From Wetlands to Farmlands: A Campaign Against Nature on China's Chongming Island, 1960-1962

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 564-587
Author(s):  
Bingru Yue

To confront food insufficiency caused by the Great Leap Forward, China's central government promoted a national policy of 'agriculture as the priority'. The Shanghai municipal government launched a campaign to expand cultivated land within its jurisdiction by transforming wetlands on Chongming Island through a military-style campaign. Tens of thousands of urban workers were drafted into a Land Reclamation Army to meet national and municipal food self-sufficiency goals. Their campaign featured both attacks on nature and interpersonal abuse. In accordance with the central directives, wetlands totalling 8,000 hectares were drained for conversion into farmland. This conversion proved to be costly, as land with low fertility was created through the permanent destruction of the wetland ecosystem and reclamation workers suffered physical and psychological mistreatment. Although the transformation of wetlands was completed quickly, food production fell far short of targets. Furthermore, the land reclamation campaign imposed irrevocable costs on the island's established communitiesotivations in authoritarian regimes operating diverse political and economic agendas.

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 505-534
Author(s):  
Jenia Mukherjee ◽  
Raphaël Morera ◽  
Joana Guerrin ◽  
René Véron

To confront food insufficiency caused by the Great Leap Forward, China's central government promoted a national policy of 'agriculture as the priority'. The Shanghai municipal government launched a campaign to expand cultivated land within its jurisdiction by transforming wetlands on Chongming Island through a military-style campaign. Tens of thousands of urban workers were drafted into a Land Reclamation Army to meet national and municipal food self-sufficiency goals. Their campaign featured both attacks on nature and interpersonal abuse. In accordance with the central directives, wetlands totalling 8,000 hectares were drained for conversion into farmland. This conversion proved to be costly, as land with low fertility was created through the permanent destruction of the wetland ecosystem and reclamation workers suffered physical and psychological mistreatment. Although the transformation of wetlands was completed quickly, food production fell far short of targets. Furthermore, the land reclamation campaign imposed irrevocable costs on the island's established communities.


2015 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1143-1176
Author(s):  
LAURI PALTEMAA

AbstractUsing new archival materials, internal publications, and gazetteers as its sources, this article studies the conduct of disaster governance in Tianjin city during the Great Leap Forward famine from 1958–1962. The city was organizationally well able to implement disaster relief efforts, and early on it took a number of measures to control and mitigate the food crisis that began in the city in early 1959. However, Maoist campaign-based disaster management could not work well when other campaigns were prioritized in its stead. Lacking central sanction for a major disaster relief effort, city leaders resorted to strategies that prioritized its residents over suburban peasants and outsiders. The city actively sought resources from outside while trying to prevent their outward flows. The city's own production of vegetables must not be overlooked as one of the reasons for better survival rates among urban residents, but even this policy was hampered by other Great Leap Forward initiatives. In the case of Tianjin, urban disaster governance of the famine was inward-looking and, at the same time, constrained and reliant on the central government.


2010 ◽  
Vol 201 ◽  
pp. 176-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Wemheuer

AbstractIn the aftermath of the famine in 1962, Mao Zedong took formal responsibility for the failure of the Great Leap Forward in the name of the central government. Thousands of local cadres were made scapegoats and were legally punished. This article focuses on the question of how the different levels of the Chinese state, such as the central government, the province and the county, have dealt with the question of responsibility for the famine. The official explanation for the failure of the Great Leap will be compared to unofficial memories of intellectuals, local cadres and villagers. The case study of Henan province shows that local cadres are highly dissatisfied with the official evaluation of responsibility. Villagers bring suffering, starvation and terror into the discourse, but these memories are constructed in a way to preserve village harmony. This article explains why these different discourses about responsibility of the famine are unlinked against the background of the “dual society”; the separation between urban and rural China. Finally, it will be shown that the Communist Party was unable to convince parts of society and the Party to accept the official interpretation.


1973 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 833-835 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Z. Bowers

China appears destined to become the first developing country to achieve effective population control before industrialization. Population control in China is one aspect of a total national policy of advancing human welfare which includes programs in general health care, maternal and child health, nutrition, and social security. A major national birth control program launched in the early 1950s reached its maximum effectiveness in 1965. This effort was largely aborted with the Great Leap Forward in 1958. The goal of a birth rate of 2 per cent of total population was finally achieved in 1965, but a setback occurred in 1966 when millions of young people were turned loose to launch the Cultural Revolution. In 1970 an immediate target of a 2 per cent rate increase was announced and a rate of less than 1 per cent was projected by A.D. 2000. The totalitarian government of China sees population control as a high priority goal. The major problems remain in the rural areas where women continue to view male offspring as essential evidence of their fecundity.


The Synergist ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 30
Author(s):  
Jim Parsons

Author(s):  
Arunabh Ghosh

In 1949, at the end of a long period of wars, one of the biggest challenges facing leaders of the new People's Republic of China was how much they did not know. The government of one of the world's largest nations was committed to fundamentally reengineering its society and economy via socialist planning while having almost no reliable statistical data about their own country. This book is the history of efforts to resolve this “crisis in counting.” The book explores the choices made by political leaders, statisticians, academics, statistical workers, and even literary figures in attempts to know the nation through numbers. It shows that early reliance on Soviet-inspired methods of exhaustive enumeration became increasingly untenable in China by the mid-1950s. Unprecedented and unexpected exchanges with Indian statisticians followed, as the Chinese sought to learn about the then-exciting new technology of random sampling. These developments were overtaken by the tumult of the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961), when probabilistic and exhaustive methods were rejected and statistics was refashioned into an ethnographic enterprise. By acknowledging Soviet and Indian influences, the book not only revises existing models of Cold War science but also globalizes wider developments in the history of statistics and data. Anchored in debates about statistics and its relationship to state building, the book offers fresh perspectives on China's transition to socialism.


Author(s):  
R.V. Vaidyanatha Ayyar

This chapter outlines the exceptional composition of the landmark Kothari Commission, and its blend of idealism and realism. It offers a succinct account of the recommendations of the Kothari Commission, and the ferocious opposition to its recommendations regarding elementary and higher education, language policy, and the establishment of world class universities. It presents a candid critique of its recommendation that has become a hardy perennial of Indian educational discourse, namely that Government allocate at least 6 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to education. It gives a crisp account of Independent India’s first National Policy on Education (1968). It also outlines the Constitutional Amendment of 1978 which made education a ‘concurrent subject’, and the educational initiatives of the short lived Janata Government (1976–8), India’s first non-Congress Party Central Government. It also outlines the key role played by J.P Naik in the Kothari Commission and Janata Government and evolution of his thinking.


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