pressures to reduce operations and maintenance costs and capital expenditure to maximise returns. The authors argue that this is the case irrespective of whether such returns are to private shareholders or dividends to government. On the other hand, where the asset owner and the asset operator are separate entities with a clearly defined contractual interface, it is not possible to increase returns by reducing operations and maintenance standards, presuming a properly constructed contract. This is because the performance standards are clearly stipulated in the contract with payment reductions applying for non-performance. Such a model can be put in place irrespective of whether the asset owner is a private company or a public utility. The paper examines the profit incentive applying to private and public sector organisations in models where:the asset owner and the asset operator are the same organisation;models where the asset owner and the asset operator are separate organisations, with the service delivery performance governed by a clearly defined contractual interface. The paper shows why the drivers governing the behaviour of public sector and private sector owners are similar, and how the separation of asset owner and asset operator can be used to ensure that service delivery standards are achieved at the lowest cost, whilst providing full transparency to shareholders, regulators and customers alike. The paper also reviews actual comparative data on service quality and performance under a number of ownership and contractual models, and draws conclusions on the effectiveness of the various asset owner/operator models in terms of service delivery performance and costs.


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