Feto-mone Gender Paradigm in the Culture and Architecture of the Dawan Tribe Settlement in Kaenbaun Village

This article aimed to show the existence of gender concepts in the culture and settlement of the Dawan tribe in Kaenbaun Village, as indicated with its strong presence in the everyday life of the community, including the formal and ritual aspects. The concept exists in the inner world and mindset of every villager and has also become the guiding element of their world view, behaviour, place arrangement, and living space structures. This study was, there, conducted using participatory observation based on the Husserlian phenomenology paradigm supported by the inductive-empirical and qualitative descriptive methods to discover and understand the gender concept as well as its application and background in the selected tribe. The results showed the fetomone gender concept has become a paradigm of the thought expressed broadly and consistently through words, behaviour, as well as place and spatial arrangements among the villagers. Its function and meaning were further clarified in relation to the life and settlement architecture of the people. The core principle observed to be behind the concept is the separation and integration of life elements in an intense and permanent mutualism symbiotic relationship. Therefore, it was necessary to research the concept, function, and meaning of gender in ethnic cultures throughout Indonesia in order to form a collection of knowledge on gender and spatial planning which is useful to the understanding of ethnic settlements’ uniqueness based on local or ethnic perspectives and their preservation.

NON-INTENTIONAL COMPONENTS OF INTENTIONAL PHENOMENOLOGY

В статье проблематизируются аспекты гуссерлевской феноменологии, которые становятся отправной точкой для новых феноменологических теорий. Эти теории преодолевают затруднения, с которыми сталкивается классическая феноменология, такие как данность истины, историчность субъекта и «пустые» интенции. Неклассические теории предлагают свое дополнительное поле рассмотрения, в котором данность феномена необязательно носит интенциональный характер. Наиболее значимыми из них являются концепция «Другого» Э. Левинаса и «насыщенный феномен» Ж-Л. Мариона. Показано, что данные проекты позволяют работать с новыми классами феноменов. The paper questions some aspects of Husserlian phenomenology which have become a starting point for new phenomenological theories. These theories overcome difficulties of the classic phenomenology, such as: the givenness of the truth, historicity of the subject and «empty» intentions. Non-classical theories offer their own additional field of inquiry, where the given of the phenomenon isn't necessarily of intentional character. Among them, most substantial are conceptions of «The Other» by E. Levinas and «saturated phenomenon» by J.-L. Marion. The paper shows that these projects allow us to work with new kinds of phenomena.

Is Perception Essentially Perspectival?

Husserl famously argues that it is essential to perception to present the perceived object in perspectives. Hence, there is no – and there cannot be – perception without perspectival givenness. Yet, it seems that there are counterexamples to this essentialist claim, for we seem to be able to imagine beings that do not perceive in perspectives. Recently, there have been some accounts in the literature that critically discuss those counterexamples and assess to what extent they succeed in challenging Husserl’s essentialist claim. In this paper I discuss three different answers to these counterexamples, all of them are found wanting. I offer a novel solution, taking into account some crucial findings of the contemporary debate about imagination and modality. I argue that this new solution is capable of fully vindicating Husserl’s essentialist claim. Finally, I reconstruct Husserl’s own way to treat such counterexamples, in order to showcase the notion of modality Husserlian phenomenology relies on. I argue for the hitherto widely underappreciated point that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology cannot appeal to strictly absolute modality but that the kind of modality in Husserlian phenomenology is conditional on the facticity that we have the transcendental structure we do in fact have.

Lived Experiences of Emergency Department (ED) Nurses with Comorbidities amidst COVID-19 Pandemic at Candon City of Ilocos Sur: A Phenomenological Study

Nurses may be regarded as modern-day superheroes, but realistically, they are humans too. They experience joy, gratitude, fear, and anxiety just like normal human beings. With this pandemic, nurses are exposed to psychological stress. Healthcare staff, specifically nurses, experience a plethora of psychological distress during the care of COVID-19 patients. Identifying factors that affect nurses' mental health during the care of these patients can be an advantage in mitigating the psychological burden that they are experiencing. [1] This study described the ER nurses' lived experiences about being in the frontline despite their comorbidities. The study applied a qualitative method using Husserlian phenomenology. The researchers adopted the purposive sampling approach in selecting the ten participants to achieved data saturation. The process involved in the collection of data was through individual interviews. The criteria of the selection of participants are: must be registered nurse, a nurse working at the emergency room of the four hospitals in Candon City, Ilocos Sur; with a minimum work experience of 6 months in the facility; between ages 40 to 60 years of age; regular employee; and with comorbidity. Key words: lived-experiences, emergency room nurses, comorbidity, amid pandemic.

Phenomenology, Aesthetics, and Worldbuilding in Murasaki’s The Tale of Genji and Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings

In this paper, I examine the theoretical aspects of worldbuilding in Murasaki’s and Tolkien’s imagined worlds and accentuate the role of aesthetic landscape creation through which spatio-temporal layers are negotiated. As a starting point, I refer to Thomas Ryba’s Husserl, Fantasy and Possible Worlds (1990), where he evaluates the believability of secondary worlds via Husserlian phenomenology. To shed light on Ryba’s statement that authors must be “adept at describing the qualities of characters and the world in which they live” (232) through the lens of engagement, I contend that critically acclaimed imagined worlds such as Heian Japan in The Tale of Genji (c.1000 A.D.) and Middle-earth in The Lord of the Rings (1954-1955) demonstrate two fundamental qualities: the physical environments possess aesthetic qualities and the emotional experience of the place is integrated into the fabric of worldbuilding, generating an aura of believability.

A Neuro-Phenomenological Perspective on the Autism Phenotype

In the current paper, we present a view of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) which avoids the typical relational issues, instead drawing on philosophy, in particular Husserlian phenomenology. We begin by following the recent etiological perspectives that suggest a natural predisposition of a part of individuals with ASD towards hypersensitivity and the reduced influence of cognitive priors (i.e., event schemas). Following this perspective, these two characteristics should be considered as a sort of phenomenological a priori that, importantly, could predispose people with ASD towards a spiritual experience, not intended in its religious meaning, but as an attribute of consciousness that consists of being aware of and attentive to what is occurring in the present moment. Potential clinical implications are discussed.

Phenomenology as Radical Reflection

What does it mean to adopt a phenomenological approach when doing philosophy of perception? What form should such an approach take? This chapter addresses these questions by first distinguishing three different kinds of phenomenological approach: ‘Humean’ phenomenology, which attempts to discern the structure of perceptual experience via reflection on its surface properties; ‘Kantian’ phenomenology, which aims to provide a priori arguments about the structure perceptual experience must have if it is to possess manifest properties; and ‘Husserlian’ phenomenology, which aims to achieve an intuitive grasp of the essential properties of perceptual experience via imaginative variation. It then argues that the shortcomings of each of these approaches motivate a ‘Merleau-Pontian’ conception of phenomenology as ‘radical reflection’—a mode of reflection on perceptual experience that simultaneously attempts to understand the origins and authority of reflection itself. The methodology that results is thoroughly interdisciplinary, aiming to reconcile philosophical conclusions about the necessary structures of perceptual experience with our best empirical knowledge of the contingencies that shape both our experiences and our reflective capacities.