scholarly journals Reforming Intermediary Liability in the Platform Economy: A European Digital Single Market Strategy

Author(s):  
Giancarlo Frosio

Since the enactment of the first safe harbours and liability exemptions for online intermediaries, market conditions have radically changed. Originally, intermediary liability exemptions were introduced to promote an emerging Internet market. Do safe harbours for online intermediaries still serve innovation? Should they be limited or expanded? These critical questions—often tainted by protectionist concerns—define the present intermediary liability conundrum. Apparently, safe harbours still hold, although secondary liability is on the rise. As part of its Digital Single Market Strategy, the European Commission would like to introduce sectorial legislation that would de facto erode liability exemptions for online intermediaries, especially platforms. Under the assumption of closing a “value gap” between rightholders and online platforms allegedly exploiting protected content, the proposal would implement filtering obligations for intermediaries and introduce neighbouring rights for online uses of press publications. Meanwhile, an upcoming revision of the Audio-visual Media Services Directive would ask platforms to put in place measures to protect minors from harmful content and to protect everyone from incitement to hatred. Finally, the EU Digital Single Market Strategy has endorsed voluntary measures as a privileged tool to curb illicit and infringing activities online. This paper would like to contextualize the recent EU reform proposal within a broader move towards turning online intermediaries into Internet police. This narrative builds exclusively upon governmental or content industry assumptions, rather than empirical evidence. Also, the intermediary liability discourse is shifting towards an intermediary responsibility discourse. Apparently, the European Commission aligns its strategy for online platforms to a globalized, ongoing move towards privatization of enforcement online through algorithmic tools. This process might be pushing an amorphous notion of responsibility that incentivizes intermediaries’ self-intervention to police allegedly infringing activities in the Internet.

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giancarlo Frosio

As part of its Digital Single Market Strategy, the European Commission would like to introduce vertical regulations, replacing — or better conflicting with — the well-established eCommerce Directive horizontal intermediary liability regime. An upcoming revision of the Audio-visual Media Services Directive would ask platforms to put in place measures to protect minors from harmful content and to protect everyone from incitement to hatred. Meanwhile — under the assumption of closing a ‘value gap’ between rightholders and online platforms allegedly exploiting protected content — the Draft Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market would implement filtering obligations for intermediaries. Finally, the EU Digital Single Market Strategy has also endorsed voluntary measures as a privileged tool to curb illicit and infringing activities online. Each of these actions will erode the eCommerce intermediary liability arrangement by bringing in — in a way or another — proactive monitoring obligations and causing a systemic shift from a negligence-based to a strict liability regime for hosting providers. This systemic shift would apparently occur against public consensus and absent any justification based on empirical evidence. Nonetheless, it will bring about dire consequences by pushing privatization of enforcement online through algorithmic intelligence, based on murky, privately-enforced standards, rather than transparent legal obligations. This reform might cause a policy earthquake that will shake and crack EU law’s systemic consistency, due process and fundamental rights online.


Author(s):  
Maria Lillà Montagnani

This chapter reviews developments in the regulation of online platforms as a result of the European Digital Single Market (DSM) strategy. In order to show a shift from a conditional liability regime to an organizational one—that is, a regime where liability depends on the structure adopted by the undertaking in relation to the diverse types of content—this chapter unpacks the category of illegal content (copyright infringing content, harmful content, and misleading content) and details for each type the obligations that have been envisaged by the European institutions. In doing so, the chapter establishes the boundaries of the online intermediaries’ liability regime for illegal content that is emerging within the DSM strategy, analyses its main features, and addresses its coherence.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giancarlo Frosio

In imposing a strict liability regime for alleged copyright infringement occurring on YouTube, Justice Salomão of the Brazilian Superior Tribunal de Justiça stated that “if Google created an ‘untameable monster,’ it should be the only one charged with any disastrous consequences generated by the lack of control of the users of its websites.” In order to tame the monster, the Brazilian Superior Court had to impose monitoring obligations on YouTube. This was not an isolated case. Proactive monitoring and filtering found their way in the legal system as a privileged enforcement strategy through legislation, judicial decisions and private ordering. In multiple jurisdictions, recent case law has imposed proactive monitor obligations on intermediaries. These cases uphold proactive monitoring across the entire spectrum of intermediary liability subject matters: intellectual property, privacy, defamation, and hate/dangerous speech. In this context, however, notable exceptions—such as the landmark Belen case in Argentina—highlight also a fragmented international response. Legislative proposals have been following suit. As part of its Digital Single Market Strategy, the European Commission, would like to introduce filtering obligations for intermediaries to close a “value gap” between rightholders and online platforms allegedly exploiting protected content. In addition, proactive monitoring and filtering obligations would also feature in an update of the European audio-visual media legislation. Meanwhile, online platforms have already set up miscellaneous filtering schemes on a voluntary basis.In this paper, I suggest that we are witnessing the death of “no monitoring obligations,” a well-marked trend in intermediary liability policy. Current Internet policy—especially in Europe—is silently drifting away from a fundamental safeguard for freedom of expression online. In this respect, this paper would like to contextualize this trend within the emergence of a broader move towards private enforcement online. The EU Digital Single Market Strategy apparently endorsed voluntary measures as a privileged tool to curb illicit and infringing activities online. As I argued elsewhere, the intermediary liability discourse is shifting towards an intermediary responsibility discourse. This process might be pushing an amorphous notion of responsibility that incentivizes intermediaries’ self-intervention. In addition, filtering and monitoring will be dealt almost exclusively by intermediaries through automatic infringement assessment systems. Due process and fundamental guarantees get mauled by algorithmic enforcement, limiting enjoyment of exceptions and limitations, use of public domain works, and silencing speech according to the mainstream ethical discourse. The upcoming reform—and the border move that it portends—might finally slay “no monitoring obligations” and fundamental rights online, together with the untameable monster.


2020 ◽  
Vol 338 ◽  
pp. 265-275
Author(s):  
Daniel Zimmermann

In July 2019 the new president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, presented her guidelines for the period of presidency 2019-2024. While most proposals perpetuate the current reform agenda, the focus on the social dimension of the single market is remarkable. Von der Leyen has not only announced the full implementation of the European Pillar on Social Rights, but also highlighted new investment in digital competences seen as a key to competitiveness and innovation of the European economy. This paper will discuss whether the dynamics of the digital single market could lead to a new impetus on EU social policy and on European funding of training programmes. Therefore, an overview of significant funding programmes promoting digital skills is given.


Author(s):  
Simona Jokubauskaitė ◽  
Alyssa Schneebaum

AbstractWe propose an improved method to assess the economic value of unpaid housework and childcare. Existing literature has typically assigned a minimum, generalist or specialist’s wage, or the performer’s opportunity cost to the hourly value of these activities. Then it was used to calculate macro-level value based on the number of hours spent in this work. In this paper, instead of imputing an average or minimum wage for housework and childcare to determine a value to the work, we use the actual local wage rate requested for these services from providers on online platforms. Applying this method to Austrian Time Use Survey data shows that the value of unpaid childcare and housework, had it been paid, would be equivalent to about 22% of the 2018 GDP.


Author(s):  
Viola Elam

This paper provides an overall assessment of recent initiatives devised by the European Commission as part of the Digital Single Market Strategy (“DSMS”) and beyond. A connecting thread running through various policy documents and legislative proposals is the principle of copyright territoriality. Copyright’s territorial nature is identified as a great hindrance to the establishment and smooth functioning of an internal market for digital content and services, since it contributes to the cumbersomeness of rights clearance, territorial exclusivity and geo-blocking practices. Nonetheless, the initial policy options, geared towards a substantial erosion of copyright territoriality, have not been articulated in concrete legislative measures. The Commission has finally opted for a considerably less ambitious approach, which purports to mitigate some minor side effects of territoriality. The proposal seeking to mandate full accessibility of content across the EU was watered down to accommodate concerns expressed by the majority of stakeholders in the creative industry. The efforts to tackle geo-blocking are not addressed to providers of audio-visual content and copyright-protected works. The extension of the “country of origin” principle is limited to services ancillary to broadcasts. Likewise, cross-border “portability” of content does not offer a real solution to dismantling national barriers in the European digital environment. Hence, copyright will remain territorially grounded and a full integration of markets for creative content will not become a reality, at least in the near future. This paper discusses the potential lack of continuity between the overarching aims expressed in the DSMS and subsequent legislative steps, and criticises the use of terminology leading to legal uncertainty. The newly introduced neighbouring right for press publishers might represent an additional source of territorial fragmentation. The (general monitoring) obligation imposed on information society service providers requires strict scrutiny. This paper, however, values the adoption of regulations, entailing a deeper level of harmonisation, and the provision of mandatory exceptions and limitations


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