Basic Law: Israel as Nation-State—National Honor Defies Human Dignity and Universal Human Rights

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 213
Author(s):  
Kamir
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-117
Author(s):  
Billy Holmes

Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights facilitates inequality regarding the imposition of the death penalty and thus, it cannot ensure universality for the protection of the right to life. Paragraph two of this article states: ‘sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes.’ This article argues that the vagueness of the phrase ‘the most serious crimes’ allows states to undermine human rights principles and human dignity by affording states significant discretion regarding the human rights principles of equality and anti-discrimination. The article posits that this discretion allows states to undermine human dignity and the concept of universal human rights by challenging their universality; by facilitating legal inequality between men and women. Accordingly, it asserts that the implications of not expounding this vague phrase may be far-reaching, particularly in the long-term. The final section of this article offers a potential solution to this problem.


1996 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kretzmer

In 1992 the Israeli Knesset enacted the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom. These basic laws, as chapters in Israel's emerging formal Constitution, have opened the way for judicial review of parliamentary legislation that violates human rights. Opposition from some political quarters prevented inclusion in the basic laws of some rights protected under modern constitutions and human rights treaties. However, the rights protected include ‘human dignity’, a term that can be broadened by judicial interpretation so as to include violations of rights not specifically mentioned in the basic laws. The basic laws lay down a balancing test for deciding whether restrictions on protected rights are legitimate. All restrictions must be prescribed by a law that befits Israel as a Jewish and democratic State, that was enacted for a worthy purpose and that meets the proportionality test.


2006 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 12-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aharon Barak

This Article discusses the normative basis for the protection of human rights in Israel and discusses various effects of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty enacted in 1992. The Article points out that this “constitutional revolution” affected not only the judiciary, which enforces the protection of human rights, but both the executive and the legislative branches that have also internalized the constitutional revolution, by carefully evaluating every bill proposed and every other government action to ensure that it passes constitutional muster. Additionally, the Article discusses the effect of the constitutional revolution on public discourse in Israel. A central part of the discussion is devoted to the role of the protection of human rights in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, and to the role of the protection of human rights during periods of terror activities.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masoumeh Rad Goudarzi ◽  
Alireza Najafinejad

Abstract The inability of traditional Shi’a jurisprudents to respond to the challenges in the field of human rights and the rights of religious minorities, which is rooted in the denial of human dignity and the emphasis on religious dignity, has led to the emergence of a new discourse among contemporary Shi’a jurisprudents in Iran in recent years. This group of jurists known as reformist jurists seeks to re-evaluate the jurisprudential laws, re-interpret the Shari’a and find a way out of the religion to reduce the existing conflict with the universal human rights standards. The opinions of this group of jurists, albeit criticized by the traditional scholars, have been welcomed by young clerics. To understand the main aspects of this jurisprudential dispute, two main questions have been considered by the researchers: What are the main principles of human rights in the thoughts of traditionalist and reformist jurists in Iran? And how differently have the reformist jurists conceptualized the subject of human rights? To answer these questions, the impact of traditional jurisprudents on the formulation of the current constitution of Iran is studied and the main differences between the views of traditional and modern jurists are evaluated.


Author(s):  
AC (Rinie) Steinmann

The concept of human dignity is relatively new in international and domestic constitutional law. Dignity is protected as a value or a right, or both, in international law and many domestic jurisdictions. It is difficult to define human dignity in a legal context, as the concept is not defined in the first international document which recognizes inherent human dignity and the protection thereof, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1946) and many international (and national) documents enacted thereafter. Despite dissensus regarding the widespread use of the concept, dignity has come to display three elements in constitutional adjudication post World War Two: the ontological element which entails that human beings have equal inherent human dignity that cannot be waived or diminished; the second element being the claim that inherent human dignity has to be recognised and respected; and the limited-state claim as the third element which entails that states have a positive obligation to progressively realise human dignity through the mechanism of socio-economic rights. It is widely accepted that these elements root in Kantian moral ethics which holds that man's autonomy is based upon universal dignity, as a result of which man should never be used as a means to an end, but only as a means in himself. Kant expressed this idea through formulation of a categorical imperative, namely that everyone's inherent human dignity has to be respected and protected universally. The preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1946), article 1(1) of the German Basic Law and section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 embody the elements of Kant's categorical imperative. As a result, the three elements are applied as a definitional term of human dignity in German and South African constitutional adjudication. Based on these elements, it can be argued that the current idea of universal inherent dignity, at least in German and South African law, comports with Kant's ideal that man should never be used as a means to an end.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Sieber

AbstractModern neurotechnologies are rapidly infringing on conventional notions of human dignity and they are challenging what it means to be human. This article is a survey analysis of the future of the digital age, reflecting primarily on the effects of neurotechnology that violate universal human rights to dignity, self-determination, and privacy. In particular, this article focuses on neuromarketing to critically assess potentially negative social ramifications of under-regulated neurotechnological application. Possible solutions are critically evaluated, including the human rights claim to the ‘right to mental privacy’ and the suggestion of a new human right based on spiritual jurisdiction, where the human psyche is a legal space in a substantive legal setting.


2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-241
Author(s):  
Mirko Pecaric

This paper explores recent notions in public administration, which are intertwined and addressed to the administration of public affairs. On this basis it demonstrates that content of legal system is filled through the static legal principles and rules, but they receive their real content through the informal practices and conditions of the human mind. The paper concludes that discussed notions could have only one name, because they all are the synonyms of reciprocal relation between the human dignity and efficient administration.


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