scholarly journals THE RELATIONS OF CONTINGENT AND NECESSARY, NORMATIVE AND ACTUAL AS A WORLDVIEW PHILOSOPHY IDEA

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 390-395
Author(s):  
V.N. Karpovich
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
Moral Fact ◽  
Natural Laws ◽  
Necessary Truths

The relation of the contingent and the necessary truths and between facts and duties is an important philosophical problem. Hume formulated it in a paradoxical form, arguing that people can, for the sake of momentary benefit, commit an act leading to bad consequences for themselves and for other people. This argument has been widely discussed in the literature, with different approaches and different interpretations. Here we propose to include in the reasoning not only moral, but also natural laws, so that the combination of two types of modalities in the premises would allow to get deductively a moral fact as a conclusion from another moral fact plus a connected combination of deontic and aletic modalities in the premises.

The Harmony and Application of Natural Laws

1882 ◽  
Vol 14 (351supp) ◽  
pp. 5602-5603
Author(s):  
B. T. Giraud
Keyword(s):  
Natural Laws

Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s Theory of Natural Laws in Ethics: An Analytic and Critical Review

2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-89
Author(s):  
Rahim Dehghan Simakani ◽  
Maryam Khoshdel Rohani
Keyword(s):  
Critical Review ◽  
Natural Laws

Ritual Impurity in Tannaitic Literature: Two Opposing Perspectives

2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-103
Author(s):  
Vered Noam
Keyword(s):  
Entire System ◽  
Natural Laws ◽  
Natural Substance ◽  
Actual Existence ◽  
Human Awareness

This paper examines the rabbinic concept of impurity in terms of the essence of the reality that this term implies. Did the Rabbis consider impurity to be a force of nature, or rather an abstract formalistic structure devoid of any actual existence? A review of rabbinic sources regarding corpse impurity reveals that the essential structures of tannaitic halakhah are grounded in a natural, immanent perception of impurity, which gave rise to an entire system, intricate and coherent, of “natural laws of impurity.” Layered onto this system, as a secondary stratum of sorts comprising exceptions and “addenda,” is a more subtle halakhic tapestry woven from a diametrically opposed perception. This view subjects the concept of impurity to human awareness and intention, severing it from reality and, in so doing, also stripping it of its “natural” substance.

Taking Responsibility for Injustice

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Goodhart
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
Social Conventions ◽  
Political Work ◽  
Political Struggles ◽  
Iris Marion Young ◽  
Taking Responsibility

This chapter puts many of the ideas outlined previously to work in considering the problem of responsibility for systemic injustice. Building on the insights of Iris Marion Young and Marion Smiley, it argues that responsibility must be reconceptualized as a political rather than a philosophical problem and that its solution lies in counterhegemonic political struggles over the meaning of injustice itself. The chapter shows, in a concrete way, what such struggles might look like, describing the ways in which social conventions and interpretations structure our thinking about responsibility and what might be done to challenge and change them. It concludes that to take responsibility for injustice is to take up this political work.

How the Explanations of Natural Laws Make Some Reducible Physical Properties Natural and Explanatorily Powerful

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Lange
Keyword(s):  
Physical Properties ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Center Of Mass ◽  
Natural Laws ◽  
Fundamental Properties

Some philosophers regard no reducible physical properties as perfectly natural. However, in scientific practice, some but not other reducible physical properties (such as the property of having a given center of mass) denote genuine, explanatorily potent respects in which various systems are alike. What distinguishes these natural reducible physical properties from arbitrary algebraic combinations of more fundamental properties? Some philosophers treat naturalness as a metaphysical primitive. However, this chapter I suggests that it is not—at least, not as far as the naturalness of reducible physical properties is concerned. Roughly speaking, it is argued here that a reducible physical property’s naturalness is grounded in its role in the explanation of laws.

Brute Necessity and the Mind–Body Problem

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Van Cleve
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind

In a growing number of papers one encounters arguments to the effect that certain philosophical views are objectionable because they would imply that there are necessary truths for whose necessity there is no explanation. For short, they imply that there are brute necessities. Therefore, the arguments conclude, the views in question should be rejected in favor of rival views under which the necessities would be explained. This style of argument raises a number of questions. Do necessary truths really require explanation? Are they not paradigms of truths that either need no explanation or automatically have one, being in some sense self-explanatory? If necessary truths do admit of explanation or even require it, what types of explanation are available? Are there any necessary truths that are truly brute? This chapter surveys various answers to these questions, noting their bearing on arguments from brute necessity and arguments concerning the mind–body problem.

On the Nature of Necessary Truths in Jurisprudence: Putting Wittgensteinian Hinges to Use

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 203-237
Author(s):  
Yi Tong
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Nature ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
The Law

Inquiring into the fundamental nature of law has been traditionally formulated as an attempt to answer the question, “What is Law?” Such an inquiry typically proceeds by identifying the necessary features of law. Joseph Raz, for example, writes: A theory consists of necessary truths, for only necessary truths about the law reveal the nature of the law. We talk of ‘the nature of law’, or the nature of anything else, to refer to those of the law’s characteristics which are of the essence of law, which make law into what it is. That is those properties without which the law would not be law.1

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