scholarly journals Dual Processing in Syllogistic Reasoning

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-145
Author(s):  
Predrag Teovanović

The study aimed to examine several assumptions of dual process theories of reasoning by employing individual difference approach. A set of categorical syllogisms was administered to a relatively large sample of participants (N = 247) along with attached confidence rating scales, and measures of intelligence and cognitive reflection. As expected, response accuracy on syllogistic reasoning tasks highly depended on task complexity and the status of belief-logic conflict, thus demonstrating beliefbias on the group level. Individual difference analyses showed that more biased subject also performed poorer on Raven's Matrices (r = .25) and Cognitive Reflection Test (r = .27), which is in line with assumptions that willingness to engage and capacities to carry out type 2 processes both contribute to understanding of rational thinking. Moreover, measures of cognitive decoupling were significantly correlated with the performance on conflict syllogisms (r = .20). Individual differences in sensitivity to conflict detection, on the other side, were not related to reasoning accuracy in general (r = .02). Yet, additional analyses showed that noteworthy correlation between these two can be observed for easier syllogistic reasoning tasks (r = .26). Such results indicate that boundary conditions of conflict detection should be viewed as a function of both tasks' and participants' characteristics.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Burič ◽  
Jakub Šrol

Studies on individual differences in susceptibility to cognitive biases have identified several cognitive dispositions which were thought to predict reasoning by contributing to the efficiency of analytic thought. Recently formulated hybrid models, however, suggest that substantial differences between reasoners may arise early already in the intuitive stages of the reasoning process. To address this possibility, we examined standard individual difference measures, mindware instantiation, and conflict detection efficiency as predictors of the accuracy on conflict reasoning problems presented under a two-response paradigm. This was intended to tease apart the predictors of intuitive responding from those factors which only contribute to reasoning when participants have enough time for analytic engagement. We found that participants correctly solved almost half of conflict reasoning problems already at the initial response stage and that the individual differences in initial reasoning performance were predicted by their cognitive reflection, mindware instantiation, and detection efficiency. The findings advance the specification of hybrid dual-process models and provide corroborating evidence that a part of the link between bias susceptibility and cognitive dispositions is due to differences in intuitive processing.


2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Białek ◽  
Przemysław Sawicki

Abstract. In this work, we investigated individual differences in cognitive reflection effects on delay discounting – a preference for smaller sooner over larger later payoff. People are claimed to prefer more these alternatives they considered first – so-called reference point – over the alternatives they considered later. Cognitive reflection affects the way individuals process information, with less reflective individuals relying predominantly on the first information they consider, thus, being more susceptible to reference points as compared to more reflective individuals. In Experiment 1, we confirmed that individuals who scored high on the Cognitive Reflection Test discount less strongly than less reflective individuals, but we also show that such individuals are less susceptible to imposed reference points. Experiment 2 replicated these findings additionally providing evidence that cognitive reflection predicts discounting strength and (in)dependency to reference points over and above individual difference in numeracy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaja Damnjanović ◽  
Vera Novković ◽  
Irena Pavlović ◽  
Sandra Ilić ◽  
Slobodan Pantelić

The dual process framework posits that we reason using the quick System 1, and the deliberate System 2, both of which are part of our “adaptive toolbox”. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) estimates which system was used to solve a reasoning problem. Usually, the CRT tasks are solved incorrectly by using System 1, and correctly through System 2. We have applied the reference point hypothesis to the tasks of the CRT and proposed that this change would facilitate the switch between systems, resulting in better performance on the version of the test with a reference point, compared to the CRT without one. The results confirmed our assumptions, as evidenced by a generally higher score on the CRT with a reference point, albeit with different effects between items.


2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (10) ◽  
pp. 1398-1407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gideon Nave ◽  
Amos Nadler ◽  
David Zava ◽  
Colin Camerer

In nonhumans, the sex steroid testosterone regulates reproductive behaviors such as fighting between males and mating. In humans, correlational studies have linked testosterone with aggression and disorders associated with poor impulse control, but the neuropsychological processes at work are poorly understood. Building on a dual-process framework, we propose a mechanism underlying testosterone’s behavioral effects in humans: reduction in cognitive reflection. In the largest study of behavioral effects of testosterone administration to date, 243 men received either testosterone or placebo and took the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), which estimates the capacity to override incorrect intuitive judgments with deliberate correct responses. Testosterone administration reduced CRT scores. The effect remained after we controlled for age, mood, math skills, whether participants believed they had received the placebo or testosterone, and the effects of 14 additional hormones, and it held for each of the CRT questions in isolation. Our findings suggest a mechanism underlying testosterone’s diverse effects on humans’ judgments and decision making and provide novel, clear, and testable predictions.


Author(s):  
Ayşegül Engin

AbstractThe cognitive reflection test (hereafter, CRT) is a widely used tool in studies that deal with human decision-making and problem-solving. However, the interpretation of the results of the test remains an open discussion in extant literature. Despite the high predictive power, the characteristics of a decision-maker measured by the CRT remain unclear. This article suggests a novel and inclusive framework that relates the CRT to the cognitive experiential theory (hereafter, CET), which is a well-established dual-process theory. The framework explains the observed phenomena (e.g., individual decision-maker differences) using data from five laboratory experiments. The framework is inclusive because it provides possible explanations for the results in the published literature. The overall results support the argument that the CRT measures the efficiency of the resources of an individual’s working memory. In contrast, the rationality experientiality inventory (hereafter, REI) (a measurement tool of the cognitive experiential theory) captures an individual’s cognitive ability. The efficient use of the working memory leads to the full potential of decision-makers’ cognitive abilities in analytical tasks, thereby indicating that cognitive ability and working memory form a viable framework for studies in the disciplines behavioral operational research (hereafter, OR) and decision sciences.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Byrd ◽  
Paul Conway

Conventional sacrificial moral dilemmas propose directly causing some harm to prevent greater harm. Theory suggests that accepting such actions (consistent with utilitarian philosophy) involves more reflective reasoning than rejecting such actions (consistent with deontological philosophy). However, past findings do not always replicate, confound different kinds of reflection, and employ conventional sacrificial dilemmas that treat utilitarian and deontological considerations as opposite. In two studies, we examined whether past findings would replicate when employing process dissociation to assess deontological and utilitarian inclinations independently. Findings suggested two categorically different impacts of reflection: measures of arithmetic reflection, such as the Cognitive Reflection Test, predicted only utilitarian, not deontological, response tendencies. However, measures of logical reflection, such as performance on logical syllogisms, positively predicted both utilitarian and deontological tendencies. These studies replicate some findings, clarify others, and reveal opportunity for additional nuance in dual process theorists’ claims about the link between reflection and dilemma judgments.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman Burič ◽  
Ľubica Konrádová

Following the growing body of evidence suggesting that substantial individual differences in reasoning exist already at early stages of the reasoning process and that reasoners might be able to produce logical intuitions, the model of mindware automatization posits that the mindware acquired to the extent that it is fully automatized can cue the logically correct type 1 response. In this study, we asked participants to solve the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) presented under the two-response paradigm. Among individual difference factors, we measured mindware instantiation and conflict detection efficiency. These variables explained approximately 10% of the variance in the accuracy of intuitive answers. We also observed that in more than half of cases, the correct response was already correct at the initial response stage. These results are in line with the theoretical model of mindware automatization to a large extent and raise a question about the main attribute of the CRT. Keywords: cognitive reflection, mindware, conflict detection, logical intuition, two-response paradigm


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikola Erceg ◽  
Zvonimir Galic ◽  
Andreja Bubić

When solving reasoning tasks such as the Cognitive reflection test (CRT) or the Belief bias syllogisms (BBS), people can do it in four different ways depending on whether they detected the conflict or not and whether they were accurate or not. Specifically, one can detect the conflict and be accurate, detect the conflict but be inaccurate, fail to detect the conflict but still be accurate or fail to detect the conflict and be inaccurate. In this study, we investigated whether the individual differences in intelligence, numerical ability, math knowledge and analytic thinking dispositions underpin these different approaches to solving reasoning tasks. Generally, we found that very accurate conflict non-detectors were the most intelligent, numerate and knowledgable of all the groups. On the contrary, inaccurate conflict non-detectors were the least intelligent, numerate and knowledgable, with the other two groups somewhere in between these two. However, the conclusions depended on what reasoning tasks were used and how the conflict detection was operationalized. We argue that these individual differences indicate that different people solve reasoning tasks in qualitatively different ways and that this calls in question the validity of reasoning tasks. Namely, we hypothesize that reasoning tasks could be measuring different constructs for different people. Specifically, we hypothesize and offer preliminary evidence that the CRT at least somewhat assesses reflection for those lower on cognitive abilities, but not at all for those very intelligent and numerate participants. We discuss how these findings relate to contemporary dual-process theories and validity of reasoning tasks and offer some speculations and suggestions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Volker Thoma ◽  
Leonardo Weiss-Cohen ◽  
Petra Filkuková ◽  
Peter Ayton

The attempts to mitigate the unprecedented health, economic, and social disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic are largely dependent on establishing compliance to behavioral guidelines and rules that reduce the risk of infection. Here, by conducting an online survey that tested participants’ knowledge about the disease and measured demographic, attitudinal, and cognitive variables, we identify predictors of self-reported social distancing and hygiene behavior. To investigate the cognitive processes underlying health-prevention behavior in the pandemic, we co-opted the dual-process model of thinking to measure participants’ propensities for automatic and intuitive thinking vs. controlled and reflective thinking. Self-reports of 17 precautionary behaviors, including regular hand washing, social distancing, and wearing a face mask, served as a dependent measure. The results of hierarchical regressions showed that age, risk-taking propensity, and concern about the pandemic predicted adoption of precautionary behavior. Variance in cognitive processes also predicted precautionary behavior: participants with higher scores for controlled thinking (measured with the Cognitive Reflection Test) reported less adherence to specific guidelines, as did respondents with a poor understanding of the infection and transmission mechanism of the COVID-19 virus. The predictive power of this model was comparable to an approach (Theory of Planned Behavior) based on attitudes to health behavior. Given these results, we propose the inclusion of measures of cognitive reflection and mental model variables in predictive models of compliance, and future studies of precautionary behavior to establish how cognitive variables are linked with people’s information processing and social norms.


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