Reckoning and Redemption: The 9/11 Commission, the Director of National Intelligence and the CIA at War

2020 ◽  
pp. 407-426
Author(s):  
Huw Dylan ◽  
David V. Gioe ◽  
Michael S. Goodman

This chapter focuses on the attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, and the impact on CIA. The agency received intense criticism from Congress in the final form of the 9/11 Commission Report, and had to adapt. But it also needed to move extremely quickly in the aftermath of the attacks, working alone and with allies, old and new. Having failed to prevent the attacks, the CIA was the tip of the spear in the US’s retaliation. Document: Office of Inspector General Report on Central Intelligence Agency Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusions of the Report of the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001.

2021 ◽  
pp. 096834452110179
Author(s):  
Raphaël Ramos

This article deals with the influence of Gen. George C. Marshall on the foundation of the US intelligence community after the Second World War. It argues that his uneven achievements demonstrate how the ceaseless wrangling within the Truman administration undermined the crafting of a coherent intelligence policy. Despite his bureaucratic skills and prominent positions, Marshall struggled to achieve his ends on matters like signals intelligence, covert action, or relations between the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. Yet he crafted an enduring vision of how intelligence should supplement US national security policy that remained potent throughout the Cold War and beyond.


Author(s):  
Roger Z. George

This chapter examines the role of intelligence in the development and execution of strategy. It begins with a discussion of what intelligence is all about and how its utility has been viewed by strategists. In particular, it considers the different components of the ‘intelligence cycle’, namely, intelligence collection, intelligence analysis, and special intelligence missions that rest on effective counterintelligence and counterespionage. It then charts the history of US intelligence, from its use to support cold war strategies of containment and deterrence to its more recent support to US strategies for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. It also reviews the challenges and causes of ‘strategic surprise’, citing a number of historical cases such as the September 11 terrorist attacks. The chapter concludes with an assessment of how the US intelligence community has performed since reforms were made in response to 9/11 and its focus on new threats posed by cyberwar and cyber-attacks.


Author(s):  
Richard A. Best

This article discusses the dilemma of the defense intelligence. It discusses the interweaving yet complicated relationship of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Immersed in a divided and a “stovepiped” culture, the member agencies of the intelligence community lacked coordination and collaboration. In this article, the nature of the three agencies of the DOD: the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) are discussed. The evolution of coordination among the intelligence community agencies and the impact of 9/11 on the cooperation and collaboration between the agencies are also discussed including the era of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the challenges posed by the future space surveillance.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 723-747 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Frankel Pratt

This article explains the emergence and institutionalization of the US’s targeted killing practices as a case of norm transformation. I argue that international and domestic US prohibitions on assassination have not disappeared, but have changed as a result of practitioner-led changes in the conventions, technologies, and bureaucratic structures governing the use of force in counterterrorism activities. After discussing the limits of alternative explanations, and drawing inspiration from practice theory, pragmatist social theory, and relational sociology, I posit three causal mechanisms as responsible for the transformation: convention reorientation, which was the redefinition of targeted killing to distinguish it from assassination; technological revision, which was the development and use of unmanned aerial vehicles (“drones”) to bypass normative and strategic concerns over precision; and network synthesis, which was the support of the Bush administration and especially of the Obama administration, overruling dissenters from within the Central Intelligence Agency (who were often very highly placed). I trace the processes by which these mechanisms operated and interacted in simultaneous and mutually reinforcing ways from the start of the millennium until now. Finally, I discuss some of the ways in which this contributes to institutional analysis and the study of norm change more generally, and, in particular, how it considers the role of technology and the reciprocity of means and ends.


2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 551-560
Author(s):  
ERIC PULLIN

Secrecy has unintended consequences. The release on 9 December 2014 of the US Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the torture of terrorism detainees focused public attention on the secret activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Regrettably, lost amidst debate over justifying or condemning state-sponsored torture is a more basic concern, the issue of state secrecy, which underlies the discussion of how governments promote national ends. Only two days after the issuance of the Senate Intelligence Committee's report, the US House of Representatives adjourned without taking action on the Freedom of Information Act reform bill – despite receiving unanimous approval in both houses. This bill would not have required complete openness, but it would have eliminated many of the arbitrary mechanisms that enable the CIA and other governmental agencies to suppress requests for information. Although the House Republican leadership failed to put the act on the legislative calendar, the Obama administration's Department of Justice also deserves opprobrium for surreptitiously opposing the act behind the scenes. The US government's disregard for establishing reasonable rules of transparency virtually guarantees that the CIA will continue to suppress its records, and thus public scrutiny of its unchecked activities, for a very long time to come.


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