Social Cognition: A Literary Perspective

Paragraph ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Chesters
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Simulation Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Victor Hugo ◽  
Theory Theory ◽  
Francois Rabelais ◽  
Interaction Theory ◽  
Scientific Debate

The set of procedures called variously mindreading, mentalizing, or social cognition — broadly put, the process by which we know others — is one that literature can dramatize in peculiarly intense ways. This essay describes three accounts of these procedures in current cognitive scientific debate — Theory Theory, Simulation Theory, and Interaction Theory. It is argued that each account alone struggles to capture the strange blend of immediacy and opacity that confronts me when I seek to grasp the minds of others. Through close readings of two literary passages (one by François Rabelais, the other by Victor Hugo), it is further argued that literature can by contrast do exactly this. To read ‘cognitively’ is thus both to reveal and to enlist literature's power to think about thinking.

The Person Model Theory and the Question of Situatedness of Social Understanding

2018 ◽  
pp. 468-492 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albert Newen
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Simulation Theory ◽  
Early Infancy ◽  
Theory Theory ◽  
Social Understanding ◽  
Interaction Theory ◽  
Context Dependent ◽  
Clear Cases ◽  
Person Model ◽  
Intense Debate

Humans are hyper-social beings, highly dependent on others and on successfully interacting with them. Which theory can adequately describe our ability to understand others? In the literature we have an intense debate among proponents of theory-theory, simulation theory, and interaction theory. I argue first that none of these accounts is adequate but that we need to go in the direction of what I call the “person model theory.” The second important question is which types of embodiment (or further aspects of 4E) are systematically relevant for social understanding according to the person model theory? I argue that there are clear cases of embodiment of social understanding, while extendedness and/or enactment seem to be only clearly implemented in early infancy. Furthermore, 4E features of being embodied, enacted, extended, or embedded can only be ascribed to an implementation, a token of a specific type which makes the 4E features intensely context-dependent.

Intersubjectivity and Psychopathology

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaun Gallagher
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Phenomenological Approach ◽  
Simulation Theory ◽  
Theory Theory ◽  
Embodied Interaction ◽  
Online Interaction ◽  
Interaction Theory ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
Second Person

This chapter provides a review of theory of mind (ToM) approaches to explaining certain dysfunctions of intersubjectivity in pathologies such as autism and schizophrenia. ToM approaches such as theory theory and simulation theory focus on mindreading but fail to explain important aspects of online intersubjective interaction. A phenomenological approach (interaction theory), focusing on embodied interaction, offers an alternative account of intersubjective processes and specific dysfunctions in pathology. Further research is needed on second-person, online interaction to develop this approach as a viable explanation of intersubjective problems in psychopathology.

scholarly journals Theory of Mind after Severe Acquired Brain Injury: Clues for Interpretation

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
U. Bivona ◽  
R. Formisano ◽  
L. Mastrilli ◽  
S. Zabberoni ◽  
C. Caltagirone ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Brain Injury ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Personal Experience ◽  
Acquired Brain Injury ◽  
Theoretical Models ◽  
Simulation Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Clinical Population ◽  
Theory Theory ◽  
Severe Acquired Brain Injury

Background.Recently, increased interest has been shown in Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities of individuals with severe acquired brain injury (sABI). ToM impairment following sABI can be associated with altered executive functioning and/or with difficulty in decoding and elaborating emotions. Two main theoretical models have been proposed to explain the mechanisms underlying ToM in the general population:Theory TheoryandSimulation Theory. This review presents and discusses the literature on ToM abilities in individuals with sABI by examining whether they sustain the applicability of theTheory Theoryand/orSimulation Theoryto account for ToM deficits in this clinical population. We found 32 papers that are directly aimed at investigating ToM in sABI. Results did not show the univocal predominance of one model with respect to the other in explaining ToM deficits in sABI. We hypothesised that ToM processes could be explained by coinvolvement of the two models, i.e., according to personal experience, cognitive features, or the emotional resources of the persons with sABI.

Comment: Basic Empathy and Complex Empathy

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Zahavi
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Simulation Theory ◽  
Theory Theory ◽  
Social Understanding ◽  
Short Commentary

In my short commentary, I dwell on the distinction between basic and complex empathy, and suggest that a basic perception-based form of empathy might point to the existence of a type of social understanding that is more direct and more fundamental than the types of social cognition normally addressed by simulation theory and theory theory.

scholarly journals The Private Language Argument and a Second-Person Approach to Mindreading

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 75-86
Author(s):  
Joshua Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Simulation Theory ◽  
Theory Theory ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Private Language ◽  
Second Person ◽  
Private Language Argument

I argue that if Wittgenstein’s Private language Argument is correct, then both Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory are inadequate accounts of how we come to know other minds since both theories assume the reality of a private language. Further, following the work of a number of philosophers and psychologists, I defend a ‘Second-Person Approach’ to mindreading according to which it is possible for us to be directly aware of at least some of the mental states of others. because it is not necessary to assume a private language within the Second-Person Approach, I argue that this account of social cognition is superior to Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory since it avoids the objections of the PlA.

Einfühlen und Verstehen

2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 220-243
Author(s):  
Verena Mayer
Keyword(s):  
Simulation Theory ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Theory Theory ◽  
Other Minds ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
The Many

How do we understand other minds? The current debate uses the iridescent term “empathy” to explain our quite different mindreading capacities. Since no alternatives seemed to be available the discussion has been mostly in a deadlock between “simulation theory” and “theory theory”. Only recently the relevance of phenomenological findings on the issue has been brought forward. In this paper Husserl’s two concepts of “Einfühlung”, as developed in the second volume of his Ideas, are set against the background of the latest discussion. Husserl’s explanation of empathy in terms of analogical experience highlights the transcendental role of empathy in the context of constitution. At the same time it may solve some of the many riddles left by the recent debate.

How We See Others: The Psychobiology of Schemas and Transference

CNS Spectrums ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 10-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan J. Stein
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
The Other ◽  
Clinic Setting

ABSTRACTSocial cognition involves automatic and stimulus-driven processes; these may be important in mediating stereotypes in the community and schemas and transference in the clinic setting. Significant differences in self-related processing and other-related processing may also lead to important biases in our view of the other. The psychobiology of social cognition is gradually being delineated, and may be useful in understanding these phenomena, and in responding appropriately. In the clinic, schemas can be rigorously assessed, and schema-focused psychotherapy may be useful in a number of indications.

scholarly journals The Pain of Granting Otherness: Interoception and the Differentiation of the Other / Der Schmerz der Gewährung von Andersheit: Interozeption und die Differenzierung des Objekts

2017 ◽  
Vol 39 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 155-173
Author(s):  
Joona Taipale
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Developmental Psychology ◽  
Early Experience ◽  
Social Experience ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Research Paradigm ◽  
Central Task ◽  
Experience Of Care ◽  
Psychoanalytic Perspective

SummaryThis article examines the foundations of social experience from a psychoanalytic perspective. In current developmental psychology, social cognition debate, and phenomenology of empathy, it is widely assumed that the self and the other are differentiated from the outset, and the basic challenge is accordingly taken to consist in explaining how the gap between the self and the other can be bridged. By contrast, in the psychoanalytic tradition, the central task is considered to lie in explaining how such a gap is established in the first place. My article develops this latter idea. I focus on the infant’s early experience of care, show how the presence of the caregiver can be interpreted in terms of an interoceptive experience, illustrate the gradual self/other differentiation from this perspective, and thus argue that the other is granted ‘otherness’ gradually. By emphasising this graduality, I challenge the assumption that self/other differentiation dominates the infant’s life from the outset. In this manner, I show how the psychoanalytic theory may be used in contesting one of the cornerstones of the current research paradigm.

scholarly journals The role of morality in social cognition

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Lauren Ray ◽  
Peter Mende-Siedlecki ◽  
Ana P. Gantman ◽  
Jay Joseph Van Bavel
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Social Perception ◽  
Impression Formation ◽  
Factor Models ◽  
The Other ◽  
One Dimension ◽  
Primary Role ◽  
The Past ◽  
Important Basis

Over the past few decades, two-factor models of social cognition have emerged as the dominant framework for understanding impression formation. Despite the differences in the labels, there is wide agreement that one dimension reflects sociability potential, and the other, competence. One way in which the various two-factor models do clearly differ, however, is in the way the dimensions incorporate or produce evaluations of morality. Aristotle saw morality as the most important basis on which to form positive evaluations, because competence and sociability could only be virtuous, sincere, and trustworthy if expressed through a moral character. This chapter highlights research demonstrating the unique and possibly primary role of morality in social cognition. We clarify the dynamic, interactive, and conjoint effects of morality on social perception, and argue morality, competence, and sociability are three influential and interactive dimensions of social perception.

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