scholarly journals The Logic of Term Limits Pledges

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Morrier
Keyword(s):  
Term Limits ◽  
Career Concerns ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Model Specification ◽  
Political Agency ◽  
Election Campaign ◽  
Agency Model

This article offers a rationale for candidates who voluntarily pledge to term limits. My analysis is built on a standard political agency model to which I add an election campaign where candidates can commit not to seek a second term. Pledging to term limits allows candidates to signal their private type and insulate themselves from career concerns. By doing so, candidates leverage the fact that the representative voter endogenously prefers to elect a candidate who does not seek reelection because she either has on average more desirable attributes, distorts her decisions to a lesser extent, or both. As a result, candidates who pledge to term limits have a higher probability of being elected in the first place. I characterize the equilibria of a model specification in which politicians differ with respect to their policy preferences and uncover circumstances in which term limits pledges are informative and improve the voter's welfare.

Modelling multiples identity types through agency: Part 3 – mindsets and the Trump election

Kybernetes ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 638-655 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Di Fatta ◽  
Maurice Yolles
Keyword(s):  
Content Analysis ◽  
Personality Traits ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Dynamic Theory ◽  
Multiple Identities ◽  
Political Agency ◽  
Election Campaign ◽  
Content Type

Purpose Building on theory in Part 2 of this paper, a relationship is developed between the strategic multiple identities considered there. Personality analytic pathologies arise when these identities are not consistent. This theory is then examined using the mindset agency theory (MAT) developed in Part 2 of the paper. Two classes of MAT models exist: a three-trait (MAT3T) and a five-trait (MAT5T). The former centres on personality traits, while the latter includes traits that are external to the personality. These are then applied to a case study of Donald Trump’s US election campaign. Design/methodology/approach By applying MAT3T and MAT5T to the Trump election campaign, personal and public identities are analysed using content analysis of his narratives. Findings Of the strategic identities, data can be accessed for two, and measured qualitatively using mindset theory, these indicating the likelihood of a personality with pathologies. It is found that Trump MAT3T and MAT5T take different values, suggesting that he has an analytical pathology in his political agency. Originality/value There is not currently any coherent dynamic theory of multiple identities able to provide measures indicative of personality pathologies.

scholarly journals A political agency model of coattail voting

2011 ◽  
Vol 95 (11-12) ◽  
pp. 1652-1660 ◽  
Author(s):  
Galina Zudenkova
Keyword(s):  
Political Agency ◽  
Agency Model

scholarly journals Lobbying as a Guard against Extremism

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Galina Zudenkova
Keyword(s):  
Interest Group ◽  
Special Interest ◽  
Policy Issue ◽  
Special Interest Group ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Common Agency ◽  
Policy Outcome ◽  
Existence Of Equilibrium ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Moderate Policy

Abstract This paper analyzes endogenous lobbying over a unidimensional policy issue. Individuals differ in policy preferences and decide either to take part in lobbying activities or not. They are assumed to be group rule-utilitarian such that they follow the rule that, if followed by everyone else in their special interest group, would maximize their group’s aggregate welfare. Once formed, lobbies make contributions to the incumbent government in exchange for a policy favor as in a common-agency model. I show the existence of equilibrium with two organized lobbies. Individuals with more extreme preferences are more likely to join lobbying activities. Therefore, the lobbyists are rather extremists than moderates. However, the competition between those extreme lobbies results in a more moderate policy outcome relative to that initially preferred by the biased government. Lobbies therefore guard against extremism, while acting as moderators of the government’s preferences.

scholarly journals Political Agency and Legislative Subsidies with Imperfect Monitoring

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Blumenthal
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Political Agency ◽  
Imperfect Monitoring ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Policy Making Process

Politicians are expected to implement projects that benefit their constituents. These projects’ benefits sometimes partially accrue to interest groups and not entirely to voters. Since these projects are costly to implement, this provides an incentive for interest groups to intervene in the policy-making process by offering legislative subsidies to politicians. In addition, voters are frequently ill-equipped to scrutinise politicians’ actions and can often only imperfectly monitor them. This paper shows how these considerations interact in a stylised two-periods political agency model with moral hazard and adverse selection. I show how and when voters benefit from the existence of self-interested interest groups and of their involvement in the policy-making process. I also consider how voters monitor politicians in the presence of interest groups that might capture projects’ benefits.

Citizenry Accountability in Autocracies

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Gilli ◽  
Yuan Li
Keyword(s):  
Political Agency ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
The Political ◽  
Economic Literature ◽  
Failed State ◽  
China Policy ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Different Types

AbstractDo the citizens have a role in constraining policies in autocratic governments? Usually the political and economic literature model autocracy as if the citizens have no role in constraining leader’s behavior, but actually autocratic government are afraid of possible citizens’ revolts. In this paper we focus on contemporary China to analyze how citizens might induce an autocratic government to adopt congruent policies. Although there is no party or electoral competition, the leader fears deposition by coup d’etat of the selectorate and revolutionary threats from citizens. We build a three player political agency model to study the role of both these constraints and we show that the effectiveness of the selectorate and of revolutionary threats are crucial factors in determining the policy outcomes. In particular, we show that the citizens can effectively discipline the leader because of the revolution threat notwithstanding the selectorate size, but this may result in a failed state when the costs of revolting and the selectorate size are small. As the size of the selectorate and the costs of revolution vary dramatically across countries, our result explain why different types of autocracies arise. In particular our model and results provide a useful framework to interpret China policy in the last twenty years.

scholarly journals A Political Theory of Populism *

2013 ◽  
Vol 128 (2) ◽  
pp. 771-805 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daron Acemoglu ◽  
Georgy Egorov ◽  
Konstantin Sonin
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
Soft Term ◽  
The Rich ◽  
The Right ◽  
Intermediate Amount

Abstract When voters fear that politicians may be influenced or corrupted by the rich elite, signals of integrity are valuable. As a consequence, an honest politician seeking reelection chooses “populist” policies—that is, policies to the left of the median voter—as a way of signaling that he is not beholden to the interests of the right. Politicians that are influenced by right-wing special interests respond by choosing moderate or even left-of-center policies. This populist bias of policy is greater when the value of remaining in office is higher for the politician; when there is greater polarization between the policy preferences of the median voter and right-wing special interests; when politicians are perceived as more likely to be corrupt; when there is an intermediate amount of noise in the information that voters receive; when politicians are more forward-looking; and when there is greater uncertainty about the type of the incumbent. We also show that soft term limits may exacerbate, rather than reduce, the populist bias of policies.

scholarly journals Candidate Traits in Elections: When Good News for Selection is Bad News for Accountability

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Schnakenberg
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Good News ◽  
Political Agency ◽  
Agency Model

We analyze a two-election political agency model with moral hazard and adverse selection in which candidates have observable traits such as job qualifications that help voters to imperfectly predict politicians' types. Candidate's traits can help voters select good types of politicians. However, selecting candidates with good traits can reduce accountability because the voter cannot commit to throw out politicians with good traits who produce bad outcomes. This result explains when and why voters may sometimes select candidates who they believe are less likely to be competent.

scholarly journals Candidate traits in elections: when good news for selection is bad news for accountability

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Keith Schnakenberg
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Good News ◽  
Political Agency ◽  
Agency Model

AbstractWe analyze a two-election political agency model with moral hazard and adverse selection in which candidates have observable traits such as job qualifications that help voters to imperfectly predict politicians' types. Candidate's traits can help voters select good types of politicians. However, selecting candidates with good traits can reduce accountability because the voter cannot commit to throw out politicians with good traits who produce bad outcomes. This result explains when and why voters may sometimes select candidates who they believe are less likely to be competent.

Separation of powers with ideological parties

2021 ◽  
pp. 095162982110172
Author(s):  
Alvaro Forteza ◽  
Juan S. Pereyra
Keyword(s):  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Political Agency ◽  
Elected Officials ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Agency Model ◽  
First Order ◽  
Political Environments ◽  
Ideological Parties ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Valence Issue

Separation of powers with checks and balances (SP) is usually regarded as a key institution complementing elections in the control of elected officials. However, some analysts and many politicians also warn that excessive checks on the executive in the presence of polarization may lead to political inaction. We analyze the interaction between elections and SP, and study under what circumstances they complement each other. We first introduce a political agency model with ideological parties where citizens and politicians care about rents (a valence issue) and policy (a positional issue). Then, we analyze the impact of SP on the effectiveness of elections to discipline and select politicians. We demonstrate that SP unambiguously raises a majority of voters’ welfare in highly polarized non-competitive political environments, because it strengthens both discipline and selection without causing political gridlock. SP also raises voters’ welfare if elections are very effective at disciplining first period incumbents. Nevertheless, SP may reduce voters’ welfare if most rents go undetected and reform is not a first-order issue.

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