Complexity analysis and hardware implementation of extensible modulo addition for lightweight block cipher in Internet of Things (IOT)

This project presents complexity analysis and hardware implementation of extensible modulo addition [15] encryption algorithm on a 32-bit lightweight FPGA based block cipher called INFLEX, which is designed for the internet of things (IoT) environment, supporting 64-bits key. It is designed for constrained hardware resources yet providing a highly secure scalable configuration for the variety of applications. This characteristic is obtained by the use of generalized Feistel structure combined with an improved block inflation feature. INFLEX follows a typical ARX (Add, Rotate, XOR) round function with a distinguished feature of block expansion and collapse as per user selected control string, which makes INFLEX act as a tweakable Cipher. We have shown comparison of INFLEX algorithm robustness and immunity against linear and differential attacks and demonstrated that it outperforms one of the benchmark block Ciphers Speck32/64 proposed by national security agency (NSA).

Complexity analysis and hardware implementation of extensible modulo addition for lightweight block cipher in Internet of Things (IOT)

This project presents complexity analysis and hardware implementation of extensible modulo addition [15] encryption algorithm on a 32-bit lightweight FPGA based block cipher called INFLEX, which is designed for the internet of things (IoT) environment, supporting 64-bits key. It is designed for constrained hardware resources yet providing a highly secure scalable configuration for the variety of applications. This characteristic is obtained by the use of generalized Feistel structure combined with an improved block inflation feature. INFLEX follows a typical ARX (Add, Rotate, XOR) round function with a distinguished feature of block expansion and collapse as per user selected control string, which makes INFLEX act as a tweakable Cipher. We have shown comparison of INFLEX algorithm robustness and immunity against linear and differential attacks and demonstrated that it outperforms one of the benchmark block Ciphers Speck32/64 proposed by national security agency (NSA).

Legitimation and Textual Evidence: How the Snowden Leaks Reshaped the ACLU’s Online Writing About NSA Surveillance

Scholars in discourse studies have defined legitimation as the justification (and critique) of powerful institutions and their practices. In moments of crisis, legitimation tactics often shift. This article considers how such shifts are incited by unauthorized information leaks. Leaks, I argue, constitute freshly available texts that reveal privileged institutional information presented in a specialized rhetorical style. To explore how leaks are harnessed by institutional critics, I examine the 2013 Snowden/National Security Agency (NSA) crisis. Combining corpus analysis with discourse analysis, I explore how Snowden’s NSA leaks affected the online writing of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). I also consider overlaps between the rhetorical patterns in the leaked NSA documents and those in the ACLU’s post-leaks writing. Findings from my analysis of legitimation and style categories suggest that, prior to the leaks, ACLU writers primarily used a character- and narrative-based style to delegitimize the NSA’s policies as illegal and secretive, and to push for their reform. After the leaks, though, the ACLU mainly used an informationally dense style rife with academic terms and vocabularies of strategic action, portraying NSA surveillance as massive and complex. As the documents moved from the NSA’s secret, technical discourses to public, critical discourses, the latter came to resemble the former rhetorically. These findings raise crucial questions about how critics can make use of leaks without necessarily relegitimizing institutional power.

An Account of the ISO/IEC Standardization of the Simon and Speck Block Cipher Families

Simon and Speck are two block cipher families published in 2013 by the US National Security Agency (NSA). These block ciphers, targeting lightweight applications, were suggested in 2015 to be included in ISO/IEC 29192-2 Information technology—Security techniques—Lightweight cryptography—Part 2: Block ciphers. Following 3.5 years of deliberations within ISO/IEC JTC 1 they were rejected in April 2018. This chapter provides an account of the ISO/IEC standardization process for Simon and Speck.

Side channel analysis of SPECK

SPECK is a family of lightweight block ciphers developed by Beaulieu et al. of the US National Security Agency (NSA) for the Internet of Things (IoT). It is an ARX-based design with a Feistel-like structure which supports keys of size ranging from 64 bits to 256 bits. SPECK has been standardised by ISO/IEC for radio frequency identification (RFID) devices. It has drawn the attention of many cryptanalysts and several cryptanalysis results have been published. In this paper, carry flag attacks on the full SPECK ciphers are presented. Depending on the key size and block size, the complexities of our attacks, to nearly ensure success, vary from 2 59 time and 2 14 data to 2 227 time and 2 62 data.

Chilling effects and the stock market response to the Snowden revelations

This study analyzes the changes in individuals’ Internet search behavior and economic variables following Edward Snowden’s revelation of National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance activities of global Internet communications. We refer to the abrupt changes in individual search behavior beginning in June 2013 following Snowden’s revelations as the “Snowden effect.” The “Snowden effect” is a form of chilling effect. Using data from a unique search engine, DuckDuckGo, we show that chilling effects indeed exist. However, further analysis including the stock prices of the largest cybersecurity companies demonstrate a muted market response to the revelations, while cybersecurity spending data suggest resulting economic harm in the form of increased opportunity costs of buyers of cybersecurity services.

Interrogating Hidden Truths

Within a larger cultural exchange of information, investigative documentary makers balance creative artistry with journalistic practices while they navigate risk and security concerns in precarious times, and they play a vital role in democratic functioning by fostering public awareness and dialogue. These investigative documentarians are breaking new stories even as they face threats—legal, privacy, security, safety—that may be more profound given their location outside formal journalism institutions. Opening with the story of CitizenFour, Laura Poitras’s Academy Award–winning exposé of US National Security Agency spying through the story of whistleblower Edward Snowden, the film case studies here also include Southwest of Salem: The Story of the San Antonio Four, the documentary investigation of four lesbians wrongfully convicted of a heinous crime; and The Feeling of Being Watched, a first-person verité journey into government spying on the filmmaker’s predominantly Arab-American community outside Chicago.

The Ford Administration, the National Security Agency, and the “Year of Intelligence”: Constructing a New Legal Framework for Intelligence

In the mid-1970s, Congress and the judiciary moved to regulate the National Security Agency (NSA) at a moment when such regulation might have restricted the growth of electronic surveillance. The Ford administration played a crucial role in preventing that from happening. It did so by controlling the flow of intelligence information to Congress and by establishing a flexible new legal framework for intelligence based on broad executive orders, narrow legislation, and legal opinions written by executive branch lawyers. This framework fostered a perception of legality that headed off calls for comprehensive legislation governing intelligence. The Ford administration’s actions protected NSA from meaningful regulation, preserved the growth of electronic surveillance, and sustained executive branch preeminence in national security affairs. The episode proved formative for the Ford administration officials involved—including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Antonin Scalia—and solidified the central role of executive branch lawyers in national security policymaking.