scholarly journals The Promises and Perils of Hospital Mergers

2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (8) ◽  
Keyword(s):  
2017 ◽  
Vol 119 (3) ◽  
pp. 597-627 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurt R. Brekke ◽  
Luigi Siciliani ◽  
Odd Rune Straume
Keyword(s):  

2012 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 363-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Varkevisser ◽  
Frederik T. Schut

AbstractIn markets where hospitals are expected to compete, preventive merger control aims to prohibit anticompetitive mergers. In the hospital industry, however, the standard method for defining the relevant market (SSNIP) is difficult to apply and alternative approaches have proven inaccurate. Experiences from the United States show that courts, by identifying overly broad geographic markets, have underestimated the anticompetitive effects of hospital mergers. We examine how geographic hospital markets are defined in Germany and the Netherlands where market-oriented reforms have created room for hospital competition. For each country, we discuss a landmark case where definition of the geographic market played a decisive role. Our findings indicate that defining geographic hospital markets in both countries is less complicated than in the United States, where antitrust analysis must take managed care organisations into account. We also find that different methods result in much more stringent hospital merger control in Germany than in the Netherlands. Given the uncertainties in defining hospital markets, the German competition authority seems to be inclined to avoid the risk of being too permissive; the opposite holds for the Dutch competition authority. We argue that for society the costs of being too permissive with regard to hospital mergers may be larger than the costs of being too stringent.


1997 ◽  
Vol 23 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 191-220
Author(s):  
Thomas L. Greaney

Justice Stewart’s 1966 dictum about the inevitability of government success in challenging mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act held true for another fifteen years or so. In the early 1980s, however, federal enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), began to find the federal courts less hospitable to antitrust merger cases as more sophisticated economic inquiries and changing proof burdens complicated the task of identifying anticompetitive mergers. Indeed, since the early 1980s, the government has lost more litigated merger cases than it has won and has come under criticism from some quarters for becoming gun shy and not adequately policing the wave of consolidations that have occurred over the past decade.Hospital mergers, however, are a different story. Until two years ago, the government rode a streak of important victories in federal courts and FTC administrative proceedings, and had obtained consent decrees from scores of hospitals that had announced plans to merge.


2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katalin Katona ◽  
M. F. M. F. M. Canoy
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Mari Holm Ingelsrud

<div class="page" title="Page 1"><div class="layoutArea"><div class="column"><p><span>This article investigates the probability of turnover to three destinations following hospital merg- ers: within the hospital sector, out of the hospital sector, and out of work. It is hypothesized that mergers increase turnover to nonemployment among employees with poor health and increase turnover to employment outside of the hospital sector among healthy employees. Discrete-time survival analyses show that mergers increase turnover within the hospital sector for all employ- ees, regardless of health. Turnover to other sectors and out of work does not increase. Possible explanations for the limited turnover out of the sector associated with mergers are aspects of the Norwegian labor market such as the institution of employee participation, low unemployment, and labor shortages within hospitals. </span></p></div></div></div>


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