scholarly journals Patriotyzm ekonomiczny

2008 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 3-18
Author(s):  
Andrzej K. Koźmiński

The article discusses a special type of expectations addressed to the economic actors. These expectations either directly or indirectly refer to the idea of “national interest” and the common national weal. The author starts his deliberations with the connections between economy and patriotism in the Polish economic and political thought of the 19th and 20th centuries. He also presents some sociological conditions of contemporary views and attitudes concerning the connections between economy and national interests. They have been confronted with the mechanisms of gaining supremacy in the increasingly globalized economic competition.

2020 ◽  
pp. 64-91
Author(s):  
Cedric Ryngaert

This chapter examines the variables that may determine the exercise of jurisdiction in the common interest. It inquires what explanatory variables determine the dependent variable of the (non-)exercise of jurisdiction in the common interest, based on actual jurisdictional practice of states. However, the chapter’s approach is also normative where it seeks to justify particular interest-based practices of jurisdiction or recommends reform. The author argues that, realistically, bystander states are only likely to exercise selfless jurisdiction if this also serves their national interests. However, he submits that this limitation of cosmopolitan action need not be regrettable. Instead, it could be justified from a normative perspective. In particular, the variables determining the (non-)exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction as well as the jurisdictional extension of domestic economic regulation are discussed to support the argument.


1986 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 495-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. David Clinton

“The national interest” is frequently criticized in the contemporary study of international relations as an ambiguous term that lends itself to the support of unethical state policies by justifying single-minded national selfishness. This article argues that much of the criticism of the national interest on normative grounds in fact derives from confusion over the meaning of the concept. It separates two meanings — national interest as the common good of the national society, set off from the international environment, and national interests as the concrete objects of value over which states bargain, within that international setting. It surveys six views of the link among the national interest, the international society that legitimates various state interests, and the demands of ethical action, and concludes that statesmanship which relies on both definitions of national interest can provide the best guide to ethical state conduct within the “anarchical society” of international politics.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-112
Author(s):  
Nachman Alexander

This article examines how Fadlallah and Khomeini’s respective quests for sovereignty are reflected in their political thought, particularly vis-a-vis their notions of maṣlaḥa, which I define as the “common good.” I argue that if, to an extent, Islamic political thought seeks to maximise maṣlaḥa, then this can also constitute a claim to sovereignty, the definition of which remains multidimensional and contentious. By closely examining Fadlallah and Khomeini’s writings and pronouncements on governance, popular movement, and state, I attempt to reveal how discussions regarding Islamic governance demonstrate a broader claim to authority in Islamic history.


2019 ◽  
Vol 244 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Coast

Abstract The voice of the people is assumed to have carried little authority in early modern England. Elites often caricatured the common people as an ignorant multitude and demanded their obedience, deference and silence. Hostility to the popular voice was an important element of contemporary political thought. However, evidence for a very different set of views can be found in numerous polemical tracts written between the Reformation and the English Civil War. These tracts claimed to speak for the people, and sought to represent their alleged grievances to the monarch or parliament. They subverted the rules of petitioning by speaking for ‘the people’ as a whole and appealing to a wide audience, making demands for the redress of grievances that left little room for the royal prerogative. In doing so, they contradicted stereotypes about the multitude, arguing that the people were rational, patriotic and potentially better informed about the threats to the kingdom than the monarch themselves. ‘Public opinion’ was used to confer legitimacy on political and religious demands long before the mass subscription petitioning campaigns of the 1640s.


Author(s):  
Christopher J. Berry

The common argument that Hume is a conservative is interrogated. Its accuracy once subject to further inspection is suspect and fails to capture a key characteristic of Hume’s socio-political thought. After identifying those aspects of Hume’s thought that most securely underwrite attributing the conservative label, it is argued nonetheless that the conservative label is at least insecure. It is further claimed that when his commitment to ‘science’ and his polemics against superstition, and other ‘chimerical’ practices and principles, are taken on board then the stronger case that the label is a distortion can be judged to have substance.


Author(s):  
Paul J. Griffiths

The secular state, the church, and the caliphate are associations that each hold universal aspirations, at least implicitly. While the universal aspirations of the church and caliphate may be obvious enough, every state seeks dominion over the whole world. (“Secular” describes states that limit their vision to this world, as opposed to the transcendence to which both the church and caliphate appeal.) As an essay in Catholic speculative theology, Griffiths asks two questions: Whether Catholic theology supports or discourages the variety of political orders, and whether these orders could be ranked in terms of goodness from a Catholic perspective? In response to these questions, Griffiths appeals to two aspects of St. Augustine’s political thought: Political rivalries serve the common good; and the principal indicator of the degree to which a state serves the common good is its explicit service to the god of Abraham. The United States (a secular state) is compared with ISIS (an attempted caliphate).


Author(s):  
Christina Eckes

Chapter 2 discusses the legal consequences and deeper meaning of EU loyalty with particular attention to external relations. It identifies specific active and passive obligations flowing from the principle of sincere cooperation in the context of EU external relations and argues that they are best understood as forming part of a comprehensive duty of loyalty. EU loyalty endows EU membership with a distinctive meaning. It is central to imposing a quasi-federal discipline and making sovereign states ‘Member States of the EU’ by acting as a tool that can at times take specific legal obligations beyond the letter of the law. EU loyalty legally restrains Member States from exercising their rights as independent international actors in a way that finds no parallel beyond the European Union. It may require placing the common Union interest above national interests. The concept of unity of international representation has a particular capacity to deepen and widen the obligations flowing from EU loyalty. It amplifies the effects of EU loyalty on the scope of legal action of the Member States, including in the field of reserved competences. It is also part of the explanation of why loyalty has more stringent consequences externally rather than internally. This in turn means that the duty of loyalty has a particular integrative force in the context of external relations. Chapter 2 also argues that this stringent understanding of EU loyalty is justified by the nature of external relations and that this justification should be (better) explicated by the EU institutions in order to justify EU external actions vis-à-vis EU citizens.


2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 1007-1021 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOEL ISAAC

The world of grand strategy is not one to which intellectual historians have devoted a great deal of attention. Matters of interstate economic competition and imperial rivalry have, of course, long been at the center of histories of early modern political thought. Yet, when these currents in the history of political thought narrow into nineteenth-centuryrealpolitik, and then turn toward the professionalized contemporary discourses of international relations and war studies, intellectual historians have, for the most part, left the matter to the experts. The strategic maxims of Clausewitz and Liddell Hart may fascinate IR theorists, political scientists, and military historians, but they seldom fire the imaginations of tender-minded historians of ideas. The two books under review challenge such preconceptions. They ask us to consider the history of Cold War strategic thought in a wider conceptual frame. Buried in the history of strategy, they suggest, are some of the central themes of postwar social and political thought.


2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. Sparling

AbstractPartisanship inspires a degree of ambivalence. There is a widespread tendency—which has a long history in republican political thought—to decry division and partisanship as corrupting, undermining individual judgment, and promoting clientelism, dependencies and loyalties antithetical to the common good. Yet there is an equally widespread intuition that excessive unity is corrupting, undermining the vigour of civic life. Contemporary political theory remains divided on the normative implications of division and unity—witness the battles between agonistic and consensus-oriented schools of democratic theory. In this article I examine the thought of two eighteenth-century writers who, while often treated as contributing to a common intellectual project of reinvigorating classical civic virtue, took opposite positions on the desirability of division. Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Ferguson offered competing accounts of what corrupts civic virtue, one decrying party divisions and the other lauding them. The article examines the underlying philosophical presuppositions of Rousseau and Ferguson's competing claims and suggests, ultimately, that both positions suffer from neglecting to attend to an important distinction between salutary and harmful divisions.


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