Categorial Intuition and the Theory of Categorial Representation

2018 ◽  
Vol 79 ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Jong-Woo Lee
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 407-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chad Kidd

Abstract A recent trend in Husserl scholarship takes the Logische Untersuchungen (LU) as advancing an inconsistent and confused view of the non-conceptual content of perceptual experience. Against this, I argue that there is no inconsistency about non-conceptualism in LU. Rather, LU presents a hybrid view of the conceptual nature of perceptual experience, which can easily be misread as inconsistent, since it combines a conceptualist view of perceptual content (or matter) with a non-conceptualist view of perceptual acts. I show how this hybrid view is operative in Husserl’s analyses of essentially occasional expressions and categorial intuition. And I argue that is also deployed in relation to Husserl’s analysis of the constitution of perceptual fullness, which allows it to avoid an objection raised by Walter Hopp – that the combination of Husserl’s analysis of perceptual fullness with conceptualism about perceptual content generates a vicious regress.


1981 ◽  
Vol 12 (9999) ◽  
pp. 127-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Sokolowski ◽  
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 613-630
Author(s):  
Zeljko Radinkovic

The text deals with a certain phase of the Heideggerian way of thinking, which had precedes the emergence of ?Being and Time? (1927). Heidegger?s reception, criticism, and transformation of some of the central concepts of Husserlian phenomenology (intentionality, a priori, categorial intuition) is the focus of the reflections. This article shows how this radical transformation of Husserlian phenomenology goes beyond the formal coincidence of the phenomenological principle ?to the things themselves? and points to the essential connection of the question of being and its phenomenological demetalization.


Phainomenon ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 16-17 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-54
Author(s):  
Francese Pereña

Abstract At the beginning of Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Gesamtausgabe, volume 20), Heidegger extensively puts forward his views against phenomenology, especially that of Husserl, which is the one we are going to consider. By means of what he calls the “fundamental discoveries of phenomenology”, that is, intentionality, categorial intuition and the meaning of the a priori in Husserl’s Logical!nvestigations, Heidegger reaches a definition of phenomenology: “the analytic description of intentionality in its a priori”. Next, Heidegger proceeds to what he characterizes as an “ immanent critique” of phenomenology, that consists in highlighting that in Ideas Husserl does make but omits the fundamental question on “the being of consciousness” and on “the sense of being”, in a way that ends up in being un-phenomenological. We go into Heidegger’ S text in order to consider the legitimacy of its critique and, particularly, its alleged immanence.


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