scholarly journals Mindware instantiation as a predictor of logical intuitions in the Cognitive Reflection Test

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Burič ◽  
Ľubica Konrádová

Following the growing body of evidence suggesting that substantial individual differences in reasoning exist already at early stages of the reasoning process and that reasoners might be able to produce logical intuitions, the model of mindware automatization posits that the mindware acquired to the extent that it is fully automatized can cue the logically correct type 1 response. In this study, we asked participants to solve the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) presented under the two-response paradigm. Among individual difference factors, we measured mindware instantiation and conflict detection efficiency. These variables explained approximately 10% of the variance in the accuracy of intuitive answers. We also observed that in more than half of cases, the correct response was already correct at the initial response stage. These results are in line with the theoretical model of mindware automatization to a large extent and raise a question about the main attribute of the CRT. Keywords: cognitive reflection, mindware, conflict detection, logical intuition, two-response paradigm

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Burič ◽  
Jakub Šrol

Studies on individual differences in susceptibility to cognitive biases have identified several cognitive dispositions which were thought to predict reasoning by contributing to the efficiency of analytic thought. Recently formulated hybrid models, however, suggest that substantial differences between reasoners may arise early already in the intuitive stages of the reasoning process. To address this possibility, we examined standard individual difference measures, mindware instantiation, and conflict detection efficiency as predictors of the accuracy on conflict reasoning problems presented under a two-response paradigm. This was intended to tease apart the predictors of intuitive responding from those factors which only contribute to reasoning when participants have enough time for analytic engagement. We found that participants correctly solved almost half of conflict reasoning problems already at the initial response stage and that the individual differences in initial reasoning performance were predicted by their cognitive reflection, mindware instantiation, and detection efficiency. The findings advance the specification of hybrid dual-process models and provide corroborating evidence that a part of the link between bias susceptibility and cognitive dispositions is due to differences in intuitive processing.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakub Šrol ◽  
Wim De Neys

One of the key components of the susceptibility to cognitive biases is the ability to monitor for conflict that may arise between intuitively cued “heuristic” answers and logical principles. While there is evidence that people differ in their ability to detect such conflicts, it is not clear which individual factors are driving these differences. In the present large-scale study (N = 399) we explored the role of cognitive ability, thinking dispositions, numeracy, cognitive reflection, and mindware instantiation (i.e. knowledge of logical principles) as potential predictors of individual differences in conflict detection ability and overall accuracy on a battery of reasoning problems. Results showed that mindware instantiation was the single best predictor of both conflict detection efficiency and reasoning accuracy. Cognitive reflection, thinking dispositions, numeracy, and cognitive ability played a significant but smaller role. The full regression model accounted for 40% of the variance in overall reasoning accuracy, but only 7% of the variance in conflict detection efficiency. We discuss the implications of these findings for popular process models of bias susceptibility.


2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Białek ◽  
Przemysław Sawicki

Abstract. In this work, we investigated individual differences in cognitive reflection effects on delay discounting – a preference for smaller sooner over larger later payoff. People are claimed to prefer more these alternatives they considered first – so-called reference point – over the alternatives they considered later. Cognitive reflection affects the way individuals process information, with less reflective individuals relying predominantly on the first information they consider, thus, being more susceptible to reference points as compared to more reflective individuals. In Experiment 1, we confirmed that individuals who scored high on the Cognitive Reflection Test discount less strongly than less reflective individuals, but we also show that such individuals are less susceptible to imposed reference points. Experiment 2 replicated these findings additionally providing evidence that cognitive reflection predicts discounting strength and (in)dependency to reference points over and above individual difference in numeracy.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Edgcumbe

Abstract:Performance on Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is thought to predict moral judgments concerning the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). This relationship is hypothesised to be mediated by the tendency toward thinking dispositions such as actively open-minded thinking (AOT), rational (REI-R) and experiential thinking (REI-E), and religiosity. The relationship between cognitive reflection, intuitive thinking and moral judgments with thinking dispositions are examined. As the MFQ measures five types of moral judgments which include ‘individualising values’ – harm and fairness, and ‘binding values’ - loyalty, authority and purity it was hypothesised that performance on these moral foundations would be influenced by thinking dispositions and cognitive reflection. Results indicate that the relationship between cognitive reflection and moral judgments were mediated differently by thinking dispositions. Religious participants and intuitive thinkers alike scored highly on binding moral values. Analytic thinkers and non-religious participants scored highly on individualising moral values. The data is consistent with religiosity and intuition being inherently linked and suggests that moral values are influenced by individual differences in thinking dispositions and cognitive style.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-145
Author(s):  
Predrag Teovanović

The study aimed to examine several assumptions of dual process theories of reasoning by employing individual difference approach. A set of categorical syllogisms was administered to a relatively large sample of participants (N = 247) along with attached confidence rating scales, and measures of intelligence and cognitive reflection. As expected, response accuracy on syllogistic reasoning tasks highly depended on task complexity and the status of belief-logic conflict, thus demonstrating beliefbias on the group level. Individual difference analyses showed that more biased subject also performed poorer on Raven's Matrices (r = .25) and Cognitive Reflection Test (r = .27), which is in line with assumptions that willingness to engage and capacities to carry out type 2 processes both contribute to understanding of rational thinking. Moreover, measures of cognitive decoupling were significantly correlated with the performance on conflict syllogisms (r = .20). Individual differences in sensitivity to conflict detection, on the other side, were not related to reasoning accuracy in general (r = .02). Yet, additional analyses showed that noteworthy correlation between these two can be observed for easier syllogistic reasoning tasks (r = .26). Such results indicate that boundary conditions of conflict detection should be viewed as a function of both tasks' and participants' characteristics.


2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (7) ◽  
pp. 1011-1022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oshin Vartanian ◽  
Erin L. Beatty ◽  
Ingrid Smith ◽  
Kristen Blackler ◽  
Quan Lam ◽  
...  

Performance on heuristics and bias tasks has been shown to be susceptible to bias. In turn, susceptibility to bias varies as a function of individual differences in cognitive abilities (e.g., intelligence) and thinking styles (e.g., propensity for reflection). Using a classic task (i.e., lawyer–engineer problem), we conducted two experiments to examine the differential contributions of cognitive abilities versus thinking styles to performance. The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)—a well-established measure of reflective thinking—predicted performance on conflict problems (where base rates and intuition point in opposite directions), whereas STM predicted performance on nonconflict problems. Experiment 2 conducted in the fMRI scanner replicated this behavioral dissociation and enabled us to probe their neural correlates. As predicted, conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the ACC—a key region for conflict detection—even in cases when participants responded stereotypically. In participants with higher CRT scores, conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and activation in PCC covaried in relation to CRT scores during conflict problems. Also, CRT scores predicted activation in PCC in conflict problems (over and above nonconflict problems). Our results suggest that individual differences in reflective thinking as measured by CRT are related to brain activation in PCC—a region involved in regulating attention between external and internal foci. We discuss the implications of our findings in terms of PCC's possible involvement in switching from intuitive to analytic mode of thought.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Niraj Patel

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) has quickly become a popular measure of individual differences in propensity to reflect versus rely on intuition (Frederick, 2005). The test consists of three questions, and it has been found to be associated with many different every day beliefs, such as religious beliefs, and performance on heuristics and biases tasks. As such, it has dominated recent theorizing about individual differences in intuitive/reflective thinking propensities. However, it is unclear whether these questions primarily measure individual differences in reflective versus intuitive thinking propensities, versus numeracy, or even another cognitive skill such as cognitive restructuring (i.e. the ability to reframe problems). The present research examined the extent to which the CRT performance can be attributed to individual differences in intuitive/reflective thinking propensities, versus other factors such as numeracy and/or insight problem solving ability, by observing whether presenting the correct answers in multiple-choice format without the "intuitive" answers would make the problems trivially easy or if many participants would still be unable to solve the problems correctly. Furthermore, it sought to determine whether the CRT's associations with other judgments and beliefs (e.g. religiosity, paranormal beliefs, etc.) can be explained by its assessment of intuition/reflection or one of these other factors. Results indicate that performance on the CRT is multiply determined, with numeracy and insight problem solving ability also being primary factors. Furthermore, numeracy in particular could help explain some differences in everyday beliefs. Keywords: Cognitive Reflection, Intuition, Numeracy, Insight, Beliefs, Judgments


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 447-466
Author(s):  
Klara Rapan ◽  
Pavle Valerjev

Until recently, studies within the dual-process approach were mainly focused on group differences in processing, and individual differences were neglected. However, individual differences have proven to be a significant factor in conflict detection efficiency and the overall success in base-rate neglect and similar tasks. This should be taken into consideration within the framework of the Hybrid Model of Dual Processing. New tendencies in the development of this model have focused attention on the degree of mindware instantiation as a predictor of base-rate neglect task efficiency. This study aimed to examine the relationship between mindware and base-rate neglect task efficiency and to test and explore the relationship between base-rate response frequency and conflict detection efficiency and the degree of mindware instantiation. All participants solved base-rate neglect tasks, made judgments of confidence in their responses, and solved the Statistical Reasoning Test, Cognitive Reflection Test and Numeracy Scale. We used the Statistical Reasoning Test as a measure of mindware instantiation. The degree of mindware instantiation was found to be the only significant predictor of base-rate neglect task efficiency and the results showed that participants with a higher degree of mindware instantiation generally made more base-rate responses. No correlation was found between the degree of mindware instantiation and conflict detection efficiency. These findings support the hypothesis that the power of logical intuition depends on the individual’s degree of mindware instantiation. Therefore, the results of this research indicate the importance of further research into the role of statistical reasoning in base-rate neglect task efficiency. However, we discuss that there are some methodological limitations in this research which might explain why the degree of mindware instantiation had no relationship with conflict efficiency.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kilian James Garvey ◽  
Laura Folse ◽  
Crystal Curry

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