ANARCHISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY

We offer an introductory article to the translation of Dutch philosopher Joery Schreivers’ work Phenomenologists and Anarchism, which deals with the reception of current foreign trajectories of phenomenological and akratic reflexions from the perspective of contemporary Russian academic discourse. In the light of this, an attempt is made to assess the significance and originality of J. Shrivers’ study, focused on the conceptual juxtaposition of two philosophical traditions: phenomenology and the philosophy of anarchism. The value of the author’s stated perspective, which provides an opportunity to revise the classical phenomenological texts, is articulated as being related to its methodological novelty—not only for the Russian-speaking space, but also for foreign philosophy; a review and analysis of the central theses of the article, related to the key figures of the line of succession of acrical reflection in the phenomenological tradition, which is outlined by the author, is given, including: M.Heidegger, R. Schürmann, E.Levinas, J.Derrida, J.-L.Nancy, J.-I.Lacoste, C.Romano and J.-L.Marion. The article also builds theoretical connections between the anarchist foundations of a number of phenomenological reflections identified by J. Schreivers and the ontological accoutrements of other current philosophical trends—for example, the actor-network theory and the polyphony of new materialisms.

DIALOGIC PHENOMENOLOGY OF PAIN EXPERIENCE SAULIUS GENIUSAS THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF PAIN. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2020 ISBN 978-0-8214-2403-2

The review focuses on Saulius Geniusas’ book, The Phenomenology of Pain. In this study, Geniusas develops his own systematic phenomenology of the experience of pain, based primarily on the conceptual resources of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. In doing so, the philosopher formulates and successfully implements original methodological principles of “dialogical phenomenology.” Such a phenomenology consists of, on the one hand, strict phenomenological analysis of pain based on the methods of epoché, phenomenological reduction and eidetic variation, and on the other hand, of actual and partly polemical inclusion of phenomenological point of view in the ongoing discussion of pain in the social and biological sciences. The author manages to do this by supplementing his eidetic analysis of the essence of pain experience with the method of “factual variations” and by appealing to the analytical optics of Husserl’s late genetic phenomenology. This way the book reflects—on strictly phenomenological grounds—numerous findings from the sociology and biology of pain. The book relies on the tradition of phenomenological research, offers a conceptual reconstruction of the key dispute about pain that took place in this tradition (between Franz Brentano and Carl Stump) and, in its turn, grounds the positive sciences of pain in the direct evidence of experience itself.

FREEDOM AS THE MAIN PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY GÜNTHER NEUMANN DER FREIHEITSBEGRIFF BEI GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ UND MARTIN HEIDEGGER. PHILOSOPHISCHE SCHRIFTEN, BAND 9. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2019 ISBN 978-3-428-15537-8 HEIDEGGER UND LEIBNIZ. MIT EINEM GELEITWORT VON FRIEDRICH-WILHELM VON HERRMANN (DAS DENKEN MARTIN HEIDEGGERS II 2 HRSG. VON HANS-CHRISTIAN GÜNTHER). Traugott Bautz Verlag, Nordhausen, 2020 ISBN 978-3-95948-493-0

Book review focuses on two books by Gunther Neumann, dedicated to the thought of Heidegger and Leibniz. If one of the books deals specifically with the understanding of freedom in both of the two philosophers, then the other one deals more with Heidegger’s three approaches to Leibniz’s thought: (1) Interpretation of Leibniz in the context of the making of fundamental ontology and in Being and Time, as well as the reading of Leibniz after Being and Time; (2) Interpretation of Leibniz during the transition to Ereignis thought; (3) Interpetation of Leibniz in the framework of Ereignis thought. Author’s scrupulous close reading approach allows to show the changes in Heidegger’s approach to Leibniz’s philosophy, as well as sketch out the placement of Leibniz’s great themes on the horizon of Heidegger’s history of the truth of being. Author also shows that from metaphysics there stems a certain view in the modern philosophical discussions oriented on neurosciences—a certain view on the human being and on the freedom of will. On this background Heidegger appears as a thinker who has looked beyond the alloy of metaphysics and sciences, in which the concept of freedom has been greatly restricted. Heidegger manages (thanks to the radical questioning of Being) to turn the view on the problem of freedom, which appears in G. Neumann’s books as the main problem of philosophy—through the contact of Leibniz’s thought and Heidegger’s.

CORE OF THE ESSENCE AND CORE OF THE PERSON: JEAN HERING AND A HIDDEN SOURCE OF EDITH STEIN’S EARLY ONTOLOGY

The present paper makes the case for considering Jean Hering the source from which Edith Stein first borrowed the concept of “core,” notably, “core of the person.” In particular, we maintain that the background of Stein’s decision is represented by the original version of Hering’s famous booklet Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee, namely, the Appendix (Fragmente zur Vorbereitung einer künftigen Lehre vom Apriori) to his still unpublished dissertation on Lotze. Nevertheless, whereas Hering introduces the concept of “core” to merely discriminate between different types of essences within the framework of a general attempt at determining the structure of individual essences, Stein takes it to characterize always and exclusively the structure of the person, notably, its mode of being, thereby paving the way for her future personalistic ontology. The paper will be divided into three parts. In § 2 evidence will be produced to support the thesis that Stein had direct knowledge of Hering’s dissertation. § 3 will analyze Hering’s notions of essence and “core of the essence” (in both versions of the text and in relation to the example of the “essence” of Caesar). Finally, § 4 will tackle the “core” in Stein’s early works, in particular in the book on empathy, and in comparison with Hering’s understanding of it. The paper intends to pursue a double goal: it aims at emphasizing the novelty of Stein’s conception of the essence, notably, core of the (individual) essence while at the same time reconstructing the wider framework to which it belongs.

SPIRITUAL ACTS IN ANTHROPOLOGY. EDITH STEIN’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

The aim of the present contribution is to prove that spiritual acts not only play a significant role in the phenomenological description of the person and in individual and social experiences, but likewise they play a decisive role in the methodological constitution of phenomenology and have a core function in the theoretical structuring of the phenomenological description of the person, regarding, for example, metaphysical and anthropological characteristics. Firstly, in the paper, the implications for anthropology that arise from Edith Stein’s phenomenology are examined. In the second part—from the insight that Stein does not structure anthropology without its metaphysical background—the paper underlines the metaphysical presuppositions of anthropology in Stein’s thinking. In both stages, the investigation engages with Husserlian insights that Stein took on board and creatively introduced from Husserl’s thought into her own work. The inference from this engagement of Stein with Husserl emerges in the way Stein structures anthropology in general, and the origin of this can be seen in the description of the person as a psychophysical individual. At this point, the question arises regarding how the description of the spiritual acts can contribute to the structure of the person and, in this sense, to the foundation of anthropology as a philosophical-theological science.

IN-BETWEEN MIND, SPIRIT, AND BEING: A CRITICAL APPRECIATION OF GERDA WALTHER’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF MYSTICISM WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO CORRESPONDENCES TO POST-MATERIALIST NOTIONS OF REALITY

In her main work, Walther exposes the unio mystica as meta-transcendental constitution of (fundamental) spiritual being (the bracketing indicates that this demonstration can be read in a metaphysical, i.e., strong, as well as in a secular, i.e., weak, version). While reflecting her approach theoretically and methodologically by drawing on Husserl, Landmann, Stein, just as on Pfänder and Conrad-Martius, Walther proposes a genuine approach that pushes the transcendental idealistic paradigm further. Its crucial claim is (imperfect) perceptibility and experientiality of (fundamental) spiritual being (labeled “God” by Walther). It is based on a substantially and ontologically differentiating—though integrative—notion of the conditio humana: entanglement of ego-center (both belonging to the transcendental realm and transgressing it meta-transcendentally), self (belonging to psychophysical being), and soulspiritual implications of personal basic essence (belonging to spiritual being) with its “metaphysical-real core” (belonging to fundamental spiritual being). By the help of mystical vision, (fundamental) spiritual being is not only (though imperfectly) perceived and experienced; rather, according to Walther, human ego-consciousness also communicates with God as a spiritual person. However, the latter cannot be supported by Walther’s analysis. In other words, a critical distinction must be made between the—phenomenologically demonstrable—philosophical content of Walther’s investigation and its theologically motivated readings. Accordingly, the present article can appreciate the philosophical significance of her Phenomenology of Mysticism without thereby being committed to its theological interpretations. Walther’s main work, in summary, is a substantial—if not consistently concise—contribution to the philosophy of mind/spirit and being, which, moreover, is able to act as a bridge between philosophical phenomenology and theology. Additionally, in the weak reading, Walther’s integrative concept of mind/spirit and being is connectable to postmaterialist notions of reality.

FREEDOM AND (CO)BEING: AN-ARCHE’S ROUTES THROUGH THE LANDSCAPES OF PHENOMENOLOGY. PREFACE TO JOERY SHRIVERS’ ARTICLE “ANARCHISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY”

We offer an introductory article to the translation of Dutch philosopher Joery Schreivers’ work Phenomenologists and Anarchism, which deals with the reception of current foreign trajectories of phenomenological and akratic reflexions from the perspective of contemporary Russian academic discourse. In the light of this, an attempt is made to assess the significance and originality of J. Shrivers’ study, focused on the conceptual juxtaposition of two philosophical traditions: phenomenology and the philosophy of anarchism. The value of the author’s stated perspective, which provides an opportunity to revise the classical phenomenological texts, is articulated as being related to its methodological novelty—not only for the Russian-speaking space, but also for foreign philosophy; a review and analysis of the central theses of the article, related to the key figures of the line of succession of acrical reflection in the phenomenological tradition, which is outlined by the author, is given, including: M.Heidegger, R. Schürmann, E.Levinas, J.Derrida, J.-L.Nancy, J.-I.Lacoste, C.Romano and J.-L.Marion. The article also builds theoretical connections between the anarchist foundations of a number of phenomenological reflections identified by J. Schreivers and the ontological accoutrements of other current philosophical trends—for example, the actor-network theory and the polyphony of new materialisms.

TWO PHASES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF HEDWIG CONRAD-MARTIUS’ ONTOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION ON HUMAN BEING AND LIVING THINGS

Interest in the ontological constitution of living beings (with particular reference to the human being) characterizes the whole development of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ philosophy. Several works written by the philosopher over the years deal with both the phenomenological description and the ontological foundation of the difference between plants, animals, and humans. Specifically, the ontological structure of the human being is investigated as a layered structure which presupposes those of plants and animals while overcoming them in a more complex and spiritual unity, on which human freedom and human knowledge depend. Although this topic maintains a crucial role in Conrad-Martius’ thought, the way the philosopher addresses it and the theoretical results of her phenomenological-ontological inquiry about it do not remain unchanged. Indeed, the ontological structure at the basis of phenomenal differences as well as the metaphysical foundations of this structure change over the decades. This paper aims at distinguishing between two phases, characterized by different ontological categories, through which Conrad-Martius’ anthropology and biological ontology develop. In the first phase, at the beginning of the twenties (precisely in her work Metaphysical Dialogues), the essential differences between plants, animals, and humans are explained with reference to a vital origin preceding the constitution of reality; to describe it Conrad-Martius employs terms such as “abyss” and “under-earthly realm.” In the second phase, exemplified by some writings published in the forties and the fifties, the reference to such a dimension disappears and the eidetic variety within the living world, including human specificity, is exclusively traced back to the finalistic substantiation of essences in the natural beings.

WITOLD PŁOTKA, PATRICK ELDRIDGE (EDS.) EARLY PHENOMENOLOGY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. MAIN FIGURES, IDEAS, AND PROBLEMS. Contributions to Phenomenology. Vol. 113 Springer, 2020 ISBN 978-3-030-39622-0

The collective volume Early Phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe: Main Figures, Ideas, and Problems, edited by Witold Płotka and Patrick Eldridge, enriches the ongoing and highly topical research of the history of phenomenology with the thematization of a specific period and localization of phenomenology. The authors of eleven chapters explore the emergence of phenomenology in local traditions outside the Germanophone area, its appropriation and development, describing the unique forms it acquired in individual environments. The book clarifies the characteristics of the early wave of phenomenology and provides a list of Central and Eastern European phenomenologists who participated in it. On the one hand, the volume is a contribution to historiography, enriching the study of the history of phenomenology thematically and thus contributing to the development of phenomenology itself; on the other hand, it introduces its own set of philosophical problems. These concern methodology and the issue of the Central and Eastern European identity, which is examined through the prism of the development of local traditions of phenomenology. When exploring the latter it is useful to introduce the concept of the marginocentric. This concept, which originated in comparative literature, facilitates an understanding of the unique cultural configuration of a concrete tradition in its communication with internal and external environments.

SICHÜBERLIEFERUNG: RE-MOVING THE HISTORY OF BEING AS PRESENCE

How are we to responsively belong to tradition? This paper retrieves the concept of self-tradition (Sichüberlieferung) in Heidegger’s magnum opus Being and Time (1927). We will take as a guiding light Heidegger’s designation of a mode of his phenomenology as “phenomenology of the inapparent” expressed in the 1973 Zähringen Seminar. We will pay special heed to the function of the middle voice, neutrality of Da-sein, and tautology in the question of Being and history and bring to light the relation between authentic temporality and authentic historicity in a tautological turning of the selfsame. We will make a remark on the delay of Da-sein’s authentic historicity in the light of the “self-tradition” which marks Heidegger’s non-metaphysical response to the heritage of metaphysics of presence. In the wake of the phenomenology of the inapparent, we will turn to Derrida’s 2008 text The Animal that Therefore I Am to explore Derrida’s different approach to free the “I am” from that of Heidegger’s Dasein whose being is set in Jeweilig-Jemeinigkeit. We will show how Derrida’s invention of animot enables him and us to speak with the voices of our non-human animal others and enables us to free ourselves from the fixities of presence of the present in our thought, language, and sensitivity. In a relay of the two philosophers’ reading of us and their ways of self-overcoming of man as rational animal, we will learn to be in question and to learn to relate to one another without reducing one to the other and other to the one.