A Theory of Sequential-Stage Signaling: Evidence from Equity-Crowdfunding
We develop a theory of sequential-stage signaling that addresses how issuers’ signals are perceived by the receivers when there is an intermediary that facilitates the transaction and the intermediary’s incentives may not be aligned with those of signal receivers. We propose that boundedly-rational receivers may misinterpret costly signals indicating issuers’ underlying quality and consider signals revealing intermediary’s private information on issuers’ quality to be more informative. We apply the theory to the context of equity crowdfunding offerings in the U.S. While the signal from ventures’ backing by professional investors is associated with more positive outcomes of the crowdfunding campaigns, our findings show that this effect is mediated by the equity stake requested by the crowdfunding platforms as compensation for their services. The platforms’ "skin in the game" sends an additional easily-interpretable signal to crowd investors on venture quality.