Are Individuals Luck Egalitarians? – An Experiment on the Influence of Brute and Option Luck on Social Preferences

This article is devoted to the stream in political philosophy which came to be known as “luck egalitarianism”. Luck egalitarians are concerned with the questions of distributive justice; their main idea is that no person should be worse-off due to factors which they are unable to influence. Luck egalitarians express this idea via the dichotomy of brute and option luck. The goal of the article is to describe two main lines of critique which luck egalitarianism encounters, and to assess which one is the most dangerous for this movement. Some authors criticize luck egalitarianism from a moral standpoint. They believe that it is overly cruel towards those who suffer due to unfortunate but free choices, humiliating towards those whom it deems to be worthy of help, and that it contradicts our moral intuitions concerning the question of what do people who engage in socially necessary, yet risky professions, deserve. Another important problem for this trend of political thought has to do with metaphysical criticism. Luck egalitarians claim that a person is not responsible not only for the status of her family, her gender, ethnicity, etc., but also for her talents and abilities. The question arises; is there anything for what a person can be genuinely responsible for? Thus, luck egalitarianism encounters the problem of determinism and free will. This problem threatens the identity of luck egalitarianism: if free will does not exist or if it cannot be identified, then the key dichotomy of brute and option luck is meaningless. The article demonstrates that it is the criticism of the second kind which currently poses the greatest problem for luck egalitarianism.

Download Full-text

Verteilungsgerechtigkeit, Verantwortung und Zufall: Die Bedeutung von Risikoakzeptanz für den Glücksegalitarismus

Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung ◽

10.3196/004433021834259246 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 75 (4) ◽

pp. 511-536

Author(s):

Julius Schälike

Keyword(s):

Expected Utility ◽

Risk Taking ◽

Lottery Ticket ◽

Equal Opportunities ◽

Ronald Dworkin ◽

Relevant Difference ◽

Knowing That ◽

Luck Egalitarians ◽

To Receive ◽

Option Luck

Luck egalitarians like Ronald Dworkin and G. A. Cohen claim that the influence of luck on the distribution of goods or welfare has to be equalized, whereas inequality must be accepted if the subjects bear responsibility for it. The paper investigates how this claim should be interpreted and if it is plausible. Analyzing several examples, I try to show that the spectrum of pertinent cases is much more limited than Dworkin and Cohen think. Sometimes it seems as if someone is responsible for being in a worse position than someone else, while in fact they didn't have equal opportunities. Fitting cases of responsibility for inequality can be found when we focus on the outcomes of calculated gambles (Dworkin: option luck). But why, and what exactly are cases in point? What distinguishes the risk-taking of someone who buys a lottery ticket from that of a peasant who cultivates a piece of land, knowing that a storm might ruin the crop? I try to demonstrate that an ethically relevant difference occurs when the attitude towards risk differs. Would the agent prefer to receive the expected utility safely, or would she rather gamble?

Download Full-text

CATERING FOR RESPONSIBILITY: BRUTE LUCK, OPTION LUCK, AND THE NEUTRALITY OBJECTION TO LUCK EGALITARIANISM

Economics and Philosophy ◽

10.1017/s0266267118000226 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 35 (02) ◽

pp. 259-281 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Greg Bognar

Keyword(s):

Individual Responsibility ◽

Luck Egalitarianism ◽

Brute Luck ◽

Luck Egalitarians ◽

Option Luck ◽

As If

Abstract:The distinction between brute luck and option luck is fundamental for luck egalitarianism. Many luck egalitarians write as if it could be used to specify which outcomes people should be held responsible for. In this paper, I argue that the distinction can’t be used this way. In fact, luck egalitarians tend to rely instead on rough intuitive judgements about individual responsibility. This makes their view vulnerable to what’s known as the neutrality objection. I show that attempts to avoid this objection are unsuccessful. I conclude that until it provides a better account of attributing responsibility, luck egalitarianism remains incomplete.

Download Full-text

Fairness and Legitimacy in Justice, And: Does Option Luck Ever Preserve Justice?

On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays in Political Philosophy ◽

10.23943/princeton/9780691148700.003.0007 ◽

2011 ◽

Author(s):

G. A. Cohen

Keyword(s):

Luck Egalitarianism ◽

Starting Point ◽

Technical Sense ◽

Luck Egalitarians ◽

Option Luck

This chapter defends the claim that what recommends an outcome that was achieved by just steps from a just starting point is not, in the general case, itself (unqualified) justice, but the different virtue of legitimacy, or, more precisely, the property that no one can legitimately complain about it. David Miller has claimed that luck egalitarianism is inconsistent with the principal distinction that Cohen tries to draw in the chapter, because luck egalitarianism says: distribute equally, compensating appropriately for luck-induced deficits, and then whatever arises from people's choices is just. However, this suggests that luck egalitarians should not call whatever arises “just,” but merely “legitimate” (in the technical sense of being something that no one can complain about).

Download Full-text