ELECTORAL FRAUD IN THE 2009 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN IRAN

Significance The twin votes were marred by an opposition boycott, allegations of electoral fraud and apparent state-backed violence. With a COVID-19-related state of emergency now in operation, the Front for the Defence of the Constitution (FNDC), an umbrella civil society and opposition movement which opposed the new constitution, faces difficult strategic choices as it seeks to prevent President Alpha Conde seeking a third term in December’s scheduled presidential elections. Impacts Conde’s likely candidacy will further polarise the country and heighten the risk of civil unrest. In the event of an opposition candidate winning the presidency, the new constitution will almost certainly be repealed. A Conde candidacy and poll-related violence could see the EU issue targeted sanctions against Conde and his allies, including travel bans.

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The 2020 Presidential Election in Belarus: Erosion of Authoritarian Stability and Re-politicization of Society

Nationalities Papers ◽

10.1017/nps.2021.33 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 49 (5) ◽

pp. 808-819

Author(s):

Sofie Bedford

Keyword(s):

Presidential Elections ◽

Political Mobilization ◽

Status Quo ◽

The Political ◽

Electoral Fraud ◽

The Past ◽

Political Status ◽

Current Affairs ◽

Election Results ◽

Near Future

AbstractOn August 9, 2020, presidential elections were held in Belarus. Despite blatant electoral fraud and procedural violations, the official results declared Aleksandr Lukashenka reelected for a sixth term. While in the past, even the most obviously fraudulent election results have been followed by an atmosphere of resigned acceptance, this time countless Belarusians took to the streets to contest the results. What made this election different? This analysis of current affairs looks at the 2020 events through the lens of authoritarian consolidation theory, suggesting the unprecedented political mobilization was enabled by erosion in the three pillars of authoritarian stability: repression, cooptation, and legitimation. A majority of the population had been accepting the political status quo out of fear, for social and monetary security provided in exchange for loyalty, or a general understanding that there were no alternatives. Lukashenka did not realize this had largely changed. Nine months later, the foundation of the authoritarian regime is in an even worse shape. The regime’s reliance on repression further counteracts the legitimacy of the system. As a result, it seems it will be difficult for the authorities to re-consolidate authoritarianism, at least in the near future, no matter how the ‘revolution’ unfolds.

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â€˜I do not know who won the electionsâ€™: How Not to Conduct Elections and Kenyaâ€™s Democratic Reversals

Politeia ◽

10.25159/0256-8845/3274 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 33 (3) ◽

pp. 44-67 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Westen K. Shilaho

Keyword(s):

Presidential Elections ◽

Ethnic Violence ◽

Electoral Fraud ◽

Per Se ◽

Multiparty Politics

The role of election management bodies (EMBs) in consolidation of democracy, peace and stability in Africa cannot be overemphasised. Kenyaâ€™s electoral bodies have struggled to assert their autonomy from the executive, a prerequisite for credible elections, since the advent of multiparty politics in 1991. The violently disputed presidential elections in 2007 were partly triggered by a partisan and politicised electoral body. The Chairman of the defunct Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) controversially declared the incumbent, Mwai Kibaki, winner, igniting unprecedented ethnic violence. In the midst of the crisis, he explosively confessed that he did not know who won the elections. The 2013 elections were meant to restore Kenyansâ€™ confidence in elections. However, Raila Odinga, the controversial presidential loser in 2007, once again accused the electoral body, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), of electoral fraud in favour of Uhuru Kenyatta. Consequently, the opposition called for the disbandment of the IEBC. Are electoral bodies per se the cause of perennial disputed elections in Kenya?

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Haitian presidential election will move to runoff

Emerald Expert Briefings ◽

10.1108/oxan-db206591 ◽

2015 ◽

Keyword(s):

Presidential Election ◽

Presidential Elections ◽

International Aid ◽

Electoral Fraud ◽

Content Type ◽

Presidential Candidates ◽

Ruling Party ◽

The Way ◽

Held Back

Subject In a relatively successful first round of elections two clear frontrunners have emerged from a plethora of candidates Significance On November 5, Haiti's provisional electoral council (CEP) announced the results of the October 25 presidential elections. As expected, a runoff will now be held on December 27 between Jovenel Moise of the incumbent ruling party and Jude Celestin, who previously ran for the presidency in 2010. Despite some allegations of electoral fraud, the runoff looks set to go ahead, paving the way for intense campaigning and negotiations to win the support of the eliminated presidential candidates. Impacts The election of a new president in December will unlock more international aid, which has been held back due to political concerns. The new president's honeymoon period will be brief as he will face immediate security, economic and governability challenges. A peaceful electoral period could allow the UN Mission in Haiti to begin drawing its operations to a close.

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Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud

American Political Science Review ◽

10.1017/s0003055415000635 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 110 (1) ◽

pp. 180-197 ◽

Cited By ~ 50

Author(s):

ASHLEA RUNDLETT ◽

MILAN W. SVOLIK

Keyword(s):

Statistical Analysis ◽

Presidential Elections ◽

Point Of View ◽

Political Organization ◽

The Political ◽

Electoral Fraud ◽

Preliminary Support

Most electoral fraud is not conducted centrally by incumbents but rather locally by a multitude of political operatives. How does an incumbent ensure that his agents deliver fraud when needed and as much as is needed? We address this and related puzzles in the political organization of electoral fraud by studying the perverse consequences of incentive conflicts between incumbents and their local agents. These incentive conflicts result in a herd dynamic among the agents that tends to either oversupply or undersupply fraud, rarely delivering the amount of fraud that would be optimal from the incumbent’s point of view. Our analysis of the political organization of electoral fraud explains why even popular incumbents often preside over seemingly unnecessary fraud, why fraud sometimes fails to deliver victories, and it predicts that the extent of fraud should be increasing in both the incumbent’s genuine support and reported results across precincts. A statistical analysis of anomalies in precinct-level results from the 2011–2012 Russian legislative and presidential elections provides preliminary support for our key claims.

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