scholarly journals The Commission of Inquiry in the Perspectve of Administrative Law

1969 ◽  
pp. 366
Author(s):  
R. A. MacDonald

In an analysis of the role of public commissions of inquiry, the author discusses the various forms, classifications and rationales usually given for such inquiries, and examines judicial review proceedings in particular cases and current administrative law doctrine in light of the theory behind the creation of commissions. new theory of judicial review is then offered based upon number of functions which an ad hoc commission might serve.

Author(s):  
Angela Ferrari Zumbini

This chapter argues that, if France has been the home of administrative courts, Austria has greatly contributed to the development of administrative law with regard to administrative procedure. Thanks to the Austrian Administrative Court, established in 1875, administrative law has been increasingly important in the regulation of public affairs. The chapter analyses the causes, development, and effects of these features. One main theme is, of course, the scope and purpose of judicial review of administrative action. In this respect, the chapter shows the growth of litigation and the liberal approach followed by the Court. Moreover, the role of the Court as lawmaker is examined in the light of the general principles of law that it developed. . Such principles included legality and procedural fairness, with particular regard to the right to a hearing and the duty to give reasons. Considered as a whole, they required public administrations to act reasonably rather than arbitrarily. Finally, it was judge-made law that constituted the basis for the codification of 1925.


1992 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 89-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Feldman ◽  
Mark Gould

In a recent issue of this journal (Volume 15, Number 4, Fall 1990), Susan Sterett examined the role of the Law Commission in the development of English administrative law. She suggested that the Commission mimicked a “peak association” and adopted an “idiom of legalism” in order to justify its reform proposals. This comment disagrees with Sterett on three grounds. First, the role and constitutional position of the Commission is far more complex than Sterett suggests, and this affects the way in which the Commission works. Second, judges and academic lawyers were central to the reform of substantive principles of judicial review in the 1960s and 1970s, making it unnecessary for the Law Commission to act in this field. Finally, it is wrong to ignore the fact that much administrative law occurs outside the judicial review procedure.


Author(s):  
Conor McCormick

This chapter analyses judicially developed standards for reviewing administrative actions in the United Kingdom between 1890 and 1910. By exploring the context, reach, types, and frequency of judicial review during that timeframe—fin de siècle—this historical analysis reveals both significant changes and significant continuities by comparison with twenty-first century standards. The chapter concentrates in particular on reported cases which undermine the Diceyan claim that administrative law did not exist in the United Kingdom during this timeframe; and reflects on the inconsistencies that pervaded that body of law. It concludes that some judges tended to deploy concepts which had the effect of restraining administrative actions, whereas other judicial constructs tended to facilitate the administrative arrangements contested in court. As such, it recommends that the role of judicial review at this time should be characterized with this duality of purpose firmly in mind.


Author(s):  
Mark Elliott ◽  
Jason Varuhas

This chapter examines grounds of judicial review that are substantive in two senses: it reduces the range of substantive options open to a decision-maker, or it involves judicial examination of the quality of the reasons for the decision itself, rather than the quality of the process adopted by the decision-maker. The chapter first considers the doctrine of reasonableness or rationality in administrative law before discussing the doctrine of proportionality and the notion of judicial deference in relation to variable intensity review. It also explores the role of the proportionality test in English law and the question of whether English courts are heading towards jettisoning the reasonableness doctrine in favour of utilizing proportionality in all relevant cases.


1998 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Craig

There is a growing literature concerning the role of the ultra vires doctrine and its place within administrative law. For some the doctrine is the central principle of administrative law, without which judicial intervention would rest on uncertain foundations. For others, it constitutes at best a harmless fiction, which is incapable of explaining all instances of judicial intervention, and at worst a device which allows the judiciary to conceal the real justifications for developments in judicial review. Christopher Forsyth falls into the former camp. He has written a vigorous defence of the ultra vires principle, contending that “it remains vital to the developed law of judicial review”. The purpose of this article is to contribute to the debate on this issue by putting the opposing view. The article will be divided into four sections.


2018 ◽  
Vol 277 (1) ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
D. A. Candeub

<p>Tirania e o direito administrativo</p><p> </p><p><em>The Federalist Papers </em>define “tyranny” as “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many.” This definition would seem to include the modern administrative agency, which exercises all three powers. To avoid tyrannical agencies and their illegitimate exercise of power, judges and academics look to administrative law. Its procedures and requirements, such as public comment, judicial review, agency reason-giving and deliberation, and executive oversight, saddle agencies with checks and balances and, therefore, legitimacy. Yet unease with the administrative state continues; indeed, it seems to be in a constant crisis of legitimacy, suggesting that administrative law’s quest for legitimacy has not succeeded. This Article argues that this crisis of legitimacy stems from the inherent conflict between the assumptions underlying those of administrative law and the Constitution. These sets of assumptions differ profoundly over political actors’ motivations and human nature, rationality in political and administrative decision-making, and the role of executive lawmaking in a democracy. This Article compares <em>The Federalist Papers </em>and administrative law and scholarship to uncover those differences. But this Article does not engage in an “originalist” critique of administrative law. Instead, it shows that administrative law’s crisis of legitimacy inevitably proceeds from its jarring discontinuity with deep assumptions underlying our constitutional structure.</p><p> </p><p>A obra <em>O federalista </em>define “tirania” como “a acumulação de todos os poderes, legislativo, executivo e judiciário, nas mesmas mãos, seja na de um, alguns ou vários”. Essa definição pareceria incluir a agência administrativa moderna, que exerce todos os três poderes. Para evitar agências tiranas e seu exercício ilegítimo do poder, juízes e acadêmicos procuram o direito administrativo. Seus procedimentos e requerimentos, como comentários públicos, revisão judicial, agência de razão e deliberação e supervisão executiva, selam agências com verificações e balanços e, portanto, legitimação. Ainda assim, o desconforto com o Estado administrativo continua; inclusive, parece ser uma constante crise de legitimidade, sugerindo que a busca do direito administrativo por legitimidade não prosperou. Este artigo argumenta que essa crise de legitimidade se origina do conflito inerente entre hipóteses subjacentes às do direito administrativo e a Constituição. Esse conjunto de hipóteses difere profundamente das motivações de atores políticos e da natureza humana, da racionalidade na tomada de decisões políticas e administrativas, e em toda a legislação executiva na democracia. Este artigo compara a obra <em>O federalista</em>, as leis administrativas e a escolaridade para revelar aquelas diferenças. Mas este artigo não se engaja em uma crítica “original” do direito administrativo. Pelo contrário, mostra que a crise de legitimidade do direito administrativo inevitavelmente provém de chocante descontinuidade com premissas subjacentes à estrutura constitucional.</p>


Author(s):  
Joana Mendes

Despite operating in highly constrained legal environments, executive actors may act in a constitutive capacity. This observation prompts a critical assessment of the role of procedural principles in EU administrative law. As norms of conduct deployed by executive bodies during the process of implementing norms, procedural principles may have legal dimensions that, while constitutionally relevant, may not come to the fore in judicial review. The chapter develops this argument with regard to the multifaceted character of the duty to give reasons. It argues that the duty to give reasons ought to ensure the constitutional embeddedness of the constitutive action of EU executive bodies. Such role is consistent both with the original relevance of the duty to give reasons to the law of integration (in the context of the European Coal and Steel Community) and with the current EU constitutional framework. The latter justifies reinstituting the original constitutional function of the duty to give reasons, irrespective of its current scope in the context of judicial review.


Author(s):  
Bruno Denis Vale Castro ◽  
Paulo Roberto Barbosa Ramos

O presente artigo se propõe a analisar a deliberação interna e legitimidade das decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal em sede de Controle de Constitucionalidade, observada uma conjuntura de revisão da Teoria da Separação dos Poderes e necessidade de criação de novos arranjos institucionais. Neste aspecto, tem-se como objetivo geral repensar o papel do Supremo Tribunal Federal em um modelo de controle de constitucionalidade, bem como sua legitimidade, justificação de suas decisões e deliberação interna, superando a dicotomia ativismo judicial/ deferência ao legislativo, tendo em vista a necessidade de readequação da Teoria da Separação dos Poderes, de modo que se leve a Constituição a sério e se responda ao anseio de desenvolvimento democrático-social brasileiro.Por fim, considera-se que a necessidade de que algum órgão delibere em sede de controle de constitucionalidade não significa que esta deva ser permanente ou que não possa haver alguma espécie de diálogo entre os poderes, concebendo assim, que Supremo Tribunal Federal não detém o monopólio da guarda da Constituição, havendo a possibilidade de um papel mais protagonista do legislativo, a partir da utilização dos mecanismos já existentes ou mesmo da criação de novos dispositivos que permitam diálogos institucionais.Palavras-chave: Ativismo judicial. Diálogos institucionais. Controle de constitucionalidadeBETWEEN THE ACTIVISM AND LEGISLATIVE (IN) EFFICIENY: DELIBERATION AND LEGITIMACY OF DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN OFFICE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND REVIEW OF THE THEORY OF SEPARATION OF POWERSABSTRACT: This article aims to analyze the internal deliberation and legitimacy of decisions of the Supreme Court in place of Judicial Review, observed a conjuncture Revision Theory of Separation of Powers and the need to create new institutional arrangements. In this respect, it has the general objective to rethink the role of the Supreme Court in a model of judicial review, as well as its legitimacy, justification of their decisions and internal deliberation, overcoming the dichotomy judicial activism /deference to the legislature, with a view the need to readjust the Theory of Separation of Powers, so that light the Constitution seriously and respond to the yearning of Brazilian democratic and social de-velopment. Finally, it is considered that the need for some body deliberates on seat of judicial review does not mean that it must be permanent or may not be some sort of dialogue between the powers, conceived so that the Supreme Court does not hold monopoly of safeguarding the Constitution , with the possibility of a more protagonist role of the legislature, from the use of existing or even the creation of new devices that allow institutional dialogue mechanisms.KEYWORDS: Judicial activism. Institutional dialogues. Judicial review.ENTRE EL ACTIVISMO Y LA (IN) OPERANCIA LEGISLATIVA: DELIBERACIÓN Y LA LEGITIMIDAD DE LAS DECISIONES DE LA CORTE SUPREMA EN LA SEDE DE CONTROL DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD, EN UN CONTEXTO DE NUEVOS ARREGLOS INSTITUCIONALES Y LA REVISIÓN DE LA TEORÍA DE LA SEPARACIÓN DE PODERESRESUMEN: El articulo intenta analizar la deliberación interna y la legitimidad de las decisiones del Supremo Tribunal Federal en sede de Control de Constitucionalidad, observada una coyuntura de revisión de la Teoría de la Separa-ción de los Poderes y la necesidad de creación de nuevas relaciones institucionales. En ese aspecto, tiene como objetivo general pensar de otra forma el papel del Supremo Tribunal Federal en un modelo de control de constitu-cionalidad, y también su legitimidad, justificación de sus decisiones y deliberación interna, con la superación de la dicotomía activismo judicial/deferencia al legislativo, teniendo en vista la necesidad de readecuación de la Teoría de la Separación de los Poderes, de forma que se lleve a Constitución en serio y se presenta una respuesta a los deseos de desarrollo democrático-social brasileño. Al final, tiene en consideración la necesidad de que algún órgano delibere en sede de control de constitucionalidad no significa que este debe ser permanente o que no pueda haber alguna suerte de dialogo entre los poderes, concibiendo así, que el Supremo Tribunal Federal no detiene el mono-polio de la guardia de la constitución, habiendo la posibilidad de un papel más protagonista do legislativo, a partir de la utilización de los mecanismos ya existentes o mismo de la creación de nuevos dispositivos que vengan a permitir diálogos institucionales.PALABRAS CLAVE: Activismo judicial. Diálogos institucionales. Control de constitucionalidad


Fundamina ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 128-198
Author(s):  
D M Pretorius

This contribution explores the historical origins and development of judicial review in South Africa as a function and as an indication of shifts in relations between – and of the relative legal and political powers of – the three branches of state. It also provides bibliographical details of sources chronicling these historical processes. The contribution is published into two parts. This first part focuses primarily on the historical development of constitutional review, namely the power of the courts of law to test the validity of legislation against constitutional criteria. The scope of this power depends not only on the relevant constitutional provisions, but also on the actual and perceived independence of the judiciary, as well as on judicial dispositions and socio-political attitudes toward the courts. This part of the contribution further considers the origins of judicial review of the proceedings of inferior courts and of voluntary associations. The second part of the article will analyse the historical development of administrative law, with the emphasis on the common-law evolution of judicial review of the administrative decision-making processes of organs of state. In addition, it will investigate the growth of administrative law as a discrete discipline in South African law schools. Finally, it will look at the role of the interpretation of statutes in the context of administrative law.


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