scholarly journals The Path of the Law Review: How Inter-field Ties Contribute to Institutional Emergence and Buffer against Change

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel N. Kluttz

Early neoinstitutional scholarship tended to assume institutional reproduction, while more recent accounts privilege situations in which alternative models from outside an organizational environment or delegitimizing criticism from within precipitate institutional change. We know little about institutions that persist despite such change conditions. Recent advances in sociological field theory suggest that inter-field ties contribute to institutional change but ignore how such ties may reinforce institutions. Extending both approaches, I integrate self-reinforcing mechanisms from path-dependence scholarship into field theory. I elucidate my framework with an analysis of the student-edited, student-reviewed law review. Despite sustained criticisms from those who publish in them and despite its anomalous position relative to the dominant peer-reviewed journal practices of other disciplines, the student-edited law review remains a bedrock institution of law schools and legal scholarship. My analysis covers the law review’s entire institutional history, from prior to the first law review’s emergence in 1875 to its current state. I combine qualitative historical analyses of law reviews and legal scholarship with quantitative analyses of law-review structures and field contestation. I argue that self-reinforcing mechanisms evident in law review’s ties to related fields – legal practice, law schools, the university, and legal journals – have buffered it against change.

2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 535-578
Author(s):  
Bruce A. Kimball

Between 1915 and 1925, Harvard University conducted the first national public fund-raising campaign in higher education in the United States. At the same time, Harvard Law School attempted the first such effort in legal education. The law school organized its effort independently, in conjunction with its centennial in 1917. The university campaign succeeded magnificently by all accounts; the law school failed miserably. Though perfectly positioned for this new venture, Harvard Law School raised scarcely a quarter of its goal from merely 2 percent of its alumni. This essay presents the first account of this campaign and argues that its failure was rooted in longstanding cultural and professional objections that many of the school's alumni shared: law students and law schools neither need nor deserve benefactions, and such gifts worsen the overcrowding of the bar. Due to these objections, lethargy, apathy, and pessimism suffused the campaign. These factors weakened the leadership of the alumni association, the dean, and the president, leading to inept management, wasted time, and an unlikely strategy that was pursued ineffectively. All this doomed the campaign, particularly given the tragic interruptions of the dean's suicide and World War I, along with competition from the well-run campaigns for the University and for disaster relief due to the war.


2014 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 392-400
Author(s):  
Diane E. Hoffmann ◽  
Chikosa Banda ◽  
Kassim Amuli

In June 2013, faculty from the University of Maryland Carey School of Law, along with students from the law school and several health professional schools at the University of Maryland, Baltimore, visited Malawi, in southeast Africa. While there, they met with faculty and students at the University of Malawi Chancellor College to discuss the possibility of establishing an ongoing collaboration between the two universities’ law schools. The starting point for our discussion was the potential establishment of a multi-professional, comparative health law clinic that would focus on serving individuals living with HIV and AIDS (PLWHA). This goal would serve two objectives of the Law & Health Care Program (L&HCP) at Maryland: to increase interprofessional education (IPE) opportunities and to expose law students to more global health law issues. Establishing this clinic would also be consistent with two strategic objectives of the University of Malawi Faculty of Law: to establish links with other law schools providing clinical legal education, and to contribute to Malawi’s efforts to solve HIV/AIDS-related problems.


Author(s):  
Willem Hendrik Gravett

It is a sad fact that at most university law schools in South Africa, a student can graduate without ever having set foot in a courtroom, and without ever having spoken to, or on behalf of, a person in need of advice or counsel. The past several years have witnessed a swelling chorus of complaints that the current LLB curriculum produces law graduates who were "out of their depth" in practice. My purpose is to make a case for the inclusion in the LLB curriculum of a course in trial advocacy. This endeavour of necessity invokes the broader debate over the educational objectives of a university law school – a debate memorably framed by William Twining as the two polar images of "Pericles and the plumber". My thesis is that the education of practising lawyers should be the primary mission of the university law school. The first part of this contribution is a response to those legal academics who hold that the role of the law school is to educate law students in the theories and substance of the law; that it is not to function as a trade school or a nursery school for legal practice. With reference to the development of legal education in the United States, I argue that the "education/training" dichotomy has been exposed as a red herring. This so-called antithesis is false, because it assumes that a vocational approach is necessarily incompatible with such values as free inquiry, intellectual rigour, independence of thought, and breadth of perspective. The modern American law school has shown that such so-called incompatibility is the product of intellectual snobbery and devoid of any substance. It is also often said that the raison d'être of a university legal education is to develop in the law student the ability "to think like a lawyer". However, what legal academics usually mean by "thinking like a lawyer" is the development of a limited subset of the skills that are of crucial importance in practising law: one fundamental cognitive skill – analysis – and one fundamental applied skill – legal research. We are not preparing our students for other, equally crucial lawyering tasks – negotiating, client counselling, witness interviewing and trial advocacy. Thinking like a lawyer is a much richer and more intricate process than merely collecting and manipulating doctrine. We cannot say that we are fulfilling our goal to teach students to "think like lawyers", because the complete lawyer "thinks" about doctrine and about trial strategy and about negotiation and about counselling. We cannot teach students to "think like lawyers" without simultaneously teaching them what lawyers do. An LLB curriculum that only produces graduates who can "think like lawyers" in the narrow sense ill-serves them, the profession and the public. If the profession is to improve the quality of the services it provides to the public, it is necessary for the law schools to recognise that their students must receive the skills needed to put into practice the knowledge and analytical abilities they learn in the substantive courses. We have an obligation to balance the LLB curriculum with courses in professional competence, including trial advocacy – courses that expose our students to what actually occurs in lawyer-client relationships and in courtrooms. The skills our law students would acquire in these courses are essential to graduating minimally-competent lawyers whom we can hand over to practice to complete their training. The university law school must help students form the habits and skills that will carry over to a lifetime of practice. Nothing could be more absurd than to neglect in education those practical matters that are necessary for a person's future calling.


2008 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 92-122
Author(s):  
Tobias Barrington Wolff ◽  
Andrew Koppelman

In this article, Professors Wolff and Koppelman offer a critical analysis of the free speech claims that were asserted by the law schools and law faculty that sought to challenge the Solomon Amendment. Solomon is a federal statute that requires law schools to grant full and equal access to military recruiters during the student interview season. The military discriminates against gay men and lesbians under its “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, and the law professors claimed a right to exclude the military under the First Amendment doctrine of “expressive association,” arguing that the presence of discriminatory recruiters would interfere with the ability of faculty to express their own message of inclusion toward their gay students. Those claims were ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court in Rumsfeld v. FAIR. Wolff and Koppelman argue that the law professors' litigation efforts, though well intentioned, were deeply misguided, seeking to extend a recent and aberrational decision in the law of expressive association to unsustainable lengths and, in the process, offering a characterization of the manner in which faculty engage in their own expression that is inconsistent with the ideals that should govern institutions of higher learning.


2014 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 739 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sandomierski

Law schools ought to have a vision for how they contribute to the public good. This article identifies two views of how public value might fit into the mission of the law school. The additive view holds that pursuing public value (cultivating “citizens”) and training “lawyers” are distinct objectives. This view underlies traditional claims that the law school should be housed in the university, and also accounts for the historic tension between academic law schools and the profession.By contrast, the integrative view holds that training lawyers and cultivating citizens are mutually reinforcing. This view inheres in the desire to ennoble the concept of professionalism, an old tendency that is presently in ascendance. A law school that embraces professionalism can place public value at the core of its mission, deploying its internal incentive structures in the service of the public good. However, the concept is at risk of becoming diluted or being imperfectly translated into practice. Furthermore, a sole focus on professionalism may marginalize or exclude certain conceptions of citizenship.To optimize its public value, the law school that embraces professionalism should take pains to ensure it retains its robust meaning. It can do so by locating discussions about public purpose in the privileged parts of the law school, and by investing in pedagogical innovations that truly integrate conceptions of “citizen” and “lawyer.” These efforts should be supplemented by innovations that promote diverse conceptions of the citizen that do not fit cleanly into the rubric of professionalism.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-108
Author(s):  
Lawrence Rosen

When I was thinking of going to law school, I went to speak with a law professor at the university where I had done my PhD. ‘Well, Mr. Rosen,’ he said, ‘the thing about law school is it will teach you how to think.’ I kept waiting for the other shoe to drop: think about law, think like a lawyer. No, he meant think – period. With all due humility, I was at that time coming from the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, NJ, and should like to imagine that I had actually learned a few things while doing my doctorate at his own university. In the forty years since, while serving as an adjunct professor of law and visiting professor at several such institutions, I have also encountered the occasional law scholar who, in a moment of academic noblesse oblige, has regarded my anthropology credentials as quaint but insufficient evidence that one has the tough-minded capacity that flows from a legal education. The lawyers may pay some attention to a few other disciplines, but, even though they may have given in to the allure of economics and bolstered their intellectual self-image with the odd philosopher or historian, the question remains why the law schools still tend to regard anthropology as almost entirely irrelevant.


2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. i-ii
Author(s):  
Susan Edwards

Many Law schools publish their own law journals. In the United Kingdom, these are often edited by faculty staff. At the University of Buckingham, the Law School staff edit and publish an annual journal – The Denning Law Journal. It is named after the most famous and influential judicial figure of the century 20th Century, Lord Denning (1899 – 1999).


2000 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-56
Author(s):  
Theresa Shanahan

This paper explores the relationship between the university-based common law schools and the Law Society of Upper Canada in legal education in Ontario today. A central objective of this paper is to distinguish between institutional autonomy and professional autonomy and to identify the competing interests and obligations of these two organizations involved in educating lawyers. In attempting to understand the differences between the autonomous bodies that govern legal education, a cross-disciplinary approach is taken to these issues combining a sociological framework on the professions with a legal perspective. The nature of professional identity and socialization, and the premise upon which professional responsibility and expertise are based is considered within the evolution of legal education in Ontario. This paper argues that the changes in organizational autonomy within the Law Society of Upper Canada and the law schools have shaped the relationship between these two bodies and increased the law school's control over legal education. In so doing this shift has powerfully influenced the future of legal education in Ontario.


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