scholarly journals Is Automation of Statistical Reasoning a Suitable Mindware in a Base-Rate Neglect Task?

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 447-466
Author(s):  
Klara Rapan ◽  
Pavle Valerjev

Until recently, studies within the dual-process approach were mainly focused on group differences in processing, and individual differences were neglected. However, individual differences have proven to be a significant factor in conflict detection efficiency and the overall success in base-rate neglect and similar tasks. This should be taken into consideration within the framework of the Hybrid Model of Dual Processing. New tendencies in the development of this model have focused attention on the degree of mindware instantiation as a predictor of base-rate neglect task efficiency. This study aimed to examine the relationship between mindware and base-rate neglect task efficiency and to test and explore the relationship between base-rate response frequency and conflict detection efficiency and the degree of mindware instantiation. All participants solved base-rate neglect tasks, made judgments of confidence in their responses, and solved the Statistical Reasoning Test, Cognitive Reflection Test and Numeracy Scale. We used the Statistical Reasoning Test as a measure of mindware instantiation. The degree of mindware instantiation was found to be the only significant predictor of base-rate neglect task efficiency and the results showed that participants with a higher degree of mindware instantiation generally made more base-rate responses. No correlation was found between the degree of mindware instantiation and conflict detection efficiency. These findings support the hypothesis that the power of logical intuition depends on the individual’s degree of mindware instantiation. Therefore, the results of this research indicate the importance of further research into the role of statistical reasoning in base-rate neglect task efficiency. However, we discuss that there are some methodological limitations in this research which might explain why the degree of mindware instantiation had no relationship with conflict efficiency.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Burič ◽  
Jakub Šrol

Studies on individual differences in susceptibility to cognitive biases have identified several cognitive dispositions which were thought to predict reasoning by contributing to the efficiency of analytic thought. Recently formulated hybrid models, however, suggest that substantial differences between reasoners may arise early already in the intuitive stages of the reasoning process. To address this possibility, we examined standard individual difference measures, mindware instantiation, and conflict detection efficiency as predictors of the accuracy on conflict reasoning problems presented under a two-response paradigm. This was intended to tease apart the predictors of intuitive responding from those factors which only contribute to reasoning when participants have enough time for analytic engagement. We found that participants correctly solved almost half of conflict reasoning problems already at the initial response stage and that the individual differences in initial reasoning performance were predicted by their cognitive reflection, mindware instantiation, and detection efficiency. The findings advance the specification of hybrid dual-process models and provide corroborating evidence that a part of the link between bias susceptibility and cognitive dispositions is due to differences in intuitive processing.


2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-286
Author(s):  
Paul Whitney ◽  
John M. Hinson ◽  
Allison L. Matthews

AbstractWhile improving the theoretical account of base-rate neglect, Barbey & Sloman's (B&S's) target article suffers from affect neglect by failing to consider the fundamental role of emotional processes in “real world” decisions. We illustrate how affective influences are fundamental to decision making, and discuss how the dual process model can be a useful framework for understanding hot and cold cognition in reasoning.


2018 ◽  
Vol 71 (12) ◽  
pp. 2548-2561 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marin Dujmović ◽  
Pavle Valerjev

We examined the role of conflict monitoring processes in forming metacognitive judgements of confidence while performing base rate tasks. Recently proposed models of dual-process reasoning, as well as research, have shown that conflict detection might represent a link between Type 1 and Type 2 processing. Conflict detection has also been shown to affect metacognitive processes in reasoning tasks. By varying base rate probability and congruence, we generated base rate tasks of four distinct levels of congruence. The results of two experiments showed that participants were slower and less confident in conflict conditions regardless of their response. However, there were two distinct subsets of participants with different levels of sensitivity to conflict which resulted in different patterns of results when using low base rate ratios. In-depth analyses showed that the impact of base rate information in the formation of metacognitive judgements depended on congruence and response type. Base rate information was a more salient cue for metacognitive processes when responding according to base rates compared with responding according to belief. There is evidence that base rate information may serve as a direct cue for metacognition, independent of fluency.


2000 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 679-680 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Hoffrage

Stanovich & West analyze individual differences with respect to response output (e.g., participants' numerical estimates). They do not analyze the underlying cognitive processes that led to the outputs; they thereby probably misclassify some non-normative responses as normative. Using base rate neglect and overconfidence as examples, I demonstrate the advantages of analyzing cognitive processes further.


2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 276-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Newell ◽  
Brett Hayes

AbstractThe article by Barbey & Sloman (B&S) provides a valuable framework for integrating research on base-rate neglect and respect. The theoretical arguments and data supporting the nested set model are persuasive. But we found the dual-process account to be under-specified and less compelling. Our concerns are based on (a) inconsistencies within the literature cited by B&S, and (b) studies of base-rate neglect in categorization.


2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans ◽  
Shira Elqayam

AbstractWe agree that current evolutionary accounts of base-rate neglect are unparsimonious, but we dispute the authors' account of the effect in terms of parallel associative and rule-based processes. We also question their assumption that cueing of nested set relations facilitates performance due to recruitment of explicit reasoning processes. In our account, such reasoning is always involved, but usually unsuccessful.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakub Šrol ◽  
Wim De Neys

One of the key components of the susceptibility to cognitive biases is the ability to monitor for conflict that may arise between intuitively cued “heuristic” answers and logical principles. While there is evidence that people differ in their ability to detect such conflicts, it is not clear which individual factors are driving these differences. In the present large-scale study (N = 399) we explored the role of cognitive ability, thinking dispositions, numeracy, cognitive reflection, and mindware instantiation (i.e. knowledge of logical principles) as potential predictors of individual differences in conflict detection ability and overall accuracy on a battery of reasoning problems. Results showed that mindware instantiation was the single best predictor of both conflict detection efficiency and reasoning accuracy. Cognitive reflection, thinking dispositions, numeracy, and cognitive ability played a significant but smaller role. The full regression model accounted for 40% of the variance in overall reasoning accuracy, but only 7% of the variance in conflict detection efficiency. We discuss the implications of these findings for popular process models of bias susceptibility.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Burič ◽  
Ľubica Konrádová

Following the growing body of evidence suggesting that substantial individual differences in reasoning exist already at early stages of the reasoning process and that reasoners might be able to produce logical intuitions, the model of mindware automatization posits that the mindware acquired to the extent that it is fully automatized can cue the logically correct type 1 response. In this study, we asked participants to solve the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) presented under the two-response paradigm. Among individual difference factors, we measured mindware instantiation and conflict detection efficiency. These variables explained approximately 10% of the variance in the accuracy of intuitive answers. We also observed that in more than half of cases, the correct response was already correct at the initial response stage. These results are in line with the theoretical model of mindware automatization to a large extent and raise a question about the main attribute of the CRT. Keywords: cognitive reflection, mindware, conflict detection, logical intuition, two-response paradigm


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