scholarly journals Claims of Need in Property Law and Politics

Theoria ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (146) ◽  
pp. 56-74
Author(s):  
Patrick Cockburn

Abstract Both courts of law and political theorists have grappled with the problem of giving the concept of ‘need’ a place in our reasoning about the rights and wrongs of property regimes. But in the U.K., legal changes in the last fifteen years have eroded the legal possibilities for striking some compromise between the claims of the needy and the rights of property owners. Against this backdrop this article compares three theoretical accounts of how the fact of human need should impact upon our thinking about property rights: the rights-based arguments of Jeremy Waldron, the radical democratic theory of Lawrence Hamilton and the anarchist commentary of Colin Ward. While ‘theories’ of need have paid much attention to the nature of need ‘itself’, the article argues that this comparison reveals another issue that is just as important: where and how should claims of need be registered in legal and political processes?

2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Stilz

What gives a particular state the right to exercise jurisdiction and enforcement power over a particular territory? Why does the state of Denmark have rights over the territory of Denmark, and not over the territory of Sweden, and vice versa? This paper first considers a popular argument that purports to ground state territorial rights in citizens’ rights of land ownership. On this view, the state has jurisdiction over territory insofar as its people owns the territory, and delegates jurisdictional powers over their land to the state. It is argued that we should reject this approach, because it is unable to explain: (a) how the state can establish a continuous territory; (b) why later generations consent to the state’s jurisdiction; and (c) why non-consenting property owners cannot secede.Rather than considering state jurisdiction to be derived from the people’s prior property rights, this paper claims that we should consider state jurisdictional rights over territory to be primitive. It defends an alternative Kantian account of territorial rights. On this view, a state’s claim to jurisdiction over territory is justified if that state imposes a system of property law that meets certain basic conditions of legitimacy. This Kantian approach, it is argued, allows us to make better sense of state territorial rights.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Inggrit Fernandes

Batik artwork is one of the treasures of the nation's cultural heritage. Batik artwork is currently experiencing rapid growth. The amount of interest and market demand for this art resulted batik artwork became one of the commodities in the country and abroad. Thus, if the batik artwork is not protected then the future can be assured of a new conflict arises in the realm of intellectual property law. Act No. 28 of 2014 on Copyright has accommodated artwork batik as one of the creations that are protected by law. So that this work of art than as a cultural heritage also have economic value for its creator. Then how the legal protection of the batik artwork yaang not registered? Does this also can be protected? While in the registration of intellectual property rights is a necessity so that it has the force of law to the work produced


Author(s):  
J. E. Penner

This chapter discusses property law. It considers the idea that property had a “nominalist” ontology, and it was in danger of “disintegration” as a working legal category for that very reason. Nominalism about property has had a significant impact in U.S. case law. The concern here, however, is whether it is a helpful stance to take as a theorist of property. The chapter argues that it is not. There are indeed “high” level abstractions about property which one cannot plausibly do without if one is to understand property rights and property law doctrine. Moreover, the “bundle of rights” (BOR) challenge does not assist one in making sense of these abstractions. The chapter then looks at the conceptual failure of BOR and the New Private Law as it relates to property. BOR is generally regarded as being underpinned by what might be called the Hohfeld-Honoré synthesis. The synthesis rests upon a fairly serious mistake, which is that while the Hohfeldian examination of jural norms is analytic if it is anything, Honor’s elaboration of the incidents making up ownership is anything but—it is functional. This means that Honoré describes the situation of the owner not principally in terms of his Hohfeldian powers, duties, and rights vis-à-vis others, but in terms of the social or economic advantages that an owner has by virtue of his position, and the terms and limitations of those advantages.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-191
Author(s):  
Sabrina Praduroux

Abstract In the late 1950 s René Savatier foretold that the qualification of economic value itself as property (bien) would have been the ultimate evolution of the theory of property rights. This prediction has come true with regard to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Court of Justice (CJEU). This paper investigates the implications of the understanding of property developed by the two European Courts on the concept of expropriation itself as well as for the principles governing expropriation law. Hence, the paper illustrates the role played by both the ECtHR and the CJEU in laying down the parameters of legitimacy for national law, including property law. Within this context, the focus falls on cases in which the Courts characterize the facts as deprivation of property requiring for compensation, even though the relevant property could not be the object of expropriation under the domestic law of the defendant State. My contribution brings new insights into the current transformation of the traditional property categories and suggests the reinterpretation of some key concepts of expropriation law.


Author(s):  
Krystyna Szczepanowska-Kozłowska

AbstractOne form of industrial property right infringement is stocking for the purpose of offering or marketing. This form of infringement appears both in EU legal acts on trademarks or designs, as well as in national regulations, including those concerning patents. What is specific to stocking when compared to other activities comprising the stipulated exclusivity of the holder of industrial property rights is the fact that the literal meaning of “stocking” does not explain whether the infringing party or the warehouse keeper is the entity that places the goods in storage. The structure of industrial property rights as absolute rights would theoretically permit the view that the law is violated by both the entity that accepts the goods for storage and the entity that places such goods in storage. To determine if there is an infringement, it must be established what the goods being stocked are further intended for. It is not without significance that the finding of an infringement of industrial property rights does not depend on fault or awareness. From the point of view of the industrial property law regime, it is difficult to find arguments against this understanding of infringement by stocking. Since the offeror of goods infringing industrial property rights may be held liable even if the goods have not yet been manufactured, it is conceivable that the entity accepting such goods for stocking is also liable. This interpretation of the concept of stocking would certainly correspond to the absolute nature of liability for infringement.In a recent judgment the CJEU confirmed that the warehouse keeper who, on behalf of a third party, stores goods which infringe trademark rights only creates the technical conditions for trademark use by this third party provided that the warehouse keeper is not aware of that infringement. The CJEU also confirmed that only the person who decides about the purpose of storing the goods can be treated as an infringer. However, the CJEU did not respond to the question regarding whether the warehouse keeper could be treated as an infringer if it pursues the aims of storing the goods at the request of the entity that put the goods into storage.


2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daphna Hacker

Abstract This article suggests enacting an accession tax instead of the estate duty – which was repealed in Israel in 1981. This suggestion evolves from historical and normative explorations of the tension between perceptions of familial intergenerational property rights and justifications for the “death tax,” as termed by its opponents, i.e., estate and inheritance tax. First, the Article explores this tension as expressed in the history of the Israeli Estate Duty Law. This chronological survey reveals a move from the State’s taken-for-granted interest in revenue justifying the Law’s enactment in 1949; moving on to the “needy widow” and “poor orphan” in whose name the tax was attacked during the years 1959–1964, continuing to the abolition of the tax in 1981 in the name of efficiency and the right of the testator to transfer his wealth to his family, and finally cumulating with the targeting of tycoon dynasties that characterizes the recent calls for reintroducing the tax. Next, based on the rich literature on the subject, the Article maps the arguments for and against intergenerational wealth transfer taxation, placing the Israeli case in larger philosophical, political, and pragmatic contexts. Lastly, it associates the ideas of accession tax and “social inheritance” with inspirational sources for rethinking a realistic wealth transfer taxation to bridge the gap between notions of intergenerational familial rights and intergenerational social justice.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Joan S. Picart ◽  
Caroline Joan S. Picart ◽  
Marlowe Fox

Abstract This article is the first part of a two-part piece, which considers the intellectual property rights of indigenous peoples. After establishing pragmatic working definitions of who “indigenous peoples” are and what folklore (or “traditional cultural expression”) is, as compared with, but dialectically related to, “traditional knowledge,” this article does the following: 1) explains why western assumptions built into intellectual property law make this area of law a problematic tool for protecting traditional knowledge (TK) and expressions of folklore (EoF) or traditional cultural expressions (TCE) of indigenous peoples; and 2) creates a general sketch of human rights related legal instruments that could be and have been harnessed, with varying degrees of success, in the protection of the intellectual property of indigenous peoples.


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