scholarly journals El Otro No-Humano y el Coronavirus

Sincronía ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol XXV (79) ◽  
pp. 3-21
Author(s):  
Fabián de la Parra Rodríguez ◽  

The global Coronavirus pandemic originated out of a wet market in Wuhan, China. Thus, this virus is the product of the market conditions that lacked any sort of ethical considerations.Among the most ingrained dogmas in most human beings throughout history is the idea that mankind has non-human beings at their disposal to do with them whatever humanity’s will might dictate. The ethical relation is suspended during the interaction with animals and thus humans are allowed to torture, harm, imprison, and kill animals for scientific experiments, entertainment, or to satisfy hunger or a craving. Through the levinasian concept of transcendence, this article will propose Otherness as a category of Peter Singer’s utilitarian critique of factory farming. The current virus is proposed to be the result of a system that subsumes the non-human Other as matter to be manipulated and ignores any sort of ethical responsibility.

Sincronía ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol XXV (79) ◽  
pp. 3-21
Author(s):  
Fabián de la Parra Rodríguez ◽  

The global Coronavirus pandemic originated out of a wet market in Wuhan, China. Thus, this virus is the product of the market conditions that lacked any sort of ethical considerations. Among the most ingrained dogmas in most human beings throughout history is the idea that mankind has non-human beings at their disposal to do with them whatever humanity’s will might dictate. The ethical relation is suspended during the interaction with animals and thus humans are allowed to torture, harm, imprison, and kill animals for scientific experiments, entertainment, or to satisfy hunger or a craving. Through the levinasian concept of transcendence, this article will propose Otherness as a category of Peter Singer’s utilitarian critique of factory farming. The current virus is proposed to be the result of a system that subsumes the non-human Other as matter to be manipulated and ignores any sort of ethical responsibility.


1987 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan O. Via

My purpose in this article will not be to deal with the tradition history behind Matt 25:31–46 or with the actual eschatological identity of the nations, the sheep and the goats, and Jesus' least brothers, although some attention will need to be given to the latter. My primary purpose will rather be to inquire about the nature and quality of the stance or posture or self-understanding that constitutes the responses of the sheep and goats—which responses Matthew is implicitly calling his readers respectively to actualize and to reject. And what is required of human beings has implications for the possibilities and nature of human beings. The first order of business, however, will be to locate the text generically and in the context of Matthew 23–25.


2005 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Golser

Storicamente si può affermare che la Santa Sede è stata all’avanguardia nell’attenzione posta ai problemi ecologici, perché le sue prime prese di posizione risalgono all’inizio degli anni ‘70. Un’etica teologica cattolica si è sviluppata dalla metà degli anni ’80, dopo che le scienze bibliche hanno dovuto confutare l’accusa che l’antropocentrismo della Bibbia sia stata una delle cause dello sfruttamento della terra. Le ragioni storiche di un atteggiamento sbagliato verso la natura sono da vedere piuttosto nel pensiero filosofico moderno che si è sviluppato spesso in contrapposizione al cristianesimo, mentre la Bibbia e la teologia hanno in verità una visione teocentrica della creazione. I tentativi filosofici, che al posto dell’uomo vogliono mettere al centro della riflessione etica la natura stessa o la vita o anche la possibilità di soffrire, non hanno consistenza perché soltanto la persona umana come essere consapevole e libero può assumersi una responsabilità etica. Bisogna però tener conto di tutte le altre creature che in quanto create hanno una loro dignità propria. Essere creati significa essere relazionati a Dio; la fede in Dio Creatore comporta così un l’antropocentrismo relazionale. Da questi presupposti può essere sviluppata un’etica ecologica teologica che ha due percorsi, uno che insiste sul cambiamento necessario degli atteggiamenti di fondo verso la natura (le virtù ecologiche), ed uno che da determinati principi e da esperienze consolidate formula delle norme concrete per l’agire ecologico responsabile. ---------- Historically, one can say that the Holy See has been a pioneer for the attention paid to ecological issues, as it started taking a stance on the topic already in the early ‘70s of XX century. A catholic theological ethics was developed in the mid-‘80s, after the biblical sciences had to refuse the accusation that made biblical anthropocentrism one of the main causes of the exploitation of the earth. The historical reasons for a wrong attitude toward nature are to be found instead in the contemporary philosophical thinking that often developed against Christianity, while theology and the Bible promote a theocentric vision of creation. The philosophical attempts that place nature or life, or even the chance to suffer in lieu of man at the center of the ethical way of thinking, have no grounds because only human beings, self-aware and free, can take ethical responsibility. One needs to consider all creatures that, being created, have a dignity of their own. Being created means having a relation with God. Hence, the faith in the Creator involves a relational anthropocentrism. Departing from such assumptions, a theological environmental ethics can be developed along two paths, one insisting on the necessary change of the basic stance toward nature (i.e. ecological virtues), the other starting from recognized principles and experiences and postulating actual rules for responsible ecological behavior.


2021 ◽  
pp. 146144482199870
Author(s):  
Henrik Rydenfelt

The algorithmic automation of media processes has produced machines that perform in roles that were previously occupied by human beings. Recent research has probed various theoretical approaches to the agency and ethical responsibility of machines and algorithms. However, there is no theoretical consensus concerning many key issues. Rather than setting out with fixed conceptions, this research calls for a closer look at the considerations and attitudes that motivate actual attributions of agency and responsibility. The empirical context of this study is legacy media where the introduction of automation, together with topical considerations of journalistic ethics and responsibility, has given rise to substantial reflection on received conceptions and practices. The results show a continuing resistance to attributions of agency and responsibility to machines. Three lines of thinking that motivate this stance are distinguished, and their potential shortcomings and theoretical implications are considered.


Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 657 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Losada-Sierra

Grappling with the marginalization of the marginal in Western thinking, this paper sets up a dialogue between Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy and Johann Baptist Metz’s political theology in order to learn from their thoughts on the suffering of victims. For both Levinas and Metz, the idea of theodicy as an explanation of suffering is linked to the ontological conception of time and history, and therefore useless and unjustifiable by nature. The essential question of this research is how to give meaning to the concrete suffering of humanity in order to redeem history from the concept of an evolutionary progress which limits the possibility of hearing the cries of the victims of history. This article will show how Levinas’s and Metz´s rejection of traditional theodicy is closely related to the concepts of memory and history and, therefore, the paper will demonstrate how traditional theodicy becomes for both thinkers an ethical theodicy. Consequently, the ethical account of theodicy replaces the attempt to negotiate the goodness and power of God with the pain of human beings. From this perspective, ethics is shaped by a response to the cry of victims which summons the subject to understand freedom as limited and subordinated to ethical responsibility. In responding to suffering, philosophy and theology can meet beyond idealism and dogmatism.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 338-353
Author(s):  
Katrine Tinning

How can museums pass on the remembrances of the survivors of Holocaust in ways that engage visitors? This article looks at the ways museums remember the Holocaust by focusing on an exhibition entitled To Survive - Voices from Ravensbrück at the museum of cultural history, Kulturen, in Lund, Sweden. The exhibition centres on a unique collection of small objects secretly and illegally created by women in the Ravensbrück concentration camp as acts of resistance against the inhuman conditions in the camp. Exhibits on the Holocaust represent a particular tradition of museum pedagogy, associated with the imperative of ‘never again’, often read as an attempt to evoke empathy and responsibility for other human beings. In line with this tradition, the educational aim of To Survive is to encourage the viewers, to be moved to a greater sense of responsibility. The article provides a detailed description of the exhibit, discusses the choice of the museum to tone down the dark aspects of the story, and looks into how the exhibition realizes various appeals to the visitor, but also how it makes some voices mute. As such this article contributes to the ongoing museological discussions of the complexities of putting so-called difficult knowledge on display.Key Words: Museum Pedagogy, Visual Pedagogy, Memory Studies, Holocaust Studies, Difficult Knowledge, Ethical responsibility, Visitor involvement.


Author(s):  
K. E. Løgstrup ◽  
Bjørn Rabjerg ◽  
Robert Stern

This book concerns the nature and basis for the fundamental ethical relation between human beings. Beginning from the fundamental example of trust, it is argued that this relation arises from our interdependence and mutual vulnerability, which then gives us power over the lives of other people. It claimed that in this situation, there arises a demand to care for the other person. This demand is characterized as silent, radical, one-sided, and unfulfillable, as it cannot be satisfied by just doing what the other asks; requires us to act unselfishly; is non-reciprocal; and should not be experienced as a demand. As a result, the demand is distinguished from ordinary social norms, which lack these characteristics, though it is argued that there is a relation between these two levels, as legitimate social norms should ‘refract’ the ethical demand. It is also argued that in order to make sense of a demand of this sort, we must see ‘life as a gift’, rather than treating ourselves as the sovereign grounds for our own existence. In understanding the ethical demand in this way, it is suggested, we can make sense of Jesus’s proclamation to love our neighbour in purely human terms, though at the same time we may have to go beyond a scientific picture which operates with a clear distinction between fact and values, and treats determinism as a basis for rejecting moral responsibility.


Author(s):  
Johannes F. M. Schick

AbstractThis commentary introduces the notion of “technical alterity” in order to address the following questions: is it possible that technical objects can become “others” in analogy to Levinas’ ethics and can this relation provide solutions for the subject in the Anthropocene? According to Levinas, the human subject’s only break from having to be itself is in the consumption and enjoyment of things. Objects constitute thus an “other” that can be consumed, i.e., appropriated and be made one’s own. But, in times of the Anthropocene, where the entanglement of human and non-human actors becomes increasingly obvious and intricate, and a question of survival for human beings in the face of the climate crisis, it is necessary to develop a relation with non-human actors that does not reduce them to mere means to an end. This ethical relation with technical objects relies upon an epistemic act, since technical objects precisely do not have a “face” in the Levinasian sense. Technical objects as “technical others” have therefore—in light of Simondon’s philosophy of technology—to be invented.


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