scholarly journals Carruthers and Constitutive Self-Knowledge

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-78
Author(s):  
John C. Hill
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Experimental Psychology ◽  
Constitutive Theory ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Self Knowledge

In his recent book, The Opacity of Mind, Peter Carruthers advances a skeptical theory of self-knowledge, integrating results from experimental psychology and cognitive science.1 In this essay, I want to suggest that the situation is not quite as dire as Carruthers makes it out to be. I respond to Carruthers by advancing a constitutive theory of self-knowledge. I argue that self-knowledge, so understood, is not only compatible with the empirical research that Carruthers utilizes, but also helps to make sense of these results.

Joint Action and 4E Cognition

2018 ◽  
pp. 260-280
Author(s):  
Torstein T. Tollefsen ◽  
Rick Dale
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Experimental Psychology ◽  
Joint Action ◽  
Complex Nature ◽  
Cognitive Anthropology ◽  
Low Level ◽  
4E Cognition ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Way

Over past thirty years there has been an increased interest in studying joint action across a number of different disciplines including psychology, sociology, cognitive anthropology, cognitive science, and philosophy. In this chapter we canvas recent philosophical and empirical research on joint action. Along the way we highlight embedded, embodied, extended, and enactive approaches and the challenges they pose for more orthodox approaches to joint action. We propose an ecumenical approach to the study of joint action. The cognitive science of joint action will have to integrate both high-level and low-level approaches across a variety of disciplines, including experimental psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy. A single unitary account is unlikely to capture the nuanced and complex nature of joint action. Instead, we argue that we should seek a better understanding of how various accounts coalesce into a tapestry of explanatory tools.

The issue of conscious and non-conscious in the light of experimental psychology and cognitive science

2011 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-74
Author(s):  
Csaba Pléh
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Experimental Psychology

A dolgozat a tudat tulajdonságaiból indul ki (beszámoló képesség, élénkség, egységesség, koherencia), majd először az 1960-as években tekinti át a tudat iránt megindult érdeklődés első szakaszait, olyan jelenségekre összpontosítva, mint a verbális kondicionálás, az éberségi kontinuum, a hasítottagy-kísérletek, a tudat és a prefrontális működések kapcsolata. Azután áttekinti a mai természettudományos szemléletű tudatkutatás néhány vezető kérdését. Ilyenek a tudat neurobiológiai megfelelőinek keresése, az agykérgi helyektől (prefrontális rendszerek) a sajátos működésmódokig (gamma oszcilláció) s a tudatzavarok kérdéséig. Miközben egyre többet tudunk a tudatról, nem szabad felednünk, hogy számos kísérleti pszichológiai megfigyelés (előfeszítés, kétértelműségi aktiváció, figyelmi vakság) is arra mutat, hogy igen összetett jelenséggel van dolgunk, például szemantikai alapú viselkedéseink sem mindig hozzáférhetőek a tudatosság számára.

A Dynamical, Self-Organized View of the Context for Linguistic Performance

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-86
Author(s):  
Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr.
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Language Use ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Linguistic Processing ◽  
Linguistic Performance ◽  
Self Organized ◽  
Temporal Process ◽  
The World ◽  
Organizational View

Most everyone agrees that context is critical to the pragmatic interpretation of speakers’ utterances. But the enduring debate within cognitive science concerns when context has its influence in shaping people’s interpretations of what speakers imply by what they say. Some scholars maintain that context is only referred to after some initial linguistic analysis of an utterance has been performed, with other scholars arguing that context is present at all stages of immediate linguistic processing. Empirical research on this debate is, in my view, hopelessly deadlocked. My goal in this article is to advance a framework for thinking about the context for linguistic performance that conceives of human cognition and language use in terms of dynamical, self-organized processes. A self-organizational view of the context for linguistic performance demands that we acknowledge the multiple, interacting constraints which create, or soft-assemble, any specific moment of pragmatic experience. Pragmatic action and understanding is not producing or recovering a “meaning” but a continuously unfolding temporal process of the person adapting and orienting to the world. I discuss the implications of this view for the study of pragmatic meaning in discourse.

1. The art and science of music psychology

2018 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Hellmuth Margulis
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Computer Modeling ◽  
Human Behavior ◽  
Music Theory ◽  
Experimental Psychology ◽  
Art And Science ◽  
Music Psychology

Music can seem to be the human behavior that is least susceptible to explanation, but a long history exists of applying various frameworks to try to understand it. The cognitive science of music integrates ideas from philosophy, music theory, experimental psychology, neuroscience, anthropology, and computer modeling to answer questions about music’s role in people’s lives. The art of music psychology is to bring rigorous scientific methodologies to questions about the human musical capacity while applying sophisticated humanistic approaches to framing and interpreting the science.

scholarly journals Phenomenology and Experimental Psychology: On the Prospects and Limitations of Experimental Research for a Phenomenological Epistemology

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philipp Berghofer
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Learning ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Experimental Research ◽  
Experimental Psychology ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
Phenomenological Conception

AbstractHusserl’s transcendental phenomenology is first and foremost a science of the structures of consciousness. Since it is intended to yield eidetic, i. e., a priori insights, it is often assumed that transcendental phenomenology and the natural sciences are totally detached from each other such that phenomenological investigations cannot possibly benefit from empirical evidence. The aim of this paper is to show that a beneficial relationship is possible. To be more precise, I will show how Husserl’s a priori investigations on consciousness can be supplemented by research in experimental psychology in order to tackle fundamental questions in epistemology. Our result will be a phenomenological conception of experiential justification that is in accordance with and supported by empirical phenomena such as perceptual learning and the phenomenon of blindsight. Finally, I shall shed light on the systematic limits of empirical research.

Why Is Mind-Wandering Interesting for Philosophers?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Metzinger
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Research ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Mind Wandering ◽  
Conceptual Level ◽  
Specific Target ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Theories Of Mind ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Spontaneous Thought

This chapter explores points of contact between philosophy of mind and scientific approaches to spontaneous thought. While offering a series of conceptual instruments that might prove helpful for researchers on the empirical research frontier, it begins by asking what the explanandum for theories of mind-wandering is, how one can conceptually individuate single occurrences of this specific target phenomenon, and how one might arrive at a more fine-grained taxonomy. The second half of this contribution sketches some positive proposals as to how one might understand mind-wandering on a conceptual level, namely, as a loss of mental autonomy resulting in involuntary mental behavior, as a highly specific epistemic deficit relating to self-knowledge, and as a discontinuous phenomenological process in which one’s conscious “unit of identification” is switched.

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